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SYNDROMIC SURVEILLANCE FOR BIOTERRORISM-RELATED INHALATION 
ANTHRAX IN AN EMERGENCY DEPARTMENT POPULATION 
 
Nicholas D. Soulakis, PhD 
University of Pittsburgh, 2012 
Objective: To utilize clinical data from emergency department admissions and published 
clinical case reports from the 2001 bioterrorism-related inhalation anthrax (IA) outbreak to 
develop a detection algorithm for syndromic surveillance. Methods: A comprehensive review of 
case reports and medical charts was undertaken to identify clinical characteristics of IA. Eleven 
historical cases were compared to 160 patients meeting a syndromic case definition based on 
acute respiratory failure and the presence of mediastinal widening or lymphadenopathy on a 
chest radiograph. Results: The majority of syndromic group patients admitted were due to motor 
vehicle accident (52%), followed by fall (10%), or other causes (4%). Positive culture for a gram 
positive rod was the most predictive feature for anthrax cases. Among signs and symptoms, 
myalgias, fatigue, sweats, nausea, headache, cough, confusion, fever, and chest pain were found 
to best discriminate between IA and syndromic patients. When radiological findings were 
examined, consolidation and pleural effusions were both significantly higher among IA patients.  
A four step algorithm was devised based on combinations of the most accurate clinical features 
and the availability of data during the course of typical patient care. The sensitivity (91%) and 
specificity (96%) of the algorithm were found to be high. Conclusions: Surveillance based on 
late stage findings of IA can be used by clinicians to identify high risk patients in the Emergency 
Department using a simple decision tree.  
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Implications for public health: Monitoring pre-diagnostic indicators of IA can provide 
enough credible evidence to initiate an epidemiological investigation leading to earlier outbreak 
detection and more effective public health response. 
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1.0  INTRODUCTION 
The mission of public health is to protect and promote the health of the community. In 
the United States, treatment and prevention of major chronic conditions such as cardiovascular 
disease commands the majority of resources. Further resources go to the tracking and 
investigation of infectious diseases, making the environment safe, combating obesity, and 
assuring the mental and social health of the community. In the wake of the terrorist attacks of 
September 11th 2001, Emergency Preparedness emerged to share the list of top priorities for 
public health. The chaos that ensued following the attacks, the loss of thousands of lives, and the 
disruption of services to the attack sites highlighted the need for well-coordinated and efficient 
services to deal with the unexpected. In 2013, the US Health and Human Services budget for 
Emergency Preparedness will be 4.5 billion dollars across all Departments. (1) 
Terrorists perpetrate acts of violence or intimidation to further their ideology or beliefs. 
The hallmark of terrorism is to use small, focused acts affecting a small area or region to sow 
fear in the greater population. Bioterrorism is terrorism employing biological agents. Only days 
after the World Trade Center towers fell, the deadliest act of domestic bioterrorism on American 
soil brought bioterrorism into focus for public health. Unknown persons mailed anthrax tainted 
letters to headquarters of media outlets and offices of the US Senate creating havoc at each stop 
along the way.  (2) 
Anthrax is a Category A agent on the CDC’s list of Critical Biological Agents because of 
its ease of dissemination, high mortality rate, potential major impact on public health, ability to 
incite panic and social disruption, and the requirement for additional major public health 
measures. (3) Other agents in Category A include smallpox, plague, botulism, tularemia and viral 
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hemorrhagic fevers. Category B agents, such as Q fever, brucellosis, and encephalitis, also have 
some potential for easy dissemination with resultant illness, but generally cause illness and 
death, with the exception of Brucella. Thus most Category B would be expected to have lower 
medical and public health impact than Category A.  Of the Category A agents, experts often cite 
anthrax as the most suitable for a large scale attack. Smallpox is deadly but obtaining the agent is 
difficult and even the smallest release have the potential to decimate an entire population because 
of its communicability.  Plague, botulism and tularemia can also decimate a population but the 
wide availability of effective treatment and prophylaxis limit their threat. Viral hemorrhagic 
fevers appear to pose a threat but no known development of weaponized agents exists. (4) 
Anthrax is known to exist in a bioweaponized state for the specific intent of military attack. Tests 
have been conducted by Iraq and the former Soviet Union. A recent analysis reports that there is 
clear evidence of or widespread assertions from nongovernmental sources alleging the existence 
of offensive biological weapons programs in at least 13 countries. (5) 
In 2001, intentional release of aerosolized anthrax powder through the US Postal Service 
led to 11 cases of inhalation anthrax; six of which were fatal. Stress and anxiety gripped 
Americans as it seemed anthrax tainted letters could appear at anytime, anyplace. Tens of 
thousands Americans completed full courses of prophylactic antibiotics. (7) In the wake of the 
anthrax letters, millions were spent to disinfect and decontaminate postal facilities as well as 
offices on Capitol Hill. Public health agencies monitored emergency departments around the 
clock to maintain vigilance that a case resembling anthrax may arise. Public health agencies also 
spent valuable resources sifting through hundreds of cases of febrile illness detected by their 
existing syndromic surveillance hoping to gain awareness of the earliest signs of a second, much 
larger, anthrax attack.  
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This study seeks to investigate the effectiveness of a syndromic surveillance approach for 
monitoring bioterrorism-related anthrax. The project will specifically 1) examine the value of 
using co-occurrence of acute respiratory failure and widened mediastinum for inhalation anthrax 
surveillance; 2) establish a baseline of this respiratory failure/widened mediastinum syndrome in 
an emergency department population; and 3) using a systematic analysis of the anthrax cases of 
2001, simulate what a bioterrorism related outbreak would look like. 
A major problem in the study of syndromic surveillance is that the focus on sensitive 
systems often leads to false alarms of positive events. As such, investigators developing systems 
for anthrax surveillance primarily monitor for large outbreaks resembling seasonal influenza. 
This study was designed to advance research in the field of syndromic surveillance for inhalation 
anthrax in an emergency department population by focusing on a different approach. The 
primary aim of this study is to examine how syndromic surveillance accuracy and timeliness may 
be improved by the use of fulminate phase indicators of anthrax. 
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2.0  PUBLIC HEALTH SIGNIFICANCE 
Anthrax is important as a disease of agriculture and industry as well as a biological 
weapon.  Intentional release of aerosolized anthrax spores resulted in twenty two cases of 
anthrax in 2001. The spores were enclosed in envelopes and then mailed to media companies and 
offices of the US Senate. This act of bioterrorism resulted in 11 cases of cutaneous anthrax and 
11 cases of inhalation anthrax with 6 of those cases resulting in death. (6) Although the total 
number of anthrax cases represents a tiny fraction of the US population, the implications for the 
nation were extensive, in part because the letters “leaked” in transit and infected (and killed) 
postal service employees and at least one seemingly random individual through their home mail. 
Investigation, prophylaxis, and cleanup cost millions of dollars. In addition, the event created a 
sense of terror for millions of American citizens. The public health significance of early warning 
systems for bioterrorist attacks is placed into context below as the magnitude of the public health 
response in 2001 is reviewed. 
2.1 PROPHYLAXIS 
Beyond those persons directly infected with anthrax, the incident had far greater reach. 
Preventive measures had to be taken for thousands of persons who were potentially exposed to 
anthrax. It is estimated that over 10,000 persons across the Eastern United States were offered 
>60 days of post-exposure antimicrobial prophylaxis. (7) Surveys were administered at 10- and 
30- day refill clinics. Some 6,178 persons completed surveys or interviews. Of the 5,343 persons 
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who reported taking at least one dose of antimicrobial prophylaxis, 57% (n=3,032) reported 
adverse events. Nausea or vomiting (27%), headaches (25%), and dizziness (22%) were 
commonly reported. 14% of the respondents graded their adverse event as “severe.”  The 
Anthrax Vaccine and Antibiotic Availability Program reported 12 serious adverse events (SAE). 
SAEs were defined as “any untoward medical occurrence that may have resulted in any of the 
following: death, life threatening event, inpatient hospitalization, persistent or significant 
disability or incapacity, and/or congenital anomaly or birth defect.” (8) Hypersensitivity 
pneumonitis following anthrax vaccination was documented in a 39-year old previously healthy 
man on active duty in the Marines. (9) 
In Washington, D.C. 2,000 workers were advised to complete 60 days of post exposure 
prophylaxis to prevent inhalation anthrax. (10) Later surveys of the group (N=251) would show 
98 (40%) reported full adherence, 45 (18%) discontinued prophylaxis and never restarted, and 
102 (42%) reduced the dosage, forgot a pill the previous day, or stopped their antimicrobial 
therapy and restarted at least once. Two of the most cited reasons for stopping or reducing their 
dosage were adverse effects – 73/102 (78%) -- or potential for long-term adverse effects – 
59/102 (63%). In Connecticut, over 95% of 1,122 postal workers at Connecticut distribution 
Center was given post-exposure prophylaxis. Investigators collected 485 nasal swabs but no 
anthrax was isolated. (11) 
In New York City, one hundred members of 5 disaster medical assistance teams and 
other health professionals were deployed within 18 hours of activation. Over a 68-hour period, 
7,076 patients were evaluated; representing all postal employees in the 6 major postal facilities in 
New York believed to be at risk for anthrax exposure. Of the total, 2,452 patients were seen 
during the first 24 hours, 3,875 during the second 24 hours, and the remaining 749 during the last 
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20 hours of operations. An average of 161 employees was screened per hour. The antibiotic most 
commonly dispensed was ciprofloxacin, followed by doxycycline and amoxicillin. (12)  
On October 12th, diagnosis of cutaneous anthrax was confirmed in a New York City 
media company staff member. Between Friday, October 12, and Tuesday, October 16, after 
approximately 42 hours of operation and an average of 55 staff persons per shift, 1,322 persons 
were briefed, completed epidemiologic and law enforcement interviews, underwent medical 
assessments, had nasal swabs taken to better define exposures, and were given a 14-day supply 
of antibiotics within the point of distribution (POD) space. (13) 
In addition to those with occupational exposures, the general public with perceived risk 
of anthrax exposure sought medical care. Surveys of emergency medicine physicians showed 
that patients self-identified as at-risk for inhalation anthrax were approaching doctors for 
antimicrobial prophylaxis during the 2001 attacks. (14,15) 
2.2 STRESS AND ANXIETY 
Terrorism directly impacts public health by giving rise to fear among citizens concerned 
with future attacks. Considerable distress and the onset of clinical disorders such as post 
traumatic stress disorder and depression followed the 2001 anthrax attack. Dougall et al. recently 
attempted to measure the extent to which a random sampling of people in Allegheny County 
were distressed or bothered by symptoms of intrusive thoughts, avoidance, and hyper arousal 
following media coverage of the anthrax attacks. Initial anthrax media exposure was shown to be 
related to distress. The amount of anthrax media coverage participants watched at the onset of 
the attacks predicted anthrax-related stress, intrusions, and avoidance symptoms. (16)   
 7 
It is clear that Americans were disturbed by the possibility of exposure to inhalation 
anthrax. In Idaho, the State Emergency Medical Services Communications Center (StateComm) 
received 73 routine hazardous materials calls and no biohazard calls from August 1st to October 
7th. From October 8th to December 31st, StateComm received 53 routine hazmat calls and 133 
biohazard calls; all biohazard calls were related to suspicious powders. Each call required the 
involvement of public health officials, law enforcement including FBI, and hazmat. All powder 
related incidents were treated as potential criminal acts, and all samples were maintained as 
evidence. In many cases, if the envelope or package had a return address, the sender was 
contacted immediately by authorities, probably to their great shock, to verify the contents did not 
contain biological contaminants. (17) 
Panic was felt at every level of public health. In the early days of the anthrax attacks, the 
CDC formed an agency wide Emergency Operations Center (EOC) to assist in coordinating the 
response to calls from the general public, clinicians, and public health departments. From 
October 8 to November 11, 2001, a total of 11,063 telephone calls were documented and 
responded to by EOC telephone bank staff. The most frequently mentioned topic was “questions 
about the availability of an anthrax vaccine” (2,438 [58.4%] of 4,178 calls), followed by “request 
for general bioterrorism information” (617 calls [14.8%]), “request for information about 
personal protective equipment” (501 calls [12.0%]), “general concerns about bioterrorism” (491 
calls [11.8%]), and “request for information about smallpox” (400 calls [9.6%]). (18) Call 
volume increased to a peak of 858 calls received on October 16, 2001, shortly after the public 
announcement that a letter containing anthrax had been opened in Senator Tom Daschle’s office. 
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2.3 ENVIRONMENTAL INVESTIGATIONS 
After the intentional anthrax release, public health agencies incurred a major cost due to 
investigating all potentially contaminated facilities as well as the subsequent cleanup of those 
facilities. On October 18th, 2001 a suspected case of cutaneous anthrax was confirmed in a 
postal worker from the Trenton Processing and Distribution Center where at least four suspect 
letters were postmarked. From October 18th – November 3rd 2001 a total of 57 facilities in New 
Jersey were environmentally sampled by a team consisting of the New Jersey Department of 
Health and Senior Services, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the CDC National Institute 
for Occupational Safety. (19) A total of 1369 samples were collected with positive sample results 
found in two mail processing and distribution centers, six municipal post offices, and one private 
company. In order to enter a contaminated facility, investigators were required to wear Saranex 
full-body protective suits with hoods, disposable rubber boots, two pairs of nitrile gloves, and 
full-face powered air-purifying respirators with high-efficiency filters. When investigators exited 
a contaminated building they passed through a decontamination procedure, which included being 
sprayed twice from head to foot with 10% solution of sodium hypochlorite followed by a water 
rinse before removing their suits, boots, gloves, and respirator. (20) The cost of remediation of 
Bacillus anthracis contamination in the U.S. Department of Justice mail facility, one of nine 
facilities with a positive result in the New Jersey area, was reported to be $463,916. (21)   
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3.0  EPIDEMIOLOGY OF ANTHRAX 
This review will provide an analysis of statistics, trends, and outbreak reports from the 
literature which illustrate the common sources and exposures of anthrax over the last 120 years. 
An analysis of the literature will provide evidence of how the epidemiology of anthrax has 
shifted based on what was common epidemiological phenomenon in the United States to what is 
a current public health threat today.  
3.1 NATURAL HISTORY OF BACILLUS ANTHRACIS 
B. anthracis is the etiologic agent of anthrax. It is a gram-positive, nonmotile, aerobic, 
spore forming, rod shaped bacterium with a centrally located spore. The spore is approximately 
one micrometer (1µm). (22) Anthrax spores in their dormant state are highly resistant to adverse 
environmental conditions including heat, ultraviolet and ionizing radiation, pressure, and 
chemical agents. Spores can survive for years in contaminated soil. Anthrax spores can enter the 
body through the mouth, respiratory tract, or through breaks in the skin causing gastrointestinal, 
inhalational, or cutaneous anthrax respectively. Once a spore encounters a suitable environment 
such as the circulatory system of a living host, it will return to vegetative growth. Experimental 
evidence indicates that vegetative cells of B. anthracis have specific nutrient and physiologic 
requirements and survive poorly outside the host. The entire life cycle of B. anthracis appears to 
occur within the host. (22)  
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In nature, anthrax is a disease of grazing animals. Herbivores consume spores through 
grazing, wallowing, or other close contact with soil. The spores germinate to produce the 
vegetative forms which multiply and express their virulence factors. The effect is typically lethal. 
The bacilli are shed by the dying or dead animal through the loss of blood. (25) Bacilli shed by 
the dying animal will sporulate on contact with air. (23) The presence of specific nutrients in the 
soil such as calcium helps to maintain the viability of the spores in the environment for longer 
periods of time. (24)  
Dissemination of anthrax spores can occur in many ways. When a host dies, the carcass 
can be opened by scavengers, introducing vegetative cells to the environment where nutrients are 
limited and sporulation can occur. Carnivores are less susceptible to the disease and can ingest 
the spores without developing the disease. They can act as carriers by dispersing ingested spores 
over large areas but vegetative cells do not survive passage through the scavenger’s stomach. 
Avian scavengers, like vultures, can spread spores even further. Dragon et al have found that 
viscera attached to fur, wind and water, or feces all work to distribute spores into the 
environment. (25) However, even light scavenging is enough to release concentrations of B 
anthracis vegetative cells from the body to microenvironments conducive to the formation of 
spores, resulting in significant contamination of the immediate environment. (25) Cycles of rain 
and drought concentrate spores in low areas where calcium rich sediments are deposited creating 
‘storage areas’ where favorable environments exist for long periods of time. (26)  
Epizootics occur when animals ingest anthrax spores through grazing in contaminated 
fields. Environmental factors, such as droughts, may require animals to graze more closely to the 
ground, ingesting more of the contaminated soil especially in storage areas. Breeding behavior 
may also lead to infection. Dragon found that rutting aggression of male bison, bulls, such as 
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increased stamping and wallowing may greatly increase their chance of exposure to anthrax 
spores. In storage areas, this behavior can create large dust clouds of aerosolized spores. The 
spores enter the bulls’ respiratory tract through normal breathing or snorting, a common rutting 
behavior.  This behavior may also explain the high fatality of anthrax infected bulls versus 
female bison which do not have the tendency to inhale as many spores Anthrax is more lethal 
when inhaled than when ingested by herbivores. Cutaneous anthrax is infrequent among 
herbivores. 
3.2 INCIDENCE OF REPORTED ANTHRAX CASES IN HUMAN POPULATIONS 
Fortunately, anthrax occurs less frequently in human populations, than in animal 
populations.  In addition, our knowledge of anthrax, its transmission, and its risk factors have led 
to a significant decline in the incidence of anthrax outbreaks in the United States over the past 
200 years.  To illustrate, at the beginning of the 20th century, anthrax claimed the lives of many 
Americans.  From 1865 to 1906, 128 deaths from anthrax were recorded on death certificates for 
the state of Massachusetts. (27)  
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Table 1. Incidence of Reported Cases in 1919 in US Cities with Population > 100,000 
City State Population (k) Cases Deaths Cases/100k Deaths/100k 
New York NY 5,580 14 9 0.3 0.2 
Philadelphia PA 1,810 10 4 0.6 0.2 
Boston MA 740 4 0 0.5  
Camden, NJ NJ 120 3 1 2.5 0.8 
Wilmington DE 110 3 0 2.7  
San 
Francisco 
CA 500 3 0 0.6  
Denver CO 250 2 1 0.8 0.4 
Atlanta GA 200 2 0 1.0  
Hartford CT 140 1 1 0.7 0.7 
Portland, 
OR 
OR 256 1 1 0.4 0.4 
Reading PA 100 1 0 1.0  
Worcester MA 180 1 0 0.6  
Baltimore MD 720 1 0 0.1  
Detroit MI 970 0 1  0.1 
Milwaukee WI 450 0 1  0.2 
Chicago IL 270 0 1  0.4 
Des Moines IA 120 0 1  0.8 
 
The first public health systems for surveillance of anthrax began when Public Health 
Reports started publishing a regular report on anthrax in 1912. (28) Although Congress enacted a 
law in 1902 directing the Surgeon General to provide forms to all state health officers for the 
collection and compilation of data and for the publication of the reports at a national level, it was 
not until 1912 that timely reports were mandated by telegraph for five diseases and the monthly 
reporting, by letter, of ten additional diseases. Anthrax was included in the monthly reporting 
group. Incidence of occupational disease in large American cities in 1919 is shown in Table 1 
with a case fatality rate (CFR) of 46%. (29) The table highlights that anthrax was not an 
uncommon health issue, and a highly fatal one, at the turn of the century. 
 
 13 
 
Figure 1. Incidence of Reported Cases of Anthrax, United States 1920-1968 
 
From 1919-1925, 33 states reported 632 cases of anthrax with 177 deaths (28% CFR). 
The peak year for the interval was 1920 with 115 cases and 43 deaths (37% CFR). The three 
states with the highest incidence of reported cases during the interval were all located in the 
Northeast United States, states with high industrial exposure in mills and tanneries: PA; 104 
cases/15 deaths, NY; 67 cases/29 deaths, and MA; 62 cases/7 deaths. Other states with a high 
incidence of reported cases were CO (55 cases), OH (13 deaths), IL (15 deaths), and LA (12 
deaths). (30) States with the highest single year incidence of reported cases during this period 
included: 1919 MA (22 cases), 1920 NY (24 cases), 1924 TX (32 cases), 1919 NY (11 deaths), 
1920 New Jersey (7 deaths). (30) 
The US Public Health Service received an average of 60 anthrax reports a year from 1920 
to 1968. In Figure 1, the annual incidence of reported cases as noted by Cowan, Glassman, and 
McNabb is plotted over time with the five year moving average plotted in blue. (32,33,34) The 
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peak annual incidence was 197 cases in 1924. Twenty seven deaths from anthrax were reported 
in 1924. (31) The most common form of anthrax affecting individuals in this time period was 
cutaneous anthrax, with less than 17 cases of inhalation anthrax reported in the literature for the 
time period. Gastrointestinal anthrax has only been occasionally referenced in the US literature 
in the last century, but no case reports have been published. (32,33,34).  
Incident reports of human cases of anthrax frequently have originated from agricultural 
settings. From 1945-1951, Steele reported 372 anthrax cases in the United States, 29 due to 
agricultural exposure: 21 farmers and 8 veterinarians. (35) From 1957-2001, Bales reported 
seven CDC investigations of anthrax outbreaks in agricultural settings in the United States. (36) 
Anthrax in agricultural settings in the US occurs most frequently in ND, SD, MT, MN, and TX 
where it is enzootic.  
Industries such as leather goods manufacturing and textiles also had a high reported 
incidence of anthrax in the early 20th century.  Experts also regard the reporting of industrial 
anthrax cases as being more complete than in agricultural settings due to federal reporting 
regulations for workplace safety as well as the monitoring of claims for worker's compensation 
by the State Departments of Labor. (37) Industry-related anthrax in the early 20th century was 
largely centered on the Northeastern states of US:  NY, PA, MA, NJ, and NH.  These states are 
often referred to in the literature as ‘tannery’ states, given the high number of industrial cases in 
this region. (29)  Many tannery states, e.g. MA, NJ, NY, PA, reported anthrax cases to federal 
authorities every year until 1963. (38) 
In the early 20th century, reported anthrax cases were fairly frequent.  From 1919-1924, 
439 occupational cases of anthrax with 107 deaths were reported.  The maximum number of 
these cases were from Pennsylvania (n=102) and the maximum number of deaths were noted in 
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NY (n=22). As time progressed, the frequency of reported anthrax declined. (39) From 1927-
1929, the US recorded 162 cases, 30 deaths in 48 states and the District of Columbia. The 
highest cases/fatalities for the reporting period were MA 20/1, NY 37/6, and PA 29/8. (38,35)  
 
Table 2. Incidence of Reported Anthrax Cases by Material and Industry 1899-1943 
  Leather  Wool  Agriculture  Hair  Total 
Period Cases Deaths   Cases Deaths   Cases Deaths   Cases Deaths   Cases Deaths 
1899 1904 86 21  88 23     70 17  261 67 
1907 1919 111   7   1   5   126  
1919 1925 147   17   68   40   632  
1927 1929 48 5  43 4  21 7  10 3  113  
1934 1938 97 7  51 3  94 19     357 52 
1939 1943 79 9   237 8   65 10         408 33 
 
The incidence of reported anthrax cases by industry from annual reports on industrial 
anthrax of the Industrial Hygiene Section of the American Public health Association is given in 
Table 2. (30,37,38) Blank cells represent gaps in reporting for which data was not available. 
These reports were primarily due to the work of H.F. Smyth, a professor of industrial hygiene at 
the University of Pennsylvania School of Hygiene and chair of the committee. Smyth would 
tirelessly survey state and local health departments, hospitals, physicians, employers, and 
occasionally patients. Across all industries, reported anthrax cases are concentrated, as discussed 
above, in the leather, wool/tannery, and agricultural industries.  Anthrax due to exposure to 
animal hair had the highest case fatality rate from 1899-1943 with 20/55 cases being fatal. Death 
reports were not available for all years. The primary reason for a high level of anthrax cases in 
the leather and wool industries is the potential for anthrax spores to be carried into the facilities 
through the hides and hair of the animal products being processed there.  Osborn conducted an 
exhaustive investigation of the origin of all infected materials resulting in anthrax in MA over 
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the three year period (1916-1919); one of the highest incident periods in US history. The results 
are summarized in Table 3. (27) Most of the hides and hair bearing anthrax spores were not from 
US-based animals, but rather hides and hair from animals from other foreign countries. 
 
Table 3. Incidence of Anthrax Cases by Source and Infected Product in MA from 1916-19  
Country Hides Hair/wool 
China 71  
Argentina 17 6 
India 16  
United States 5 2 
Brazil 3  
Venezuela 1  
Russia 0 7 
Mexico 0 1 
 
Over time, public health interventions have been successful in reducing the frequency of 
contact with anthrax in human populations.  Vaccines and federal regulations have been 
developed and implemented to stem the number of industrial anthrax cases.  Today, the 
frequency of anthrax in humans in the United States is sporadic, as illustrated in Figure 2. 
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Figure 2. Incidence of Reported Cases of Human Anthrax, United States 1967-2007 
 
There were no reported deaths attributed to anthrax from 1979-2000. (40,41) From 2000-
2007, only 5 naturally occurring cases of anthrax were reported in the United States. (33)  The 
few cases which occur are largely farm and agriculture related cases, or involve rare and exotic 
exposures. (30,38,37)  Thus, the burden of naturally occurring forms of anthrax in humans has 
become a small health concern in the United States. Although anthrax incidence has dramatically 
declined in the US, the human anthrax remains an international problem.   
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Table 4. International Incidence (in Thousands) of Reported Anthrax Cases from 1924- 1953 
 1929 1932 1935 1938 1941 1944 1947 1950 1953 
Bulgaria   1    1.5   
Iran     2.3  1.5   
Italy 2 1.6 1.2 1.1   1.7 1.2 1.1 
Portugal        2.2 1.3 
Turkey       1.4 1.4 1.5 
USSR 15 4.5 2.5       
Yugoslavia        1.1 1.1 
Romania   1.2 2.2 1     
Spain        1.6 1 
 
Glassman presents epidemiological data extracted from the statistics by the Health 
Organization of the League of Nations for the years 1924-1938 and by the World Health 
Organization for the years 1939-1953 (34) (Table 4).  Hugh-Jones also describes the global 
anthrax problem today. As of 1996, several countries still report regular human anthrax cases: 
China - 898 cases, Tajikistan - 105, Azerbaijan - 76 cases, Kazakhstan - 70 cases, Kyrgyzstan - 
54 cases, and Spain - 50 cases. Hyper-endemic anthrax also still exists in many countries around 
the world including India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Peru, Argentina, Ecuador, 
Mexico, and Panama. (42) Existing levels of anthrax in international settings are lower than 
existed early in the century.  This observed reduction in anthrax cases is largely attributed to 
enhanced surveillance and livestock vaccination programs. 
While reductions in anthrax frequency internationally are apparent, anthrax may exist as 
a larger problem than is evident through current reporting systems. Although many physicians 
are trained to identify and treat anthrax, reporting procedures may not be enforced especially in 
rural regions of lower income areas.  
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3.3 RURAL AND AGRICULTURAL EXPOSURES TO ANTHRAX 
Agricultural sources of anthrax exposure, through close contact with sick animals, 
account for a high proportion of the total human anthrax cases for most of the world. The rarest 
transmission is to a human from a live animal. A more common source of exposure is for 
farmers, who, unaware of their risk, handle animals which have died suddenly from anthrax. 
Grazing and feed practices are the primarily issues involved in outbreaks of anthrax in livestock.  
Farmers may graze cattle, pigs, horses, goats, or sheep in contaminated fields. Farmers may also 
unknowingly use contaminated bone meal feed. (32) Sick animals are then slaughtered, skinned, 
and/or butchered by agricultural workers.  Abrasions, open wounds, or other breaks in the skin of 
farm workers can lead to cutaneous anthrax. Occasionally, veterinarians may contract anthrax 
from handling an animal for a post mortem inspection. Unsuspecting butchers may also be asked 
to process meat of an animal which died suddenly. Inhalation anthrax in humans has been rarely 
reported in agricultural settings except for circumstances where dust generated by contaminated 
bone meal fertilizers has been used.   
Although it does not occur with great frequency in the US, human anthrax infection in 
agricultural and rural settings does occur regularly in many countries. For instance, Ozkurt 
reported that 503 cases of human anthrax occurred in rural Eastern Turkey from 1992-2004; 
averaging 38.6 per year with a maximum of 50 cases. 99% of all cases were cutaneous anthrax, 
with some rare gastrointestinal cases. Only 2 cases died. 100% of patients had a history of 
exposure to anthrax-infected animals. (43) 
Peck reports that from 1992-2002, 87 cases consistent with cutaneous anthrax were 
reported at Albert Schweitzer Hospital in Haiti with seven deaths; 58 (66%) of the individuals 
affected were less than sixteen years of age. (44). Children in Haiti play an important role in 
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butchering animals. Elsewhere child anthrax is infrequent to rare. Peck describes rural anthrax 
exposure among children: “Butchering of animals in Haitian society is often performed with the 
assistance of children and involves close contact between the face of the butcher and the hide of 
the animal”. In a common butchering practice, the butcher blows into a small incision made into 
the hide of the cow to aid in the removal of the hide. Practices such as these may partly explain 
the high incidence of cutaneous anthrax in children and location of many of these lesions on the 
face.”  
Irmak reports that 39 patient admissions due to anthrax occurred at University Medical 
Center in Turkey from 1996-2002. 17 patients resided in the city; 22 in rural surroundings. 100% 
of the patients had a history of handling livestock or slaughtering or processing, skinning or 
cutting meat from an allegedly sick animal. 100% of the cases were cutaneous anthrax. (45) 
From 1967-2002, 71 cases were admitted to National Hospital of Peru with a diagnosis of 
anthrax; 100% of the cases were cutaneous anthrax. (46) Cases were distributed according to the 
following exposures: 28/71 agricultural; 17/71 cattle raising; 10/71 meat handling. Of these 
66/71 patients reported their source of exposure; 34 patients came into contact with animal 
during slaughter; 26 had direct contact with meat only.  Cases of human anthrax were associated 
with the following animals: beef cattle 56/71, goats 10/71, and swine 5/71. The Peruvian General 
Office of Epidemiology reported a decrease from an average of 300-350 cases per year in 1980s 
to 50 per year in 2000’s.   
In rural settings, food preparation practices can sometimes lead to human anthrax. In 
Lebanon, rural livestock is often not vaccinated contributing to occasional epizootics. It is 
customary to slaughter sick animals. From 1960-1974, hundreds of cases of human 
gastrointestinal anthrax cases occurred in Bekaa Valley in Lebanon; where the consumption of 
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raw or poorly cooked meat is customary. (47) One outbreak involved a family which consumed a 
goat that was slaughtered because it was dying. Meat was consumed raw by friends and family. 
The farmer’s wife died and her sister developed cutaneous anthrax on her lip.   
A near-outbreak in the US was reported in the MMWR in 2000. (48) In August, the 
Minnesota Department of Health was notified of a positive isolate for B. anthracis from a 
specimen taken from one of five cattle which suddenly died. A farmer reportedly killed, gutted, 
and skinned, one of those five cattle that were “unable to rise”. The local veterinarian had 
mistakenly approved the animal for slaughter, and 6 family members ate the meat over 20 days. 
Although two family members experienced gastrointestinal illness, no one developed anthrax.  
3.4 INDUSTRIAL EXPOSURES TO ANTHRAX 
Industrial anthrax comprises the highest historical proportion of the disease in humans in 
the United States. While most cases of agriculturally related anthrax are due to local exposure to 
anthrax, most cases of industrial anthrax are due to the importation and processing of 
contaminated materials from regions of the world with high rates of anthrax.  Spores can be 
found on dried or pickled cow hides, goat skins, horse hair or wool. (27) Often inspection 
standards are low in developing countries. The result is that factories processing large amounts 
of imported hides, hair, wool and other materials receive substandard materials.  
Industrial settings provide an environment with repeated exposure to highly contaminated 
materials. For half of the 20th century, inadequate methods of decontamination, lack of safety 
equipment, and poorly ventilated facilities contributed to a high number of anthrax cases among 
workers. The demographic profile of industrial workers was reflected in the incident anthrax 
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cases– male, working age.  Most cases were cutaneous, rarely inhalational. For example, Osborn 
reported 113 of 126 cases due to industrial setting in Massachusetts. All cases were cutaneous. 
(27) In 1951 the National Office of Vital Statistics Public Health Service reported a total of 60 
cases; 45 in the Northeastern US probably related to industry. (35) Secular trends also contribute 
to the incidence of anthrax. Wars (WWI, WWII) and the Great Depression lead to importation of 
low quality goods. (30)  
Handling hides offers an opportunity for infection if the worker has an abrasion, scratch, 
or cut. Unbroken skin is adequate protection from anthrax. (27) From 1914, war time, the 
number of imported hides from Asian countries (China, India, and Pakistan) and South America 
(Argentina, Brazil, and Venezuela) increased. As the quality of hides decreased, anthrax 
incidence increased. (27) From 1921-1922, depression increased importation of inadequately 
disinfected hides. (30) There were many contributing factors leading to anthrax in the leather 
industry. Disinfection was inadequate, injured hides, and created expense to the mill to locally 
disinfect. Consular certificates assuring area ‘anthrax free’ could be obtained illegally. (27) It 
was hard to sample bundles of materials at the port of entry. Most large shipments of hides were 
likely to have some anthrax. However, it was difficult to show the total amount per bundle. 
Industrial shipping seasons affect the shipping and storage of hides and other materials which 
can increase spore contamination. (27)  
From 1916-1919, MA reported 17 cases of anthrax in freight handlers: Teamsters, 
longshoremen, and hideweighers (3,10,4). They would come into contact with infected hides 
when unloading hides from ships or shifting them about the docks. Although it is possible wool 
or hair could infect the freight handlers, in every case in MA, it was hides. The international 
freight industry also is at risk for developing anthrax. Cole published his findings from a 1949 
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study of hide porters in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. (49) Dar es Salaam is the main channel of 
export for TZ and East Africa. In 1949, 28 cases admitted to ID section of DES Hospital; in 1950 
over 27 cases by July. 
The wool industry has garnered the most attention due to the increased risk of fatal 
inhalation anthrax. Greenfield (1880), Legge (1905) and Eurich (1913) all provide summaries of 
inhalation anthrax in the wool industry in England. (50,51,52,53,54,55,56) Very high mortality 
led England to pass disinfection regulations. US public health officials noted that since England 
opened disinfection stations, the US began to receive more inferior wool because of the 
disinfection charge and lack of a European market for inferior materials. (57) A contemporary 
survey is provided by LaForce in 1978. The US wool industry developed later than its UK 
counterpart. It was not until the second decade of the 20th century that reports of industrial 
anthrax in the wool industry were published in the US. Osborn reported from 1916-1919, 3 of 
126 cases in MA were inhalation anthrax. (27) Smyth and Cheney later reported that in NY, 23 
of 37 cases related to wool handling. (38) 
Secular trends can infect the incidence of anthrax. Smyth reported that for Philadelphia, 
after the start of WWII, anthrax incidence tripled. Analysis of anthrax in Philadelphia by source 
of infection showed only one case increase. However, goat hair fell from 28 (1929-1938) to 12 
(1939-1942) masking the increase of 15 to 29 cases among cases related to wool. (57)  
From 1935-1955, 117 cases of anthrax occurred (116 cutaneous) in Chester, PA. The 
great majority (104 of 116) were related to a local mill that uses goat hair for making liners of 
men’s coats. Definite trauma to the skin was present in many cases; usually a minor scratch. 
Gold found the US provided “totally inadequate federal regulations.”  Studies of the mill in 1955 
showed anthrax spores from air samples, dust collected from machinery, walls, floors, clothing. 
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The highest yearly incidence occurred in 1940 and 1941, respectively. (12,15) Incidence was 
highest during WWII when the regulations at the port of exit were relaxed. The source of 
infection was typically linked to Asia (China, Pakistan, India) or Morocco. (58) 
Two major outbreaks have been reported in the United States wool industry.  In 1917, Dr. 
Walter H. Brown reported 25 cases of human anthrax to the Connecticut State Department of 
Health in four months, constituting ‘the largest single outbreak of the disease ever recorded in 
Massachusetts history.’ (59) Three cases were fatal, twenty-two recovered. Through 
epidemiological investigation, it was shown that hides were imported from regions of China 
where anthrax was endemic. Brown demonstrated that the hides were shipped to the involved 
tanneries, handled by the workers who came down with anthrax, and that no other tanneries 
reported anthrax cases during the outbreak period. 
Brachman presented the 1957 NH outbreak as the most deadly inhalation anthrax 
outbreak of the 20th century. Five inhalation and four cutaneous cases occurred. (60) The 
Brachman study provided many interesting insights. He highlighted the importance of the 
industrial process of handling wool in increasing the risk to workers of exposure to infected 
materials.  The process involves: Step 1. Picking room where wool is scoured and blended. Step 
2. Carding room where wool is combed. Step 3. Spinning. Step 4. Weaving Step 5. Finishing. 
Picking was found to be the dirtiest job but not the dustiest. Also, that particular factory was well 
ventilated in the Picking room. Carding and combing were the dustiest areas with no windows. 
Brachman found four of the five inhalation anthrax cases occurred with those workers in the 
carding and combing department. Brachman eventually attributed the outbreak to the dustiness in 
the card and combing room.  
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Outbreaks of anthrax in human populations also have been noted to involve modes of 
transmission other than agricultural or industrial involvement.  Bales details 5 CDC 
investigations of anthrax outbreaks due to these “Other” exposures. (36)  For example, shaving 
brushes were known to be an early non industrial cause of anthrax.  (61,62) In 1918, cases of 
anthrax occurred among troops in various US military training camps. Fourteen of nineteen cases 
were proven to have originated from infected shaving brushes in general issue toiletry kits. In 
each case, a new brush was used just before a malignant pustule appeared and that virulent 
anthrax was found on the brush. Similar brushes obtained from involved wholesalers were shown 
to be contaminated with anthrax. Brushes with mixed horse hair from China and Siberia were 
implicated. Laboratories, gelatin factories, bone meal, plumbing supplies such as goat hair 
insulation have all been implicated in the most recent cases of anthrax. Craftsmen have also been 
infected given their use of raw materials, circumventing of US importation regulations, and lack 
of vaccination.  In 1974, Haitian crafts were implicated in a FL case investigation. (36) In 1976, 
thread from Pakistan lead to infection. (152) In 2006 two unrelated cases of inhalation anthrax 
occurred in makers of drums in New York City and rural Scotland involving West African goat 
hides (63,64) 
A recent anthrax case in Pennsylvania serves as a good case study for contemporary 
occupational inhalation anthrax. Table 5 provides a timeline for the case with references. Vado 
Diomande, a member of an African dance troupe, collapsed after performance at local college. 
Diomande presented to a local hospital and reported a two to three day history of dry cough, 
shortness of breath, profuse diaphoresis, and general malaise. (65,66) Anthrax was added to the 
patient’s differential diagnosis once his exposure to raw African goat hides became known. 
(67,68,69) After three days of clinical evaluation and examination of blood culture results, the 
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CDC was notified and a specimen was transferred to the Laboratory Response Network 
laboratories. (69,70,71) In the meantime, FBI, police, CDC investigators, and local law 
enforcement and first responders amassed at the patients home and work areas around the New 
York City metropolitan area. (72,73,74) It was established through environmental investigation 
of the patients workshop in Brooklyn, NY that the exposure was occupational and not due to 
bioterrorism. (75,76) 
The social consequences of this anthrax case were tremendous.  Major media coverage 
began immediately after the diagnosis of inhalation anthrax was confirmed. The first hours of 
media reporting brought anxiety among those in the PA and NY region, concerned over the 
possible threat of terrorism. Public health messaging stressed the occupational exposure and 
stressed no known link to terrorism was evident. Seven contacts of the patient were put on 
prophylaxis. National and regional media outlets provided around the clock coverage for about 7 
days. Vado Diomande, the anthrax patient, became a local celebrity around New York City as his 
resilience and good nature during the difficult hospitalization were broadcast. (77,78)  
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Table 5. Timeline for Inhalation Anthrax Case. New York, NY. 2006 
12/21/2005 - Brooklyn resident bought raw cow and goat hides in Africa over Christmas 
holiday for drum making. (65, 66) 
02/12/2006 - Man worked on last of the hides. Soaking, stretching, drying hides and then 
scraping. The hair was removed mechanically using a razor in a small, poorly ventilated 
workspace. 
02/15/2006 - Man cleans up workshop in Brooklyn warehouse. 
02/16/2006 - Man collapses after performance at local college. Presents to hospital and reports 
two to three day history of dry cough, shortness of breath, profuse diaphoresis, and general 
malaise. The patient appeared ill and exhibited mild respiratory distress. Posterior-anterior and 
lateral chest radiographs revealed cardiomegaly, a left upper-lobe opacity, and a small lower-
lobe opacity. Bilateral infiltrates and pleural effusions were noted. Blood cultures were 
performed. 
02/17/2006 - Patient transferred to tertiary care center due to worsening respiratory distress. 
All four blood culture bottles grew gram positive rods. Inhalation anthrax was believed to be a 
significant possibility at the time of transfer on the basis of finding of gram positive rods in the 
initial blood cultures. Chest CT revealed a large amount of mediastinal fluid accumulation 
extending from the great vessels to the heart. Mediastinal lymphadenopathy was not present. 
02/20/2006 - Test began to indicate the possible presence of anthrax. 
02/21/2006 - 1. CDC notified after isolate initially evaluated at hospital. 2. LRN and PCR 
positive from blood culture isolate positive for Bacillus anthracis. 3. PA DOH tests positive 
for Bacillus anthracis. 4. PA DOH public health investigation began after laboratory tests 
detected anthrax bacteria. NYCDOHMH notified of case of inhalation anthrax in a resident of 
Manhattan drum maker. 5. CDC arranges transport of isolate to Atlanta for further testing.  
02/22/2006 - 1. First media reports of case. CNN, CDC, NYCDOH, PADOH all issue press 
releases. Tom Skinner, spokesman for the CDC and Dr. Lisa Rotz, medical epidemiologist 
hold press conference and conference call. 2. Gamma phage lysis positive for Bacillus 
anthracis. 3. PA DOH reports no reason to believe the case is linked to an intentional release. 
CDC and FBI assisting on investigation. 4. CNN reports positive test for anthrax, links case to 
African drums. 5. CDC dispatches Environmental and Epi-investigation team to New York 
City to assist with environmental investigation. Hypothesis is that animal hides were carrying 
spores and preparation for drum making aerosolized them. (67,68,69,70,71) 
02/22/2006, 15:58 - CDC reports blood culture isolate positive for Bacillus anthracis. 
02/22/2006, 17:00 - Man’s apartment was sealed by response team including federal agents, 
police officers, fire fighters, and other city workers. Some investigators carried radiation 
detectors and others wore protective suits to test for evidence of anthrax production. (72,73) 
02/24/2006, 16:08 - Laboratory testing identified Bacillus anthracis. Seven persons on post 
exposure prophylaxis. (74,75,76,77,78) 
 
 
Overall, the frequency of anthrax infection in human populations has declined to isolated 
and sporadic agricultural cases, imported materials, and labs. Several public health measures 
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greatly affected the incidence of anthrax in the last 50 years. In 1951, Wright successfully 
demonstrated the safety and effectiveness of a human anthrax vaccine by injecting 600 personnel 
at Fort Dietrich, Maryland. (79) In 1962, Brachman conducted a field study of the vaccine on 
leather workers at a Philadelphia tannery, a susceptible industrial population known to be 
chronically exposed to anthrax. The vaccine was shown to have 92.5% effectiveness with only 
2.8% of workers developing local edema. (80) A 2003 review by Grabenstein summarizes recent 
progress in the field of anthrax vaccines. (79) 
Today, Anthrax Vaccine Adsorbed (AVA) is the only licensed human anthrax vaccine in 
the United States. Routine vaccination with AVA is indicated for workers involved in the 
production of large quantities or concentrations of B. anthracis cultures and in personnel whose 
activities have a high potential for aerosol production. Laboratory workers using standard 
Biosafety Level 2 practices in the routine processing of clinical samples are not at increased risk 
for exposure to B. anthracis spores and should not receive the vaccine. Postexposure prophylaxis 
against B. anthracis with ciproflaxin is recommended following an aerosol exposure to B. 
anthracis spores. (81) 
Federal regulations have also had a profound effect on materials imported into the US. 
The Code of Federal Regulations clearly outlines safety and sanitation measures directly related 
to materials key in the textile industry in “Title 9: Animals and Animal Products. Sanitary 
Control of Animal Byproducts (except casings), and Hay and Straw, Offered for Entry into the 
United States”. (82) Materials covered by the regulations include bone meal, hides, skins, wool, 
hair, bristles, glue stock, bones, horns, animal manure, hay, straw. 
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3.5 ANTHRAX AS BIOLOGICAL WEAPON 
In the past 50 years, public health concern of anthrax exposures has shifted from “other” 
exposures to the deliberate use of anthrax as a biological agent. In 1979, Soviet health officials 
from the Russian city of Sverdlovsk reported a very large outbreak of anthrax with an 
implausible explanation of tainted beef. Most likely, the Soviets were attempting to conceal a 
violation of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention which strictly forbade the 
manufacture or development of weaponized anthrax as of 1972. (83)  The reporting of the NY 
Times repeatedly cast a shadow of doubt on the plausibility of over a thousand Soviet citizens 
dying from ‘tainted beef.’ As Soviet officials changed their story, US public health officials put 
forward the possibility of a release of weaponized anthrax spores.  (84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 
91,92) Editors of scientific journals discussed the possibility. (93)  
Later, CDC investigators, led by Matthew Meselson were given access to Sverdlovsk for 
an epidemiologic investigation. Epidemiologic results supported an inhalation anthrax outbreak 
over the reported gastrointestinal outbreak. (94) Knowledge of the agent, exposure, route of 
infection of anthrax guided the investigators through an epidemiologic investigation. This was 
later published as a work of non-fiction. (95) Molecular epidemiologic studies later confirmed 
the strains of anthrax use by the Soviets for the biological weapons. (96) 
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Table 6. Anthrax as a Biological Threat 
1972 - The U.S. and more than 100 nations sign the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, the world's first treaty banning an entire class of 
weapons. The treaty bars possession of deadly biological agents except for defensive research including anthrax. (83) 
1979 - A rare outbreak of anthrax disease in the city of Sverdlovsk killed nearly 70 people. The Soviet government publicly blamed contaminated 
meat, but U.S. intelligence sources suspected the outbreak was linked to secret weapons work at a nearby army lab. (83,84,85,86,87,88,89,90,91) 
1991 - After years of warfare with the U.S., Iraq possessed weaponized anthrax, botulinum toxin, and aflatoxin and had several other lethal agents in 
development. Inspectors from the U.N. Special Commission (UNSCOM) spent more than two years pursuing evidence of the program. The 
UNSCOM team found that Iraq's stockpile included Scud missiles loaded to deliver pathogens. From 1991-2002, U.S. Intelligence reports assert Iraq 
has maintained an active, covert Biological weapons program capability to convert quickly legitimate vaccine and biopesticide plants to biological 
warfare production. (97) 
1991 - “Saddam Hussein regarded BW as an integral element of his arsenal of WMD weapons, and would have used it if the need arose.” (97) 
1992 - U.S. team of epidemiologists led by Matthew Meselson visit Sverdlovsk, Russia. The team's investigation found evidence in the lungs of 
victims that many died from inhalation anthrax, likely caused by the accidental release of aerosolized anthrax spores from a military base. (94) 
1995 - The religious sect Aum Shinrikyo released sarin gas in a Tokyo subway, killing 12 commuters and injuring thousands. The cult also had 
enlisted Ph.D. scientists to launch biological attacks including anthrax. Between 1993 and 1995, Aum Shinrikyo tried as many as 10 times to spray 
botulinum toxin and  Sterne vaccine spores in downtown Tokyo. (100) 
1998 - Nevada state police arrest Larry Wayne Harris and William Job Leavitt with eight flight bags of ‘military grade anthrax’ in the trunk of their 
Mercedes-Benz. Larry Wayne Harris and William Leavitt ‘conspire to possess’ weapons grade anthrax spores. (102) 
1998 - FBI reports escalating terrorist threats of biological weapons. Rising from 37 in '96, 74 in '97, to 181 in '98. FBI reports “Threatened release of 
biological agents, such as anthrax or Bubonic plague, has become the most prevalent component of this disturbing trend.” (103) 
2001 - In response to WTC Attacks on 9/11, CDC dispatched 45 EIS officers for drop in surveillance looking for “specified clinical syndromes to 
identify unusual disease manifestations or clusters”. (104) 
2001 - 11 cases of inhalation anthrax and 11 cases of cutaneous anthrax. Increased awareness of the potential for a large-scale attack. 
2002 - ‘Anthrax hoaxes’ continue to disrupt daily operations at government buildings. In August 2002, U.S. District Judge Mary Lou Robinson 
received a letter containing a white powder with a threateningly worded letter. An entire Texas federal building was closed for the rest of the day and 
into the following day. (98) 
2004 - Roger V. Evans mailed a letter to the federal courthouse in Pensacola, Fl, addressed to the Clerk of the U.S. District Court. The letter, entitled 
“Affidavit in Support of Anthrax Scare” referenced anthrax three times and contained a white powder, later determined to be harmless. Several 
employees were isolated for up to ten hours and then taken to the local hospital to draw blood for testing. (99) 
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A third epoch in the last hundred years of anthrax centers on the history of bioterrorism 
using anthrax spores. Anthrax as a perceived biological threat is presented in Table 6. In the last 
ten years, terrorist groups have embraced anthrax as an agent for destruction or as a threat. In 
recent years, in spite of the international ban on biological weapons, the former Soviet Union 
was shown to maintain the capacity for manufacturing weapons grade anthrax aerosols. 
(100,101) 
Domestically, the CIA has documented that threats of anthrax, both real and perceived, 
had reached an all time high in 1998 with almost one incident every three days. (103) “Anthrax 
Hoaxes” are known to cause chaos in federal buildings and medical clinics where abortions are 
performed due to the intensity of response by local authorities. (102,103)  
The September 11th, 2001 destruction of the World Trade Centers in New York City 
heightened the United States public health officials’ awareness to the possibility of a biological 
release of a weaponized agent. (104,105)   
Bioterrorism-related anthrax became a reality in September, 2001. On approximately 
September 19th, a letter addressed to Jennifer Lopez containing a Star of David and a bluish 
powder arrived in the mailroom of American Media Inc. (AMI), publisher of celebrity 
periodicals Sun and National Enquirer, in St. Petersburg, FL. The letter is illustrated in Figure 3. 
(106,107) Ernesto Blanco, AMI mail supervisor, received and then delivered the mail.  Several 
people handled the letter. Robert Stevens closely examined the letter and sniffed some of the 
powder. Both would be stricken with anthrax in a matter of one week. (19,108,109) 
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Figure 3. Anthrax Letter 
Because human anthrax had become such an infrequent disease, very little was 
understood of the disease except by few public health scientists and veterinarians. Initial media 
reports treated the case as an isolated incident similar to craftsmen infections.  
A typical inhalation anthrax exposure could not be initially identified for Robert Stevens, 
the apparent index case of anthrax. He did not work in a factory. He did not work with animal 
materials. Initial reports concentrated on several facts. Robert Stevens was an avid fisherman and 
outdoorsman. He had recently vacationed in North Carolina.  Investigators searched his home, 
workplace, and over 50 places he had visited around his hometown of St. Petersburg, FL in the 
prior 20 days.   It was at his workplace, a news media outlet, environmental samples tested 
positive. Once a mail handler in the same office fell ill investigators began to piece together the 
route of exposure. 
Weaponized anthrax has a wider dispersion than industrial anthrax aerosolized in textile 
mills. It is designed at an optimum size for inhalation. Investigators also found implicated letters 
to be electrostatically charged to spread the spores during the process of opening. At least 4 
letters were mailed from October, 2001 to November, 2001. An estimated 32,000 persons 
initiated antimicrobial prophylaxis. Completion of a 60-day course of antimicrobial prophylaxis 
was recommended for approximately 10,300 persons. (108) 
This outbreak was a new and unique source of anthrax exposure. Over the course of US 
public health history, the epidemiology of anthrax has shifted from an infection primarily 
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associated with animals and animal products to an odorless, colorless powder capable of 
infecting many if place in an envelope and mailed.   The ensuing media coverage placed today’s 
anthrax threat from bioterrorism in context with what had previously been an agricultural or 
industrial disease. New methods of monitoring for anthrax must take into account that no 
obvious initial exposure may be known for a patient exhibiting signs of the disease. Excerpts of 
the early media reports follow below. 
“Case appears to be isolated.”… “Sporadic cases of anthrax do occur in the United States, 
so a single case is not an indication of an outbreak. The last case of anthrax reported in the 
United States was earlier this year in Texas.” … “The Florida State Health Department and 
a team from CDC are aggressively investigating the source of infection. They are 
reconstructing the patient’s schedule for the last few weeks to attempt to determine the 
location where the patient may have been exposed. A team of CDC epidemiologists were 
sent to Florida to look for any indications of exposure to this disease. “… “They should not 
buy gas masks.” HHS – Public Health Message Regarding Anthrax Case. (2) CDC – 
Public Health Message Regarding Anthrax Case (110)  
“Local health department stressed occupational exposures.” FDOH – Health officials 
investigating isolated and non-contagious case of anthrax (111) 
“The investigation is looking into every aspect of this man’s activity, as he was an avid 
outdoorsman.” PBCHD – Anthrax confirmed in Lantana Resident (112) 
“Florida’s first confirmed case of anthrax in 27 years surfaced Thursday in Palm Beach 
County, prompting an intense investigation by federal and state health officials and 
assurances that the isolated case had no link to last month’s terrorist attacks.” … “But he 
said a deliberate release of the germ by terrorists is one of several possibilities under 
investigation. ‘We have that on the list’, said Dr. Jeffrey P. Koplan, director of the Centers 
for Disease Control and Prevention in Atlanta.“… “Yet federal Health and Human 
Services Secretary Tommy Thompson noted that Stevens, described as an avid 
outdoorsman, apparently drank from a stream while in North Carolina, a state known for 
hog farming and its associated waste.”  St. Petersburg Times – ‘Terror or accidents?’ – 
Anthrax – CDC, FBI Investigate Lantana Case (113) 
“The FBI is working with health officials in Florida and at the Centers for Disease Control 
and Prevention (CDC) to locate the source of the man’s illness, but one spokesman said, 
‘There is absolutely no indication this is tied in any way to terrorism.’” CNN – Florida 
man suffering from Anthrax Dies (114) 
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4.0  CLINICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF INHALATION ANTHRAX 
Inhalation anthrax exhibits a distinct clinical picture. This signature presentation makes 
surveillance possible for early signs and symptoms of the disease. Chapter 4 provides a clinical 
examination of anthrax to better understand the complex pathogenesis of the disease as well as a 
detailed review of case reports published in the literature. 
4.1 PATHOGENESIS OF INHALATION ANTHRAX 
How does anthrax create such havoc in the body of those affected?  The following 
section outlines the basic patho-physiology associated with anthrax and the major steps in the 
early phase of inhalation anthrax infection. 
Anthrax first gains entry to the host through inhalation of spores. The spores then 
germinate and multiply locally within the lungs. The germinated bacteria are then engulfed by 
macrophages and transported to the lymphatic system. (115) Anthrax bacteria continue to 
multiply and produces toxin within the macrophage while traveling to the lymph nodes. B. 
anthracis next escapes from the macrophage, killing it in the process. (116,117) The killing of 
the macrophage prevents the secretion of proteins, chemokines and cytokines, which can alert 
the immune system to the presence of the anthrax pathogen. Thus, once freed of the macrophage, 
the capsule of the B. anthracis inhibits phagocytosis by macrophages. (118,119)  When bacteria 
reach the regional lymph nodes, they multiply extracellularly to very high concentrations within 
the blood. In inhalation anthrax, the multiplying bacteria accelerate the release of toxins which 
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affects the endothelial cells of the vascular system leading to breakdown of blood vessels, 
hemorrhage, and massive pulmonary edema. 
 
 
Figure 4. Anthrax Toxin Action  
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Toxin production is the key to anthrax pathogenesis. To be virulent, B. anthracis must be 
encapsulated and produce a three component toxin consisting of Edema Factor (EF), Lethal 
Factor (LF), and Protective Antigen (PA).  EF and LF are not biologically active on their own. 
However, EF and PA couple to produce Edema Toxin (ET); and then LF and PA combine to 
make Lethal Toxin (LT). Both toxins exhibit unique properties. (120,121,122) Figure 4 
illustrates the toxin action of B. anthracis. This is described below in detail. 
Generally when inhaled, the anthrax spore is surrounded by alveolar macrophages as a 
normal response by the immune system to a pathogen. Protective antigen (PA) then attaches to a 
receptor on the surface of the macrophage. (123) A portion of the PA is cleaved off by a cellular 
protease (Furin), an enzyme that breaks down proteins, exposing a binding site for LF or EF. 
(124) PAs form into groups of 7 called heptameters and bind up to three copies of EF or LF. The 
heptameter complex (PA+LF or PA+EF) then inserts into the cell membrane. (125,126,127,128) 
Through endocytosis, the heptameter complex enters the endosome, a membrane bound 
compartment inside eukaryotic cells such as macrophages. The heptameter complex 
subsequently responds to a lower pH within the endosome and forms a channel in order to 
release the toxins into the cytosol. Lethal toxin stimulates macrophages to release proteins 
involved in inflammation, interleukin-1β and tumor necrosis factor α, which are partly 
responsible for systemic shock. (129,130) Lethal toxin also suppresses the inflammatory 
response in the macrophage and switches the signal for activating an immune response to a 
trigger for cell death, apoptosis. (131,132,133,134) Edema toxin upsets the balance of an 
important relay between the intracellular signal messenger cAMP and ATP which disrupts the 
water homeostasis within the cell leading to the accumulation of fluid beneath the skin or within 
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organs of the body such as the lungs. (135,136)  Edema toxin also inhibits phagocytosis within 
the cytosol by an unknown mechanism. (137) 
4.2  CLINICAL FEATURES 
The major clinical findings of inhalation anthrax (IA) are outlined below.  IA has a 
clinical pattern marked by two phases; a mild initial phase followed by an acute and severe 
fulminate phase.  The CDC describes the two stages of inhalation anthrax as “a brief prodrome 
resembling a mild viral respiratory, followed by the fulminate stage which shows development of 
hypoxia and dyspnea, with radiographic evidence of mediastinal widening”. (138)  Because the 
initial stages of anthrax resemble those of other illnesses, it is common for anthrax to go 
unrecognized until the later, more serious clinical events show themselves.  Current research 
efforts seek to identify mechanisms to identify anthrax in its earlier, mild stage. 
After inhalation of anthrax spores, the expression of symptoms begins after an incubation 
period of 1–6 days.   Common symptoms of IA begin with fever, chills, drenching sweats, 
profound fatigue, minimally productive cough, nausea or vomiting, and chest discomfort. (139) 
Dixon also notes that myalgias, malaise, and a condition resembling an upper respiratory tract 
infection can also be expressed. (116)   
The disease progresses to the fulminate phase within 2–3 days after the initial symptoms.  
Some individuals show a period of brief recovery from the initial symptoms, before deteriorating 
in the fulminate phase. Fulminate stage symptoms will most likely lead to hospitalization within 
24 hours. (115) The fulminate phase is characterized by high fever, acute dyspnea, diaphoresis 
and cyanosis. Stridor, a high pitched breathing sound, is present in some patients because of 
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extrinsic obstruction of the trachea by enlarged lymph nodes, mediastinal widening, and 
subcutaneous edema of the chest and neck.  At this point, the patient is at risk for progressing 
rapidly to shock, hypothermia, and death. (140) 
Respiratory failure is a key finding of inhalation anthrax.  Once patients have passed the 
prodromal phase of the disease, patients often complain of an increasing inability to breathe.  
Acute respiratory failure was acknowledged in all 12 cases of anthrax documented in the last 30 
years.  
Mediastinal widening is also a key finding of inhalation anthrax.  Mediastinal widening is 
identified through radiological evidence.  Because this anatomy is fairly obscure to most 
researchers, a brief overview is provided here.  The mediastinum is the extra-pleural space within 
the thorax, lying between the lungs. It is bounded by the sternum anteriorly, the paravertebral 
regions posteriorly, the thoracic inlet superiorly, and the diaphragm inferiorly. (141) A lateral 
chest radiograph divides the mediastinum into 3 parts. The anterior mediastinum boundary line 
projects from the diaphragm and along the back of the heart and in front of the trachea to the 
neck. The posterior mediastinum is behind another vertical boundary line that connects a point 
on each of the thoracic vertebrae one centimeter behind its anterior margin. In between those two 
boundary lines lies the middle mediastinum. Using this definition, the anterior mediastinum 
contains the thymus, ascending aorta, heart, and pericardium. The middle mediastinum contains 
the trachea, esophagus, hili and hilar lymph nodes, aortic arch, and numerous other lymph nodes 
and nerves. The posterior mediastinum contains a portion of the descending aorta and numerous 
nerves, including part of the lymphatic chain. (141) 
Mediastinal widening or hilar, peritracheal, or peribronchial lymphadenopathy from 
inhalation anthrax is well-documented in historical domestic cases. Suffin noted enlargement of 
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the left hilus in a craftsman exposed to contaminated yarn from Pakistan. (152) Laforce observed 
a paratracheal mass in a 46 year old male with an occupational exposure to anthrax. (52) 
Brachman commented on two cases – a 28 year old African American man with mediastinal 
widening on chest film and a 50 year old housewife whose autopsy revealed pathologic findings 
of hemorrhagic mediastinitis. (151) In necropsies from three of five cases of inhalation anthrax 
from a New Hampshire textile mill, Albrink reports numerous enlarged mediastinal lymph 
nodes, mediastinal lymph nodes that were “anthracotic discrete, and edematous,” and enlarged 
tracheobronchial lymph nodes. (142)  
Abramova has written extensively on the large epidemic of anthrax that occurred in 
Sverdlovsk, Russia in 1979 and resulted in the deaths of many persons. (143) A series of 42 
necropsies consistently revealed pathologic necrosis of the thoracic lymph nodes in the 
lymphatic drainage of the lungs and hemorrhagic mediastinitis. Other pathological reviews of 
anthrax which document mediastinitis have been published by Vessal and Grinberg. (153,144) 
4.3 DIAGNOSIS OF ANTHRAX 
If there is no reason to suspect it, early diagnosis of IA is difficult. (140) Without reason 
for increased suspicion, the early, non-specific clinical manifestation would be easy to 
misdiagnose. The advanced disease may be recognizable by characteristic chest radiograph 
abnormalities. (145) The chest CT is helpful in detecting hemorrhagic mediastinal lymph nodes, 
and edema, peribronchial thickening, and pleural effusions; findings commonly seen in IA. (139) 
Gram stain and cultures should be obtained on blood or cerebrospinal fluid (CSF) samples of 
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patients in whom anthrax is suspected. Sputum from patients seldom yields positive smears or 
cultures. (145) 
Definitive diagnosis of anthrax requires laboratory confirmation. The CDC laboratory 
criteria for confirmation of anthrax are 1) isolation of B. anthracis from a clinical specimen from 
a patient’s affected tissue or site, with confirmation by direct fluorescent-antibody staining and 
gamma phage lysis; or 2) other supportive laboratory tests, including a) evidence of B. anthracis 
DNA by polymerase chain reaction (PCR) from specimens from a patient’s affected tissue or 
site, b) demonstration of B. anthracis in a clinical specimen by immunohistochemical staining 
(IHC), or c) positive serologic testing by an investigational enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay 
(ELISA) that determined the concentration of serum immunoglobulin G (IgG) to the PA 
component of anthrax toxin; sera are considered reactive if antibody was neutralized by 
competitive inhibition. (146,147,148) 
4.4 SUMMARY OF INHALATION ANTHRAX CASES 
Recent studies have examined the signs of symptoms of anthrax in both historical 
naturally-occurring and recent bioterrorism related anthrax patients. Hupert et al. searched 
MEDLINE and Web of Science for adult human cases of anthrax between 1960 and 2000 using 
‘anthrax’ and ‘case report’ and found a total of 11 reports on 17 cases. Kyriacou identified 36 
naturally occurring cases that were identified from MEDLINE, textbooks, monographs, and 
Index Medicus. Cases ranged from the year 1880 through 1976.  Each case was confirmed by 
epidemiological characteristics, autopsy findings, and bacterial verification. Kuenhert et al., as 
part of the 2001 CDC bioterrorism investigation team, reviewed and extracted data from 
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patient’s medical records. A synthesis of clinical findings of the anthrax subjects reviewed by 
these investigators is presented in Table 7.  
Kyriacou and Hupert both examined signs and symptoms of historical inhalation anthrax 
patients. While Hupert did not report numerator/denominator, the study did provide the percent 
positive for the finding among the cases. Both studies agreed that cough, chest pain, and dyspnea 
occurred with high frequency. Kyriacou also found that all subjects were reported to have chills, 
nausea, and vomiting. Among physical findings, both Hupert and Kyriacou found rales or 
rhonchi to be present in a high proportion of anthrax cases. Kyriacou also found a high 
temperature and tachypnea, rapid shallow breathing, for more than 8 minutes. 
Kyriacou, Kuenhert, and Hupert all examined signs and symptoms among the recent 
bioterrorism related inhalation anthrax cases. All three studies found cough and dyspnea to be 
present in a high proportion of the cases. In addition, Kyriacou and Kuenhert both reported chills 
in a high proportion of the cases. Both Kuenhert and Hupert agreed that only 27% of cases had 
abdominal pain. Among physical findings for the anthrax cases, only Kyriacou presents a 
detailed breakdown of the results. Tachycardia was examined by all three studies, which was 
found to be present at least 80% of the time by Kuenhert and Hupert. Kyriacou and Hupert 
reported high temperature was found at least 60% of the time in the anthrax patients. Kyriacou 
also reports at least 90% of the anthrax cases were found to have tachypnea for more than 8 
minutes.  
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Table 7. Signs and Symptoms of Inhalation Anthrax from the Literature 
 
Influenza Syndromic
Kyriacou Hupert Kuenhert Kyriacou Hupert Kuenhert Hupert Soulakis
Sign or symptom LR (95%CI) LR (95%CI) p-value LR (95%CI) LR (95%CI) p-value LR (95%CI) LR (95%CI)
Abdominal pain . . 0.71 . . NA . 3.0(0.56,16.19)
Altered mental status 115(15.99-827.11) HIGH . NA HIGH . HIGH 8.2(1.8,36.5)
Chest pain 1.5(1.18-1.91) 1.3(0.9-1.8) 0.04 1.55(1.19-2.02) 2.6(1.9-3.7) NA 1.7(1.2-2.5) 2.9(1.3, 6.1)
Chills 1.22(1.07-1.41) 0.9(0.7-1.1) 0.21 1.93(1.56-2.40) 0.9(0.7-1.1) NA 0.8(0.7-1.0) .
Cough 1.05(0.95-1.15) 0.9(0.7-1.1) 0.47 0.97(0.89-1.05) 1(0.8-1.2) 1 0.9(0.7-1.0) 3.3(1.9, 5.7)
Diarrhea . . 0.7 . . NA . .
Dyspnea 1.63(1.39-1.92) 1(0.8-1.4) 1 2.77(2.16-3.54) 8.6(5.8-12.8) NA 5.3(3.7-7.4) 1.3(0.9,1.9) 
Fatigue . . NA . . 1 . 8.7(2.8, 27.4)
Fever 1.1(0.95-1.27) . . 1.76(1.45-2.14) . . . 2.9(1.6, 5.3)
Headache . 0.5(0.3-0.9) 0.76 . 0.4(0.3-0.7) 0.002 0.4(0.2-0.6) 16.4(2.1, 125.6)
Myalgias . . 0.21 . . 0.01 . 26.2(3.7, 187.0)
Nausea 2.8(2.16-3.63) . . 5.75(3.75-8.82) . . . 4.9(2.2, 10.7)
Vomiting 4.73(3.33-6.73) . . 9.7(5.46-17.22) . . . .
Nausea or vomiting . 1.6(1.1-2.3) 0.002 . 5.1(3.4-7.5) NA 5.1(3.0-8.5) .
Rhinorrhea . NA 0.76 . 0.2(0.1-0.5) 0.0002 0.2(0.1-0.5)
Sore throat . NA 1 . 0.2(0.1-0.5) 0.0001 0.2(0.1-0.4) 6.7(0.7, 67.4)
Sweats 13.2(6.38-27.33) . . 14.69(6.42-33.61) . . . 7.6(2.4, 24.7)
Physical findings . . . . . . .
Abnormal lung exam . NA . . 6.6(5.0-8.7) . 8.1(5.3-12.5) .
DBP<75 1.38(0.88-2.17) . . 1.79(1.12-2.85) . . . .
SBP <130 1.76(1.24-2.51) . . 1.6(1.13-2.27) . . . .
Pale or cyanot ic skin 70.82(9.6-520.8) . . NA . . . .
Pulse oximetry<96% 2.17(1.30-3.61) . . 4.89(2.66-8.99) . . . .
Rales 1.25(1.11-2.08) . . 13.52(6.55-27.88) . . . .
Rhonchi 1.3(0.67-2.53) . . 1.5(0.76-2.96) . . . .
Rales or rhonchi 1.43(1.14-1.78) . . 4.19(2.94-5.99) . . . .
Tachycardia 1.51(0.27-2.06) . 0.04 5.14(2.99-8.86) . 0.0001 . .
Tachypnoea > 18/min 1.09(1.00-1.20) . . 1.28(1.15-1.43) . . . .
High temperature 2.44(1.89-3.16) 0.7(0.5-1.0) 0.23 7.24(4.66-11.26) 1.2(0.9-1.7) 0.37 0.8(0.6-1.1) .
Wheezes 0.75(0.27-2.06) . . 0.72(0.26-1.97) . . . .
Community-acquired pneumonia Influenza-like illness
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4.5 INHALATION ANTHRAX CASE SERIES 
Excluding the recent bioterrorism-related cases, eleven inhalation anthrax cases have 
been reported in the literature since 1960. An examination of the initial diagnostic impression, 
the time to onset of symptoms, major clinical findings, and eventual outcome of the case 
provides insight into the clinical anthrax presented in the literature.  
Plotkin described an epidemic occurring within a ten week period at a goat hair 
processing plant in New Hampshire. (149) The clinical profile of the five presenting cases is 
detailed below: 
Case 1: The diagnostic impression of the first case was influenza. The time from onset of 
symptoms to treatment was about five hours. The major symptoms were backache, headache, 
102 degree fever, pulse 100, blood pressure 110/70. The case was fatal.   
Case 2: The diagnostic impression of the second case was influenza. The time from onset 
of symptoms to treatment was about 1 day. The major symptoms were fever, cough, malaise, 
temp 104 degrees, slight rhinorrhea, non productive cough, wheezing, and profuse sweating. The 
case was fatal.  
Case 3: The diagnostic impression was a severe flu, possibly bronchitis. The time from 
onset of symptoms to treatment was about 4 days. The major symptoms were 103 degree fever, 
cough, febrile, chest discomfort, and anorexia. The patient was found mumbling unintelligibly. 
The case was fatal.  
Case 4: The diagnostic impression of the fourth case was possible cholecystitis. The 
patient was diagnosed with cardiac failure with superimposed pneumonia. The time from onset 
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of symptoms to treatment was about 3 days. The major symptoms were malaise, fatigue, mild 
pain in chest, cough, temperature of 99 degrees, pulse 92, respirations 24, and abdominal pain. 
Later, dyspnea, stridor, a productive cough, profuse diaphoresis, blood pressure 110/90, and 
bilateral rales developed. Radiography showed mediastinal enlargement, bilateral basal pleural 
effusions, and a middle lobe right lung effusion.   The case was fatal. 
Case 5: No diagnosis was assigned to the fifth case. The time from onset of symptoms to 
treatment was about 3 days. The major symptoms were fever (103 degrees), chills, cough, 
dyspnea, and profuse diaphoresis. An injection of 400,000 units of penicillin was prescribed. The 
patient was later hospitalized and developed a cough, slightly cyanotic, confusion, and rales. 
800,000 units of procaine penicillin and 1 gm of dihydrostreptomycin were given every 12 hours.  
“Bacillus subtilis” was recovered. The identification was based on a gram stain of the nutrient 
broth culture. Since the technician believed the organism was a contaminant, the slide and 
culture were discarded without additional identification. (149)  
La Force presented the clinical profile of one sporadic case of anthrax in a 46 year old 
man employed at a metal fabricator shop in New Hampshire in 1966. (150) Although an anthrax 
case never occurred at the metal shop, epidemiologic investigation revealed probable aerial 
spread of B. anthracis from a nearby goat processing plant located directly across a 60 foot alley. 
Plotkin described five known cases of inhalation anthrax occurring at this goat hair processing 
plant in 1957. (149)   
Case 6: No diagnosis was assigned to the case. The patient’s family went away on 
vacation and returned to find the patient in “a state”. The patient had a history of diabetes and 
was found intoxicated and complaining of fatigue. 20 cc's of glucose through an IV, and insulin 
were prescribed. The major symptoms were confusion, lethargy, perspiration, unresponsiveness, 
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and shallow respirations. At the hospital rales and gurgling sounds developed. The disease was 
fatal.  
Brachman described two cases of inhalation anthrax occurring in Philadelphia, PA. (151) 
Epidemiologic investigation failed to reveal anthrax exposure in either case. However, Case 1 
worked at a furniture factory located 150 yards from a tannery known to have had anthrax case 
12 years earlier. Case 1 caught the bus home across the street from the tannery on a daily basis. 
Environmental investigation revealed 10 of 147 swabs positive for B. anthracis at the tannery. 
Investigators presumed the factory as the source of infection. Case 2 lived 1 ½ blocks from the 
same tannery. Epidemiologists did not further investigate this case.    
Case 7: The medical history of the first case included a 2 ½ year history of sarcoidosis 
with an episode 2 months prior. No diagnosis was assigned.  The time from onset of symptoms 
to treatment was about 7 days. The major symptoms were dyspnea and frequent coughing, 
weight loss, 97.2 degrees temperature, 115 pulse, and respirations of 40. Later, chest pain, 
dyspnea, coughing pink sputum, acute distress, orthopnia, cyanosis, rales, and hemoptysis 
developed. The disease was fatal.    
Case 8: The diagnostic impression of the second case was acute meningitis. The time 
from onset of symptoms to treatment was 2 days. The major symptoms were a “slight cold”, 
vomiting, headache, and eventually coma. The disease was fatal.  
Suffin presented the clinical profile of a 1976 case of inhalation anthrax in a California 
home craftsman. (152) The patient worked in his home as a self-employed artistic weaver and 
obtained his yarn from commercial sources. Investigation revealed the source of his infection as 
contaminated yarn imported from Pakistan.  
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Case 9: The diagnostic impression of the case was a hemorrhagic central nervous system 
process. The major symptoms were fever, sore throat, left-sided chest pain, headache, nausea, 
anorexia, tachycardia, decreased breath sounds, and unresponsiveness. The disease was fatal. 
Vessal described the radiological and pathological findings of two out of five autopsy-
proven cases of IA seen at Pahlavi University Medical Center in southern Iran. (153)  Both cases 
stem from agricultural exposures. However, the authors do not elaborate on the source of 
infection. 
Case 10: The first case was a 16 year old farm girl. She exhibited shortness of breath, 
painless swelling in her right axilla, and impending shock. The swelling increased and petechial 
hemorrhages appeared in the skin of the axilla. She was stuporous and in severe respiratory 
stridor. Radiology showed marked widening of the mediastinum with soft borders and a soft 
tissue swelling over the right chest wall. The differential diagnosis was cellulitis or blood 
dyscrasia. The disease was fatal.  
Case 11: The second case was a 34 year old farmer. She exhibited a nonproductive 
cough, shortness of breath, hemoptysis, restlessness, clammy skin, deep labored respiration, 
tachypnea, cyanosis, shock. Radiology showed a marked widening of the mediastinum, massive 
consolidation, and middle zone bilateral pleural effusions, more prominent on the left. A lateral 
chest radiograph showed a dense shadow in the middle compartment of the mediastinum. A 
second radiographic series showed the same features plus infiltrates at both bases. Aspiration of 
a total of 1100 cc of serosanguinous fluid from both sides was performed. Complete listings of 
inhalational anthrax cases examined for this literature review are in Appendix B.  
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4.6 DISTINGUISHING EARLY STAGE ANTHRAX FROM SEASONAL 
INFLUENZA 
Distinguishing early stage anthrax from seasonal influenza and influenza-like illness 
poses a challenge to health care providers. (154) Several clinical studies have attempted to 
identify clinical features useful for discriminating seasonal illnesses from bioterrorism related 
anthrax. The results are summarized in Table 8. (155,156,157,158) The most important 
components showing themselves from this work include a set of clinical features that are distinct 
from those seen in common viral respiratory tract infections such as acute respiratory distress 
and an abnormal chest x-ray. Screening protocols based on these features may improve 
identification of patients with possible inhalational anthrax in the setting of a large-scale anthrax 
attack.   
Three important studies by Hupert, Kyriacou, and Kuenhert compared the presenting 
clinical characteristics of anthrax patients to the presenting clinical characteristics of patients 
with either community acquired pneumonia (CAP), influenza like illness (ILI), or influenza.  All 
three authors reasoned that viral respiratory tract infections, such as influenza, respiratory 
syncytial virus (RSV), parainfluenza, and rhinoviruses or coronaviruses, are appropriate 
comparison conditions for their studies because of their prevalence and potential similarity to 
inhalational anthrax. All three authors also chose to compare anthrax cases to ambulatory 
patients with community-acquired pneumonia to highlight the difficulty of distinguishing these 
two conditions. 
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Table 8. Comparison of Findings of Three Clinical Studies 
 
 
Influenza
Kyriacou Hupert Kuenhert Kyriacou Hupert Kuenhert Hupert
Sign or symptom LR (95%CI) LR (95%CI) p-value LR (95%CI) LR (95%CI) p-value LR (95%CI)
Abdominal pain . . 0.71 . . NA .
Altered mental status 115(15.99-827.11) HIGH . NA HIGH . HIGH
Chest pain 1.5(1.18-1.91) 1.3(0.9-1.8) 0.04 1.55(1.19-2.02) 2.6(1.9-3.7) NA 1.7(1.2-2.5)
Chills 1.22(1.07-1.41) 0.9(0.7-1.1) 0.21 1.93(1.56-2.40) 0.9(0.7-1.1) NA 0.8(0.7-1.0)
Cough 1.05(0.95-1.15) 0.9(0.7-1.1) 0.47 0.97(0.89-1.05) 1(0.8-1.2) 1 0.9(0.7-1.0)
Diarrhea . . 0.7 . . NA .
Dyspnea 1.63(1.39-1.92) 1(0.8-1.4) 1 2.77(2.16-3.54) 8.6(5.8-12.8) NA 5.3(3.7-7.4)
Fatigue . . NA . . 1 .
Fever 1.1(0.95-1.27) . . 1.76(1.45-2.14) . . .
Headache . 0.5(0.3-0.9) 0.76 . 0.4(0.3-0.7) 0.002 0.4(0.2-0.6)
Myalgias . . 0.21 . . 0.01 .
Nausea 2.8(2.16-3.63) . . 5.75(3.75-8.82) . . .
Vomiting 4.73(3.33-6.73) . . 9.7(5.46-17.22) . . .
Nausea or vomiting . 1.6(1.1-2.3) 0.002 . 5.1(3.4-7.5) NA 5.1(3.0-8.5)
Rhinorrhea . NA 0.76 . 0.2(0.1-0.5) 0.0002 0.2(0.1-0.5)
Sore throat . NA 1 . 0.2(0.1-0.5) 0.0001 0.2(0.1-0.4)
Sweats 13.2(6.38-27.33) . . 14.69(6.42-33.61) . . .
Physical findings . . . . . . .
Abnormal lung exam . NA . . 6.6(5.0-8.7) . 8.1(5.3-12.5)
DBP<75 1.38(0.88-2.17) . . 1.79(1.12-2.85) . . .
SBP <130 1.76(1.24-2.51) . . 1.6(1.13-2.27) . . .
Pale or cyanotic skin 70.82(9.63-520.79) . . NA . . .
Pulse oximetry<96% 2.17(1.30-3.61) . . 4.89(2.66-8.99) . . .
Rales 1.25(1.11-2.08) . . 13.52(6.55-27.88) . . .
Rhonchi 1.3(0.67-2.53) . . 1.5(0.76-2.96) . . .
Rales or rhonchi 1.43(1.14-1.78) . . 4.19(2.94-5.99) . . .
Tachycardia 1.51(0.27-2.06) . 0.04 5.14(2.99-8.86) . 0.0001 .
Tachypnoea > 18/min 1.09(1.00-1.20) . . 1.28(1.15-1.43) . . .
High temperature 2.44(1.89-3.16) 0.7(0.5-1.0) 0.23 7.24(4.66-11.26) 1.2(0.9-1.7) 0.37 0.8(0.6-1.1)
Wheezes 0.75(0.27-2.06) . . 0.72(0.26-1.97) . . .
Radiologic findings . . . . . . .
Mediastinal widening 10.25(6.07-17.32) . . 23.11(8.65-61.74) . . .
Mediastinal widening or 
pleural effusions
3.55(2.82-4.46) . . 22.6(9.59-53.24) . . .
Laboratory study . . . . . . .
High hematocrit or 
hemoglobin level
4.65(2.99-7.25) . NA 3.75(1.88-7.48) . 0.004 .
Leucocytosis 1.26(0.98-1.62) . 0.03 2.65(1.47-4.78) . 0.04 .
Neutrophilia . . 0.71 . . 0.06 .
High AST level . . 0.0004 . . <0.0001 .
High ALT level . . 0.0005 . . 0.0008 .
Low sodium level . . 0.005 . . <0.0001 .
High BUN level . . 0.1 . . <0.0002 .
High creatinine level . . NA . . 1 .
Low platelet count . . NA . . 0.05 .
High bilirubin level . . NA . . 0.009 .
Low potassium level . . NA . . 0.21 .
Low albumin level . . NA . . <0.0001 .
Low calcium level . . 0.21 . . 0.002 .
Community-acquired pneumonia Influenza-like illness
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Each author differed in the method chosen for assembling a comparison population of 
CAP ILI, and influenza patients. Hupert searched MEDLINE for descriptive epidemiologic 
reports of presenting clinical features of laboratory-confirmed influenza and noninfluenza viral 
respiratory illnesses in ambulatory adults. Five published studies met the search criteria: a Phase 
II and Phase III clinical trial, a French influenza epidemic in 1995–1996 in which clinical and 
laboratory data were gathered by general practitioners, a 20-year surveillance study of RSV at a 
large academic medical center, a study of confirmed influenza cases presenting to the emergency 
department of a large metropolitan referral hospital, and a comparison of confirmed influenza 
cases to influenza-like illness cases from 14 Dutch general practice sites.  
Kyriacou selected a comparison population of CAP patients seen in the ED at a teaching 
hospital affiliated with Northwestern University School of Medicine reasoning that CAP “is the 
disease that is most likely to be considered in patients with unrecognized cases of inhalational 
anthrax.” An equal number of ILI patients were also selected at this site. 
Kuenhert used data from patients with influenza or other causes of ILI from the combined 
patient population of 5 clinical trials designed to evaluate the effectiveness of zanamivir for the 
treatment of influenza. Kuenhert also collected data from a large study conducted at 34 sites in 
the United States and Canada from 1995 through 1999. All patients enrolled in the study were 
hospitalized because of acute CAP confirmed by chest radiography. 
All three studies examined signs and symptoms of inhalation anthrax. Of the three studies 
examining fever as a discriminating factor for anthrax, only Kyriacou looked at subjective fever. 
Fever was found to be significantly different when anthrax patients were compared to ILI 
patients (PLR 1.76 [1.45, 2.14] but not CAP patients. Cough was examined by all three studies 
across CAP, ILI, and influenza patients. No significant differences were found. Hupert and 
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Kuenhert both looked at sore throat across CAP, ILI, and Influenza groups. Only Kuenhert found 
cough to be significantly high among anthrax patients when compared to ILI patients. Altered 
mental status, dyspnea, and nausea/vomiting are fulminant stage symptoms found in anthrax 
patients, and it is not surprising, then, that these features are seen proportionately more 
frequently in anthrax patients compared to ILI, CAP and influenza patients. 
Physical findings were primarily examined by Kyriacou with only high temperature and 
tachycardia examined by Kuenhert and Hupert. Kyriacou found a significant difference in 
presenting body temperature when anthrax patients were compared to CAP and ILI groups but 
not to Influenza. Kuenhert and Hupert found no significant differences in body temperature 
between anthrax and the other patients.  The most discriminating physical findings were 
tachycardia and a high hematocrit.  
Only Kyriacou looked at radiological findings.  He reported mediastinal widening as the 
most distinguishing feature when anthrax patients were compared to both CAP and ILI patients. 
(159) 
Examination of the laboratory results of the inhalation anthrax cases revealed 
significantly high levels of hematocrit, leucocytosis, AST, ALT, and BUN in anthrax patients 
when compared to CAP patients.   ILI patients significantly differed from anthrax patients across 
all lab values as CAP patients plus low platelet count, low albumin, and low calcium. The 
findings of Kyriacou and Kuenhert agreed on the significant difference in hematocrit and 
leucocyte levels among both CAP and ILI cases. 
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4.7 CASE STUDY - FLORIDA, 2001 IDENTIFYING ANTHRAX EARLY 
Several opportunities exist to increase the timeliness of detecting anthrax using 
syndromic surveillance. Table 9 on page 55 is a timeline of the two recent cases of IA from the 
2001 bioterrorism incident in the United States.  This information was gathered from press 
releases, articles, books, and news broadcasts. The unfolding of the sequence of events beginning 
in September 2001 will serve as a detailed case study of the clinical recognition of bioterrorism 
related anthrax in the emergency department.  
The timeline follows the simultaneous paths of Ernesto Blanco and Robert Stevens from 
the arrival of an anthrax letter to their AMI Inc. office to the development of flu-like illness to 
the eventual hospitalization and fulminate stage of the disease. One key feature of the timeline is 
the lack of knowledge of clinical staff and public health authorities of the existence of Blanco’s 
case until three days after the admission of Stevens.  The case study will highlight the missed 
opportunities to connect the cause of illness for Blanco and Stevens which ultimately decreased 
the timeliness of the detection of the outbreak of bioterrorism related anthrax in Florida. 
Robert Stevens was a photo editor at the Sun, a popular weekly tabloid, since 1974. 
Stevens was primarily responsible for retouching celebrity photos. Ernesto Blanco was the 
mailroom clerk of American Media Inc., the parent company of the Sun. Blanco was a 73 year 
old retired carpenter. Blanco commuted by train and bus ninety minutes to Boca Raton, FL from 
his home in Miami. (162) His duties were to pick up the 3,000-5,000 pieces of mail AMI 
received daily from the post office. He sorted most mail on his own or with the aid of one other 
clerk, then wheeled the mail throughout the office on a cart. Although Stevens primarily worked 
with digital images, Blanco did deliver mail to Stevens on a daily basis as the Sun specialized in 
sensational journalism which elicited a large volume of submissions from amateur photographers 
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and readers. Sometime around September 5th, a letter addressed to Jennifer Lopez containing a 
Star of David and a bluish powder arrived in the Sun's mailroom in the American Media 
headquarters. Blanco received and then delivered the mail to Stevens, who in turn, closely 
examined the letter and sniffed some of the powder. (161) 
Ernesto Blanco was the first of the two to seek outside medical help.  He presented to the 
emergency department on Oct 1 with extreme respiratory difficulty eventually requiring a chest 
tube.  A chest X-ray showed abnormal radiological findings, including upper and lower lobe 
infiltrates consistent with pneumonia and a small left pleural effusion. (160) The x-ray did not 
show mediastinal widening. A chest CT showed bilateral effusions and multilobar pulmonary 
consolidation but no significant mediastinal lymphadenopathy. Antibiotics were administered 
very early in the course of his care.  
Stevens was admitted to the hospital the next day, Oct 2, with a condition closely 
resembling inhalation anthrax. His chest x-ray showed a prominent superior mediastinum and a 
possible small left pleural effusion. Six hours after admission, he had generalized seizures and 
was intubated for airway protection.  Seven hours after admission, Stevens’ attending physician 
observed a Gram positive bacillus through the microscope. He added Anthrax to his differential 
diagnosis immediately. By October 3rd, an investigation was launched by the Palm Beach Health 
Department based on the evidence of microbiological results supporting anthrax. The organism 
was nonmotile, non-hemolytic, and capsular.  Testing was also positive for polysaccharide in the 
cell wall. The CDC would confirm the case the next day following the results of a positive 
gamma phage lysis test. 
By October 4th, his third day in the hospital, Blanco’s attending physicians were 
‘stymied’:   
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“…he had a typical presentation of a viral illness… We had 
x-rays consistent with bacterial pneumonia in someone who did 
not have a clinical picture of it. So you have to start working up all 
the atypical pathogens. Ernie had five or six dogs at home, so I 
thought maybe he has leptosporosis or something from the 
animals. It was a very bizarre presentation.” (161) 
 
The initial media coverage following the confirmation of Mr. Stevens as the first 
confirmed case of anthrax in 25 years stressed it was an isolated incident. Jeffery Koplan was 
quoted by the St. Petersburg times as saying “There’s no need for people to fear they are at risk.” 
By October 5th, 9 persons (5 cutaneous NY, 2 cutaneous NJ, 2 inhalational FL) had developed 
symptoms of inhalation or cutaneous anthrax due to direct or indirect exposure of tainted 
envelopes. 
At 11:30 pm on October 5th, Blanco’s attending physician would learn that another 
inhalation anthrax case had occurred in a hospital 75 miles away. His discovery was made by 
way of a phone call from a concerned colleague of Blanco’s who remembered his sudden illness 
and subsequent hospitalization after CNN picked up the Stevens story after press releases from 
local, state, and national public health authorities. (161)  
Fifteen days after admission, on October 15th, Blanco’s case would be confirmed as 
positive for inhalation anthrax. This delay was caused by the requirements of the case definition. 
Subsequent testing revealed a positive PCR test for Bacillus anthracis in hemorrhagic pleural 
fluid and reactive serological tests. (162) Cell wall and capsular staining, PCR, or demonstration 
of the presence of antibodies to anthrax were nonculture tests. The case definition required a 
positive culture. A positive nonculture test and a clinically compatible case would only be 
considered a “suspected case” by the CDC. In the wake of unfolding events, the case definition 
was changed to two positive nonculture tests. 
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In the wake of the Florida cases, the CDC formally established a case definition to use for 
the 2001 bioterrorism-related anthrax investigations as follows: Confirmed: 1) Clinically 
compatible that is lab-confirmed by isolation of B. anthracis or 2) two supportive labs providing 
evidence of B. anthracis. Suspected: 1) A clinically compatible case of illness without isolation 
of B. anthracis and no alternative diagnosis, but with laboratory evidence of B. anthracis by one 
supportive test or 2) A clinically compatible case of anthrax epidemiologically linked to a 
confirmed environmental exposure, but without corroborative laboratory evidence of B. 
anthracis infection. In areas of heightened suspicion investigators conducted enhanced clinical 
case finding. Most sought to identify “clinically compatible” cases for further investigation. 
 55 
Table 9. First Two Cases of Bioterrorism-Related Anthrax: Florida, 2001 
Sept. 19th - Sometime within two weeks of this date, a letter addressed to Jennifer Lopez containing a Star of David and a bluish 
powder arrived in the Sun's mailroom in the American Media headquarters. Several people handled the letter. Stevens closely 
examines the letter and sniffs some of the powder. Blanco, the AMI mail supervisor, received and then delivered the mail.  
Sept. 24th  - Blanco has sudden onset of fatigue at work. Over the next three days experiences gradual progression of cough, lethargy, 
shortness of breath, and fever. He also begins sweating and having abdominal pains. 
Sept. 27th - Stevens drives from Lantana, FL to Charlotte, N.C. for a family trip to visit daughter. Photo editor for tabloid leaves for 
North Carolina in good health. 
Sept. 29th - Stevens experiences fatigue. Immediately on his arrival in North Carolina, the first symptoms of illness developed; these 
included muscle aches, nausea, and fever.  
Sept. 29th - Blanco suffering nonproductive cough, fever, stuffy nose. 
Sept. 30th  - Stevens shivering and shaking, face red, severe weakness. 
Oct. 1st  - Stevens returned to his home from North Carolina early due to illness.. He spent most of the day in bed. Soaked with 
perspiration, nausea, temperature of 101 F. Worsening cough and headache. 
Oct. 1st  - Blanco admitted to Miami Cedars Medical Center. [65 miles from JFK in Atlantis]. Blanco was given the initial diagnosis 
of pneumonia. He was experiencing delirium and had difficulty breathing. Tests for Legionnaires’ disease and hantavirus were 
negative. Physical exam pointed to pneumonia: wheezing sounds in lungs, diffuse consolidation on chest radiograph, and pulmonary 
infiltrates. Chest CT infiltrates consistent with pneumonia. Recurring pleural effusions required a chest tube. Arterial blood gas values 
showed hypoxia. 
Oct. 2nd - Blanco’s chest X-ray consistent with pneumonia. 
Oct. 2nd, 02:00 - Stevens was admitted to the John F. Kennedy Hospital emergency room in Atlantis, Florida. presenting with 
disorientation, a high fever, vomiting, and inability to speak. Incoherent, delirious. Stevens was examined for meningitis by infectious-
disease specialist Dr. Larry Bush. Bush found a high white blood cell count and rod-shaped bacilli; he soon was convinced Stevens 
had contracted anthrax. He then notified the Palm Beach County Health Department. 
Oct. 2nd, 05:30 - Stevens seizures, intubated. Given spinal tap with a provisional diagnosis of meningitis. Treatment with intravenous 
cefotaxime and vancomycin was initiated for presumed bacterial meningitis while the patient awaited lumbar puncture. The initial 
chest radiograph was interpreted as showing basilar infiltrates and a widened mediastinum. 
Oct. 2nd, 08:30 - Stevens' CSF cloudy, Gram stain positive and contains bacilli. 
Oct. 2nd, 10:00 - Stevens' attending physician adds inhalation anthrax to differential diagnosis with high clinical suspicion. 
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Table 9. (Continued) 
Oct. 2nd, 09:00  - Stevens sample of bacteria received by Integrated Regional Laboratories in Fort Lauderdale. 
Oct. 2nd, 12:00 - Stevens laboratory results show bacteria to be nonmotile, nonhemolytic. 
Oct. 2nd, 15:00 - PBCD Director Malecki is notified of Stevens' case. Florida state epidemiologist is notified. 
Oct. 2nd, 18:00 - Stevens' specimens are sent to the Regional CDC Laboratory Response Network Laboratory in Jacksonville, Fl.  
Oct. 3rd - Stevens' Jacksonville lab reports capsular test is positive for polysaccharide in the cell wall. 
Oct. 3rd - Blanco’s radiograph shows pleural effusions. His blood cultures are negative. Attending physician: “Patient had X-rays 
consistent with bacterial pneumonia but not the clinical picture of it.” Blood cultures show no growth of infection. 
Oct. 3rd - Formal investigation is opened by PBHD. 6 PBDOH staff investigate at hospital. Time spent reviewing Stevens medical 
charts and interviewing wife. In the evening, government investigators, including 12 investigators from the CDC, some from the 
Epidemic Intelligence Service, began their investigation into Stevens' movements of the last few days and potential sources of the 
anthrax. The hospital ships spinal fluid samples to state health officials and the CDC. 
Oct. 4th, 08:15 - Gamma phage lysis positive. Stevens' diagnosis of anthrax is certain. The CDC confirmed the anthrax diagnosis. 
Federal officials announced that Stevens was admitted to a hospital on Tuesday with non-contagious pulmonary anthrax.  
Oct. 4th, 11:00 - CDC investigators arrive on scene to investigate Stevens' case. 
Oct. 4th - Media Reports: HHS - Public Health Message Regarding Anthrax Case. (163), CDC - Public Health Message Regarding 
Anthrax Case (110), FDOH - “Health officials investigating isolated and non-contagious case of anthrax”(111), PBCHD - “Anthrax 
confirmed in Lantana Resident.” (112) 
Oct. 5th, 06:00 - CDC investigators sweep through indoor and outdoor places Stevens had visited in last 60 days.  
Oct. 5th, 23:30  - Blanco’s attending physician notified of epidemiologic link to Stevens. 
Oct. 5th, 12:00  - CDC investigators sweep Stevens’ house. 
Oct. 5th, 13:00 - Robert Stevens dies. Sweep of AMI. 
Oct. 5th - Media reports: St. Petersburg Times - “Terror or accidents? – Anthrax – CDC, FBI Investigate Lantana Case.” (113), 
CNN - “Florida man suffering from Anthrax Dies (114), FDOH - “Death of Mr. Robert Stevens.” (164), New York Times - “Florida 
Man is Hospitalized with Pulmonary Anthrax.” (165), CNN - “Gupta: Isolated anthrax case extremely rare” (166) 
Oct. 6th  - Steven's first round of samples collected are processed. 
Oct. 6th  -  Media Reports: New York Times - “Florida man dies of Rare form of Anthrax.” (167), St. Petersburg Times - “Anthrax 
Fatality is likely isolated.” (168), “Single Anthrax Case Causes Few Ripples.” (169) 
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Table 9. (Continued) 
Oct. 7th - AMI samples collected from Stevens’ keyboard and mailroom are positive.  
Oct. 7th - Media Reports: CDC - Public Health Message Regarding Anthrax Case (170) 
Oct. 8th - Media Reports: FDOH Continuing Investigation. (171)  CNN – “Letter scrutinized as possible source.” (172)  St. 
Petersburg Times - “Tabloid workers tested for anthrax.” (173) 
Oct. 9th - Media Reports: St. Petersburg Times - “What is anthrax?” (174)  “Monday’s development.” (175)  “Officials are on 
Alert.”(176)   “Police, hospitals heighten vigilance.” (177)   New York Times. - “Puzzle of Anthrax in Florida.” (178) 
Oct. 11th - Media Reports: CDC - Public Health Message Regarding Anthrax Case. (179) 
Oct. 12th - Media Reports: CDC - Public Health Message Regarding Anthrax Case. (180) 
Oct. 15th - Blanco’s diagnosis of inhalation anthrax officially confirmed. Blanco discharged October 23rd. 
Oct. 16th - Media Reports: CDC – “Anthrax Investigation, FL and NY.” (181) 
Oct. 17th - Media Reports: CDC – “Update: Facts about anthrax testing and on-going investigations in Florida, Nevada, New York, 
and Washington, D.C.” (182),CDC – “Update: Anthrax antibiotic treatments and CDC disease detective status.” (183) 
Oct. 18th - Media Reports: CDC – “Dr. Koplan, Director of CDC, answers important public health questions about anthrax.” (184) 
Oct. 19th - Media Reports: CDC – “Update: Investigation of anthrax associated with intentional exposure and interim public health 
guidelines.” (185) 
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5.0  ANTHRAX SURVEILLANCE 
5.1 TRADITIONAL ANTHRAX SURVEILLANCE 
 The previous chapters highlighted the current understanding of the public health impact 
and important characteristics of anthrax.  The following chapter focuses on surveillance 
approaches that enable public health officials to identify outbreaks of anthrax. 
Surveillance is defined in the Control of Communicable Diseases Manual as the 
“continued scrutiny of all aspects of occurrence and spread of a disease that are pertinent to 
effective control.” (186) Operationally, surveillance involves a systematic and regular process by 
which data on disease are collected, evaluated, and reported.  Examples of surveillance activities 
include the monitoring of infectious diseases through notifiable disease systems, identification of 
cancer and trauma characteristics through registries, regular field investigations of selected 
disease issues, and the isolation of infectious agents by laboratories.  Surveillance involves not 
just the collection of information on disease with standard methods, but also the dissemination of 
this information.  Public health authorities stress that summaries of surveillance information 
should be regularly distributed to all collaborating authorities and others with a need to know the 
results of the surveillance activities. (187)  
Currently, anthrax is considered a Class 2 disease by the Control of Communicable 
Diseases Manual and is identified to public health authorities through the notifiable disease 
systems in their jurisdictions. (186)  In this form of surveillance, clinicians, laboratories, and 
health care institutions should report a recognized case of anthrax by telephone to the public 
health authorities in their area as soon as possible. (186) As an example of typical public health 
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practice, anthrax reporting through a notifiable disease system is outlined below using the state 
of Minnesota guidelines.  
In Minnesota, health care and laboratory personnel must report anthrax within 24 hours 
after the disease is reasonably expected to exist by telephone to the local health director. (188) 
The statutes also require a communicable disease report card or a report in an electronic format 
within seven days of the telephone report. Figure 5 illustrates an example disease report card 
from the Minnesota Department of Health. (189) Isolation or other specific identification of 
Bacillus anthracis by a laboratory also requires a report by telephone within 24 hours. (190) 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Minnesota Case Report Card 
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5.2 RATIONALE FOR SYNDROMIC SURVEILLANCE FOR INHALATION 
ANTHRAX 
Although traditional surveillance serves as the foundation of public health practice by 
providing information for action for the control and prevention of naturally-occurring diseases, it 
may be inadequate for monitoring for bioterrorism related attacks. Syndromic surveillance 
monitors pre-diagnostic indicators of disease outbreaks. (191,192) By definition, syndromic 
surveillance precedes traditional laboratory-confirmed surveillance.  
The response by top health officials immediately following the 2001 anthrax attacks 
clearly demonstrates the importance of syndromic data during an emerging outbreak. Health 
departments in Florida (193), North Carolina (194), New Jersey (195), Connecticut (196), and 
New York (208) all established continuous monitoring of Emergency Departments for clinical 
syndromes resembling fulminate-stage inhalation anthrax. In each case clinicians or 
epidemiologists posted at hospitals manually recorded demographic, clinical, and laboratory 
information on each patient meeting a syndromic case definition. Health departments made huge 
investments in ad hoc systems to collect and analyze the data and disseminate the results.  
Proponents of syndromic surveillance find an advantage in the timeliness of the 
approach. In a resource-challenged environment like public health, some critics point out that the 
cost of the system is redundant if treating physicians report cases as they spot them.  In the 
review of the literature “Syndromic Surveillance and Bioterrorism-related Epidemics”, Beuhler 
et al. address the controversy of whether a syndromic surveillance approach is likely to detect an 
anthrax epidemic sooner than reporting by alert clinician. (197) Using the intentional anthrax 
release of 2001, they recount the major factors in the detection of a bioterrorism-related epidemic 
such as population characteristics, availability and use of health services, the nature of an attack, 
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epidemiologic features of individual diseases, surveillance methods, and the capacity of health 
departments to respond to alerts.  
Briefly, their findings point out that most patients sought care during the mild phase of 
the illness at their primary care provider (as opposed to the Emergency Department) or were 
assigned diagnoses inconsistent with inhalation anthrax, that significant increases of febrile 
illness would most likely not been detected before patients were admitted for fulminate illness, 
and that most testing had grown a gram positive rod within 24 hours of admission. The authors 
conclude that an approach more sensitive and specific than syndromic surveillance for febrile 
illness but more rapid than growing a gram positive bacillus on culture would provide superior 
monitoring compared to the current state-of-the-art approach.  
5.3 WHAT IS SYNDROMIC SURVEILLANCE? 
The practice of syndromic surveillance grew out of a desire by public health authorities to 
prepare for large scale bioterrorism attacks. While some work in early detection of naturally 
occurring outbreaks does precede syndromic surveillance, most of the work focused on 
foodborne or waterborne pathogens. (198,199) Early published studies of syndromic surveillance 
first appeared in 1998 and accelerated in publication throughout much of the following decade 
until the present. (200) Table 10 summarizes major works in syndromic surveillance. These 
papers, especially the early work, feature new approaches to conducting surveillance by 
evaluating computer systems which regularly collected administrative data from healthcare 
facilities in a semi-automated fashion and quickly processed it into a format suitable for 
epidemiologic analysis. This line of inquiry translated into surveillance systems for local health 
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departments which provide a daily snapshot of morbidity trends in the community. Most 
successful systems included surveillance for seasonal influenza, influenza like illness, or other 
respiratory illnesses. Local and local health departments in New York, Boston, Virginia, Indiana, 
Washington, and many others have run continuously for over a decade. The most often cited 
utility is tracking the onset and magnitude of influenza season. (201) Recent influenza tracking 
also included monitored pandemic H1N1 incidence in affected areas of New York City. (202) 
The following chapter will outline the major components of syndromic surveillance 
including computer systems required to receive and process data, the variety of data sources 
commonly used, data types and coding schemes, and lastly analytical approaches commonly 
employed to identify outbreaks.  
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Table 10. Syndromic Surveillance Studies 
 
  
Study (Year) Region (Country) System Indicator Data source Data Type Interval Analysis Unit
Costaglia (1991) National (France) Sentiweb Influenza-like Illness Sentinelle G.P. Report Weekly Number of visits/GP
Carrat (1998) National (France) Sentiweb Influenza-like Illness Sentinelle GPs G.P. Report Weekly Number of visits
Toubiana (1998) National (France) Sentiweb Influenza-like Illness Sentinelle GPs G.P. Report Weekly Number of visits
Tsui (2001) Pittsburgh (US) RODS Influenza-like Illness Emergency DepartmenICD9 Code Daily Number of visits
Goldenberg (2002) Pittsburgh (US) RODS Cough OTC Sales Medication Daily Number of purchases
Lazarus (2002) Boston (US) Harvard Vanguard Medical Assoc L.R.T.I. Ambulatory ICD9 Code Daily Number of visits
Lewis (2002) Washington, D.C. (US) ESSENCE I Fever M.T.F. ICD9 Code Daily Number of visits
Gesteland (2003) Utah (US) RODS Constitutional Emergency DepartmenChief complaint 4 hours Number of visits
Hogan (2003) Multisite (US) IN-PA-UT Collaboration Respiratory OTC Sales Medication Daily Number of purchases
Mostashari (2003) New York (US) NYCDOHMH Influenza-like Illness E.M.S. Call Types Daily Ratio of ILI to Other
Mostashari (2003) New York (US) NYCDOHMH Influenza-like Illness E.M.S. Dispatches Daily Number of runs
Viboud (2003) National (France) Sentiweb Influenza Sentinelle G.P. Report Weekly Number of visits
Reis (BMC) (2003) Boston (US) Children's Hospital Respiratory Emergency DepartmenChief complaint Daily Number of visits
Heffernan (2004) New York (US) NYCDOHMH Influenza-like Illness Emergency DepartmenChief complaint Daily Ratio of ILI to Other
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Table 10 (Continued) 
 
Study (Year) Region (Country) System Indicator Data source Data Type Interval Analysis Unit
Kleinman (2004) Boston (US) Harvard Pilgrim Healthcare L.R.T.I. Ambulatory ICD9 Code Daily Number of visits
Miller (2004) Minnesota (US) Health Partners Medical Group Influenza-like Illnes Ambulatory ICD9 Code Daily Number of visits
Rogerson (2004) Boston (US) Harvard Vanguard Medical Assoc.L.R.T.I. Ambulatory ICD9 Code Daily Number of visits
Besculides (2005) New York (US) NYCDOHMH Influenza School Absenteeism Daily Percent absent
Brillman (2005) Albuquerue (US) B-SAFER Respiratory Emergency Department Chief complaint Daily Number of visits
Kulldorff (2005) New York (US) NYCDOHMH Fever/Flu Emergency Department Chief complaint Daily Number of visits
Ritzwoller (2005) Denver (US) NBSSDP Influenza-like Illnes Ambulatory ICD9 Code + M.T. Daily Number of visits
Wang (2005) Boston (US) Children's Hospital Respiratory Emergency Department Chief complaint Daily Number of visits
Zhu (2005) Florida (US) University of South Florida Respiratory Hospital Not Specified Daily Number of visits
Vergu (2006) National (France) Sentiweb Influenza-like Illnes OTC Sales Medication Weekly Number of sales
Wong (2006) National (Hong KongHospital Authority Influenza Hospital Hospitalizations Weekly Number of hospitalizations
Burkom  (2007) Multisite (US) Johns Hopkins Respiratory BioALIRT Multiple Daily Number of visits
Cooper (2007) National (England) Health Protection Agency Fever NHS Direct Nurse Calls Weekly Percent of calls
Haug (2007) Air Force Bases (USESSENCE II Influenza-like Illnes M.T.F. ICD9 Code Daily Number of visits
Jackson (2007) Seattle (US) King County Influenza-like Illnes Emergency Department Chief complaint Daily Number of visits
Cooper (2008) National (England) Health Protection Agency Fever NHS Direct Nurse Calls Daily Number of calls
Flamand (2008) Bordeaux (France) Sentiweb Influenza-like Illnes SOS Medicines G.P. House Calls Daily Number of visits
Meyer (2008) Gleneagles (ScotlandHealth Protection Scotland Multiple Multiple Multiple Daily Number of visits
Meyer (2008) Gleneagles (ScotlandHealth Protection Scotland Multiple Multiple Multiple Daily Number of visits
Murphy (2008) Multisite (US) JPL Respiratory BioALIRT Multiple Daily Number of visits
Cami (2009) Houston (US) RODS Cough OTC Sales Medication Weekly Number of purchases
Najmi (2009) NS (US) JPL Respiratory M.T.F. Multiple Daily Multiple
Tokars (2009) National (US) EARS Influenza-like Illnes Biosense ICD9 Code Daily Number of visits
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5.3.1 Computer systems 
 
Figure 6. Typical Syndromic Surveillance Process 
 
The process of syndromic surveillance is illustrated in Figure 6. (203) Syndromic 
surveillance systems typically operate in partnership with health departments, regional hospitals, 
healthcare delivery organizations, ambulatory care centers, and/or possibly universities or 
academic institutions. The Real-time Outbreak Detection System developed by the University of 
Pittsburgh and the New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene Syndromic 
Surveillance System are two good examples of currently operating systems. (204,205) These 
systems share similar characteristics such as the secondary use of automatically collected 
electronic data and short data collection intervals such as daily or hourly.  
The computer systems that support syndromic surveillance can be a single computer 
system, integrated hospital computer systems, or integrated across hospitals in one health system. 
Syndromic surveillance is often continuously run 7 days a week or can be conducted on an ad 
hoc basis for major events such as the Winter Olympics in Utah (206), G8 meetings in Scotland 
(207), or in the wake of the 2001 World Trade Center attacks. (208) Personnel may run programs 
manually or review results from automated analysis. Personnel may need to retrieve missing data 
files and conduct quality assurance. (205) Investigations are typically conducted by local health 
authorities. 
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5.3.2 Data sources 
Syndromic surveillance can leverage a wide variety of electronically available data 
sources such as over the counter drug sales (209,210,211,212), school absences (213), nurse 
hotline calls (214,215),  emergency department chief complaints (216,217,218,219), emergency 
medical services dispatch types (220,221), measured temperatures (222), radiology reports (276), 
orders for chest x-rays (223,224),  prescriptions, ICD9 codes (200,225,226,227), and progress 
notes (222). Table 11 describes various data sources by type, setting, and phase of healthcare in 
which the data is generated. 
 
Table 11. Sources of Syndromic Surveillance Data 
Data source Data type Setting Care phase 
Medication sales Drug category Pre-clinical Pre-diagnostic 
School absences Frequency Pre-clinical Pre-diagnostic 
Nurse hotline call Call type Pre-clinical Pre-diagnostic 
Chief complaint Text, brief Clinical Pre-diagnostic 
EMS call Run type Clinical Pre-diagnostic 
Temperature Vital sign Clinical Pre-diagnostic 
Radiology Report Text, narrative Clinical Pre-diagnostic 
Chest X-ray Procedure code Clinical Pre-diagnostic 
Prescriptions Drug category Clinical Diagnostic 
Diagnosis code ICD9 code Clinical Diagnostic 
Progress Note Text, narrative Clinical Diagnostic 
 
Common data types include numeric, coded, brief text, or longer text narratives. Each 
data type requires varying degrees of sophistication to process. Data may be collected in many 
different settings to reflect any point of the disease process. However, it is desirable to collect 
data as close to the time of the onset of symptoms as possible.  
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Setting also effects representativeness of the data. Pre-clinical settings are individual-
motivated such as staying home from school, buying an over the counter cough medication, or 
calling a nurse hotline. Clinical settings reflect healthcare encounters in ambulatory, ED, or 
inpatient settings where a patient interacts with the healthcare system such as stating a chief 
complaint to a clinician, or a clinician recording a patient vital sign, ordering an x-ray, 
prescribing a medication, diagnosing a patient, or documenting a progress note.  
The care phase reflects progress through healthcare system. Pre-diagnostic is the 
assessment phase whereas diagnostic reflects the plan phase of the healthcare encounter where 
the physician has issued a diagnosis and considers treatment or referral options.  
5.3.3  Data Types 
Chief complaints are a common source of data given their wide availability and the pre-
diagnostic care phase in which they are collected. However, chief complaints are often free text, 
requiring investigators to use keywords to identify patients with the syndrome of interest. (228) 
Natural language processing (NLP) techniques may also be used to code the data. Recent work 
by Travers describes the challenging characteristics of coding nurse’s chief complaints including 
misspelling, punctuation, abbreviations, and spaces.  (229,230) Table 12 closely examines the 
respiratory syndrome from the NYC syndrome coding SAS macro. (231) Examination of the 
syndrome coding suggests that many patients coded as RESP will in fact not have the condition. 
This approach illustrates a highly sensitive strategy but at the cost of low specificity. 
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Table 12. NYC Syndromic Macro for SAS 
Characteristic Syntax 
Respiratory 
conditions 
%Macro Resp; *Respiratory; 
  if  cc=:'COUGH' or  
      cc=:'COUGHING' or 
            cc=:'SOB' or   cc=:'DifFICULTY BREATHING' or 
      cc='BREATHING PROBLEMS' or 
      cc=:'SHorTNESS OF BREA' or 
      cc=:'DifF BREA'  
            cc='URI' or 
then RESP=1; else do;  
RESP= 
Misspelling index(cc,'COUG') + index(cc,'COUH') + 
Shortness of 
breath 
index(cc,'S.O.B') + index(cc,'SOB') + index(cc,'S O B') + index(cc,'S  O  B') + 
index(cc,'S.OB'); 
Difficulty 
breathing 
index(cc,'BREAT') + index(cc,'BEATH') + index(cc,'DIB') + index(cc,'D I 
B') + index(cc,'D.I.B') + index(cc,'BRATHING') +        index(cc,'DifF BR') + 
index(cc,'DifF, BR') + 
Upper 
respiratory 
infection 
index(cc,'URI ') + index(cc,'URI/') + index(cc,'URI;') + index(cc,'U R I') + 
index(cc,'URI,') + index(cc,'U.R.I') +        
Other 
respiratory 
findings 
index(cc,'PNEUMON') + index(cc,'GASP') + index(cc,'PULMON') + 
index(cc,'MONIA') + index(cc,'INFILTR') + index(cc,'CROUP') +  
index(cc,'BRONCH')  + index(cc,'HYPOX') +      
index(cc,'PLEUR')  + index(cc,'DYSPN') +   
ICD9 codes in 
Chief 
Complaint 
index(cc,'786.2') + index(cc,'786.0')  + index(cc,'480') +  
index(cc,'481') + index(cc,'482') + index(cc,'483') + index(cc,'465') +  
index(cc,'466') + index(cc,'484')  + index(cc,'485') + index(cc,'486') +         
Rule out 
certain 
combinations  
if RESP GE 1  
or ( index(cc,'URTI')  
and (index(cc,'URTIC') = 0 and index(cc,'HURT') = 0))  
or (index(cc,'CHEST') and index(cc,'CONGEST'))  
or (index(cc,'RESP') and index(cc,'RESPO') = 0 )  
or (index(cc,'CAUGHT') = 0 and index(cc,'CAUGH')) or ( 
index(cc,'COLD') and index(cc,'CHEST')) 
then RESP=1; else RESP=0; 
Alcohol on 
breath 
if RESP=1  
and (index(cc,'ALCOHOL') or index(cc,'ETOH'))  
then RESP=0; 
END; 
%Mend; 
 
The International Classification of Diseases, 9th edition (ICD9) encodes over 10,000 
illnesses into numbered disease groups. (232) These codes can describe disease and conditions at 
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varying level of detail ranging from general organ system to precise anatomical location affected 
by the illness. Syndromic surveillance often leverages ICD9 data given it is readily available 
from most billing systems. The difficulty in using this coded data type is that investigators must 
determine which ICD9 codes correspond with the illness cluster to be monitored. ICD9 codes 
can be used for symptoms, diagnoses, or procedures. Diagnosis can stem from a variety of stages 
in the clinical workflow such as: working diagnosis, admitting diagnosis, discharge diagnosis. 
Multiple codes can be assigned per visit. ICD9 codes often include the disease process and 
organism responsible (e.g. ICD 481.00 - pneumococcal pneumonia) as well as non-specific 
syndromes such as ICD 079.99 - viral syndrome. 
5.3.4 Analytical methods 
Syndromic surveillance relies on informatics techniques to automate data collection and 
code exotic data types which are a relatively new practice in surveillance. However, traditional 
analytical techniques form the foundation of outbreak detection in many well-established 
syndromic surveillance systems. Table 13 lists major syndromic surveillance studies from the 
published literature. While not exhaustive, a literature review taking into account the number of 
times a study was cited by syndromic surveillance practitioners was used to determine inclusion. 
Only studies with multiple citations were included. For instance, the 1963 Serfling study is not 
syndromic surveillance per se; however, it is one of the most highly cited surveillance papers 
given the popularity of the regression method among syndromic surveillance practitioners. 
Conversely, several excellent papers which were published this year were not included as their 
methods have not been widely adopted.  
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A general framework for syndromic surveillance is described in the sections that follow 
based on examination of these studies. Briefly, a typical analytical framework first establishes a 
baseline incidence of the monitored condition. A test statistic is then used to identify outbreaks 
by signaling significant departures of the observed from the expected rate of disease. The 
following section will review several popular approaches to establish the baseline and signal 
outbreaks.  
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Table 13. Syndromic Surveillance Analytical Approaches 
 
  
Study (Year) Analysis Length of Baseline Baseline Anamoly
Serfling (1963) Serfling regression Not specified Serfling regression
Threshold of 2 standard deviations 
increase  for 2 weeks
Choi (1981) Autoregressive integrated moving average Not specified Autoregressive integrated moving average None
Costaglia (1991) Serfling regression Not specified Serfling regression
Threshold of 2 standard deviations 
increase  for 2 weeks
Carrat (1998) Serfling regression Not specified Serfling regression 90% upper confidence interval
Toubiana (1998) Serfling regression Not specified Serfling regression Number of districts greater threshold
Tsui (2001) Serfling regression Not specified Serfling regression 95% upper confidence interval
Goldenberg (2002) Wavelet transform Not specified Wavelet transform 3 standard deviations
Lazarus (2002) General linear mixed model Not specified General linear mixed model p-value
Lewis (2002) Autoregressive integrated moving average Not specified Autoregressive integrated moving average 95% upper confidence interval
Hogan (2003) Exponential weighted moving average
28 day baseline with 2 day 
buffer Not specifed Exponential weighted moving average
Mostashari (2003) Serfling regression
3 year serial regression minus 
last 2 weeks Serfling regression 95% upper confidence interval
Gesteland (2003) Recursive least squares adaptive filter Less than 1 week Less than 1 week 95% upper confidence interval
Mostashari (2003) Serfling regression Not specified Serfling regression 99% upper confidence interval
Reis (2003) Autoregressive integrated moving average Not specified Autoregressive integrated moving average 7 day detection filter
Thompson (2003) Poisson regression Not specified Poisson regression
Viboud (2003) Method of analogues Not specified Method of analogues None
Heffernan (2004) Satscan temporal, temporo-spatial
14 day baseline minus 1,2,or 3 
day window 14 day baseline Scan statistic
Kleinman (2004) General linear mixed model Not specified Census estimates Most unusual cluster area
Miller (2004) Autoregressive error model Not specified Autoregressive error model CUSUM
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Table 13. (Continued) 
 
Study (Year) Analysis Length of Baseline Baseline Anamoly
Rogerson (2004) Cumulative sum control chart Not specified "Regional" logistic regression Cumulative sum control chart
Kulldorff (2005) Satscan space time permutation 30 day moving window None Scan statistic
Hutwagner (2005) EARS 7 day moving average 7 day moving average EARS
Hutwagner (2005) EARS 7 day moving average; 5 years 7 day moving average; 5 years Seasonally adjusted EARS
Brillman (2005) Least squares regression 8 week window Least squares regression; EWMA Page's test
Besculides (2005) Cumulative sum control chart; SatScan Not specified Serfling regression 14 day CUSUM + SatScan
Ritzwoller (2005) General linear mixed model Not specified General linear mixed model Scan statistic and SMART score
Wang (2005) Autoregressive periodic model Not specified Autoregressive periodic model 2 standard error of prediction
Vergu (2006) Poisson regression Not specified Poisson regression
Wong (2006) Poisson regression Not specified Poisson regression
Jackson (2007) General linear model 3 years General linear model Probability from poisson distribution
Cooper (2007) Poisson regression Not specified Poisson regression Empirically derived threshold
Haug (2007) Exponential weighted moving average Not specified "Regression" 95% upper confidence interval
Cooper (2008) Satscan space time permutation 4 months None Scan statistic
Meyer (2008) Cumulative sum control chart 7 days; 3-9 days; 4 weeks 1-12 months historical average Cumulative sum control chart
Flamand (2008) Shewhart control chart Not specified 7 day moving average 2 standard deviations
Meyer (2008) Cumulative sum control chart Not specified Poisson regression Farrington exceedence Score
Najmi (2009) Adaptive recursive least squares 4 week memory factor Adaptive recursive least squares Not Specified
Tokars (2009) EARS 7 day moving average 7 day moving average EARS
Cami (2009) Regression based aggregation 8 week moving average 8 week moving average Cumulative sum control chart
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5.3.5 Baseline 
The first step in detecting outbreaks is to estimate the expected level of disease activity in 
the population being monitored - the baseline. (233) This is true in traditional or syndromic 
surveillance. An important consideration for calculating a baseline is the amount of data 
available for analysis.  Long baselines may demonstrate predictable trends over the course of 
years: secular trends accounting for the movement of population centers or health care utilization 
(234), seasonality (234), environmental conditions such as high pollen periods (235), or periods 
of co-circulation of organisms (236,237). These trends may increase the rate of illness in the 
monitored population but not beyond what is regularly expected. When considering long 
baseline periods, investigators often develop regression models with terms to adjust for known 
trends in the data to better predict the current level of disease activity. Enhancements to 
regression models may also consider past outbreaks and serial autocorrelation of the data. 
(238,239) Models such as this Serfling type have been developed for syndromic surveillance of 
febrile and respiratory illness. (240,241,242,243,244,245,236,237,223) A complete listing is 
available in Appendix D. 
Regression methods require long baseline periods and intimate understanding of the 
underlying data to build the most accurate statistical models to estimate the baseline. Time series 
methods such as moving averages, stratified moving averages, and cumulative summation 
techniques require shorter baseline periods but may still adjust for regular patterns within the 
underlying data. In rapidly evolving scenarios, such as surveillance in the wake of bioterrorism 
in 2001, the need may arise for the use of a new data stream for which little baseline data is 
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available. (246) Figure 7 illustrates several features of baseline calculation using relatively short 
periods of time appropriate for bioterrorism surveillance.  
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Figure 7. Several Examples of Baseline Calculations 
Each numbered day contributes to the baseline. The day numbered ‘1’ corresponds to the 
first day of the baseline. ‘0’ days are used to calculate the observed. The simplest case is to 
calculate a 7 day moving average (7MA) to calculate the mean and standard deviation of the 
number of incident cases. A 7 day baseline with a 2 day buffer (C2), the Early Aberration 
Reporting System (EARS) approach, was developed by CDC investigators to assure that recent 
outbreak effects do not bias the baseline upward (247,248)  A 7 day baseline with a 2 day buffer 
using 3 days to calculate the observed number of cases (C3) is employed by EARS developers to 
identify more slowly developing outbreaks. Reis et al have employed a one week weighted 
window to calculate the observed thus pushing the baseline back by 7 days. (251,252) The four 
day weekend baseline (4WE) is adjusted to only consider Saturdays and Sundays as health care 
resource utilization often differs significantly from weekdays. The seven day weekday (7WD) 
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baseline complements this approach by only using weekdays to calculate the baseline 
parameters. (249) 
5.3.6 Test statistic 
The next step in syndromic analysis is to generate a statistic assessing the difference of 
the observed value from the expected value. (250) Reis et al. developed a filter approach which 
computes a test value for one day, 7 day, 7 day linear, and 7 day exponential filters. (251) For 
each filter, a weighted sum is calculated over a 7-day sliding detection window. The forecast 
errors on each day are then multiplied by the filter weights of the corresponding days of the 
sliding detection window. These products are then summed to form the overall detection score 
for each filter. If this score exceeded a predefined threshold, an alarm is triggered. (252)  
Burkom demonstrated an effective alerting algorithm using a z-score as the test statistic 
when counts are sparse or data history is short. (253)  A z-score can be derived by subtracting the 
population mean from an individual raw score and then dividing the difference by the population 
standard deviation. The z-score indicates how many standard deviations an observation is above 
or below the mean. The z-score is often applied to the prediction residuals (observed minus the 
expected count) with the mean of a predetermined number of days of residuals subtracted from 
the current estimate and divided by the standard deviation of that number of days.  
The popular EARS methodology developed at the CDC features a cumulative summation 
(CUSUM) technique. CUSUM is applied to the z-score of forecast residuals. (254) When the 
CUSUM exceeds a predefined threshold, 4 is often used, an alarm is sounded and the CUSUM is 
reset to 2. (255)  
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5.3.7 Control Charts 
 
Figure 8. Example Control Chart 
The Shewhart control chart, often referred to simply as control chart, is a graphical and 
analytical tool for deciding whether a process is in a state of statistical control. (256)In this case, 
a control chart is used to distinguish a typical disease outbreak from bioterrorism related illness. 
An example control chart from Noble et al. is shown in Figure 8. (257)  
A Shewhart chart specifies control limits in terms of a multiple of the standard error of 
the plotted summary statistic or as probability limits. The central line on a Shewhart chart 
indicates the average (expected value) of the summary statistic when the process is in statistical 
control. The upper and lower control limits of a control chart indicate the range of variation to be 
expected in the summary statistic when the process is in statistical control. The control limits are 
commonly computed as 3σ limits representing three standard errors of variation in the summary 
statistic above and below the central line. (258) Control chart method examples for syndromic 
surveillance are employed by Rogerson, Cami, and Meyer. (259,207,211) 
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An exponentially weighted moving average (EWMA) control chart, as shown in Figure 
8, approach is popular with syndromic surveillance practitioners because it weighs recent events 
more heavily than those further back in time. This is especially useful if calibrating a system for 
rapidly unfolding incidents as opposed to slowly developing events. EWMA specifies the weight 
assigned to the most recent day’s mean in the computation of the moving average. (253) It can be 
used to compute control limits from the data based on a multiple of the standard error of the 
plotted EWMAs. EWMA smoothes a prediction residual using a smoothing coefficient. The 
closer the value is to 1, the more weight is applied to the first day of residuals. A common value 
for the smoothing coefficient is 0.4. A z-score is then calculated scaling for the length of the 
baseline used. A good example of this technique in practice is documented in Hogan et al. (212) 
5.3.8 Evaluation of syndromic surveillance systems 
To evaluate the effectiveness of a system, investigators often attempt to prospectively or 
retrospectively identify outbreaks. Table 14 provides a summary of validation approaches and 
their chosen evaluation measure. 
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Table 14. Syndromic Surveillance Validation Approaches 
 
 
Attempts to investigate each outbreak signaled by syndromic surveillance can be labor 
intensive and often do not uncover outbreaks beyond clusters of seasonal or naturally occurring 
illness. Studies of signal investigations are summarized in below in Table 15.  
 
Table 15. Syndromic Surveillance Signal Investigations 
Study Result 
Hanslik 19 signals investigated using a 99.7% upper confidence interval threshold. 
Heffernan 14 of 22 citywide respiratory signals investigated; 21 of 22 citywide fever 
signals during peak Flu A and Flu B season investigated. 
Meyer 79 signals investigated from 4 sources. No actual outbreaks. 
Mostashari 45 alarms investigated; 21 during flu season. 
 
Study (Year) Validation Evaluation Measure
Serfling (1963) Seasonal influenza Correlation with seasonal illness
Choi (1981) None Absolute percentage error; Serfling regression results
Costaglia (1991) Seasonal influenza Correlation with seasonal illness
Carrat (1998) Seasonal influenza Correlation with seasonal illness
Toubiana (1998) Seasonal influenza Sensitivity; Specificity
Tsui (2001) Seasonal influenza Sensitivity; Specificity; Timeliness
Lazarus (2002) Seasonal influenza Correlation with seasonal illness
Lewis (2002) Seasonal influenza Correlation with seasonal illness
Gesteland (2003) Investigation Signals reviewed
Hogan (2003) Seasonal influenza Timeliness; Signal strength
Mostashari (2003) Seasonal influenza Correlation with seasonal illness
Viboud (2003) Seasonal influenza Correlation coefficient between observed and expected
Heffernan (2004) Seasonal influenza Signals reviewed; Correlation with seasonal illness
Rogerson (2004) Seasonal influenza Differences in geographical spread of clusters
Besculides (2005) Seasonal influenza Signals reviewed; Correlation with seasonal illness
Kulldorff (2005) Seasonal influenza Signals reviewed; Correlation with seasonal illness
Ritzwoller (2005) Seasonal influenza; Chart review Signals reviewed; Correlation with seasonal illness
Vergu (2006) Seasonal influenza Forecast accuracy versus seasonal illness.
Cooper (2007) Positive influenza tests Correlation with seasonal illness; Time lag until alarm
Haug (2007) Seasonal influenza Correlation with seasonal illness
Cooper (2008) Seasonal influenza Signals reviewed; Correlation with seasonal illness
Flamand (2008) Seasonal influenza Correlation with seasonal illness
Meyer (2008) Investigation Signals reviewed
Cami (2009) Seasonal influenza AMOC curves (mean week of detection versus false alarms per year)
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For a syndromic surveillance designed to detect bioterrorism, there is little or no 
opportunity to prospectively identify outbreaks. Investigators may use historical or naturally 
occurring outbreaks such as influenza. (260) However, there is typically only one outbreak per 
year requiring many years of data. Also, the size, shape, and duration of the outbreak do not 
necessarily replicate a bioterrorist attack.  
Simulated outbreaks provide investigators the opportunity to vary the size, duration, and 
distribution of cases over time. A typical approach is to use an existing data source such as ED 
visits and 'inject' excess cases as outbreaks into the time series. (260) Injects can vary by size by 
using absolute number, percent above baseline, or a number of standard deviations above 
baseline. Simulations often use the standard deviation of the underlying time series to generate 
the magnitude of the outbreak. Other simulations use a fixed number of cases added to the 
underlying time series. (261)  
A synthetic outbreak may vary the distribution of cases in time: one day, linear, 
exponential, reverse exponential or random distributions are all good examples. In this way 
hundreds of outbreak scenarios may be evaluated while considering factors such as timeliness or 
the size of the outbreak detected. Other factors such as the start date of the outbreak or time 
between outbreaks injected into the time series may also be randomized to further add to the 
evaluation. Common measures for outbreak detection are the percent of outbreaks detected, 
sensitivity, specificity, and the area under the curve (AUC) for a receiver operating curve (ROC). 
Results are often stratified by the timeliness of the outbreak detection or by the size of outbreaks 
detected. 
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5.4 SYNDROMIC SURVEILLANCE FOR ANTHRAX 
Current inhalation anthrax monitoring approaches began as surveillance for indicators of 
respiratory illness, fever, or a combination of both. (205) However, it became apparent that 
investigators were more likely to identify seasonal influenza than attacks of bioterrorism. Figure 
7 and Figure 9 below illustrates the correlation between positive influenza A and B tests with the 
increase in influenza like illness in New York City for the 2010-2011 influenza season. In 
addition, recent studies by Betancourt (262), Begier (263), Beitel (264), and Marsden-Haug 
(265) showed the highest percentage of illnesses to be attributed to diagnoses of acute upper 
respiratory infection not otherwise specified (NOS), Acute pharyngitis, and unspecified viral 
infection which all exhibit high seasonality. 
 
 
Figure 9. New York City Influenza and RSV Testing, 2010-2011 Season 
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Figure 10. New York City Influenza-Like Illness Surveillance 
 
Targeting late phase inhalation anthrax-specific monitoring would complement the large 
scale febrile illness syndromic surveillance most health departments currently practice.  As 
demonstrated in the wake of the 2001 anthrax attacks, the system would monitor for fulminate 
stage clinical findings of inhalation anthrax such as acute respiratory distress and mediastinal 
widening. Most systems already collect the necessary data types for identifying inhalation 
anthrax. Respiratory distress is often defined by the use of ICD-9 codes 518.5, 518.81, or 518.82 
or an ICD-9-CM procedure code for the use of a mechanical ventilator 96.7. (266)  
Radiology notes, while not widely collected but readily available, would be used to 
identify mediastinal changes using natural language processing (NLP) techniques. A recent 
Chapman study examined 1 year of radiologic report data to evaluate the accuracy of NLP 
 82 
techniques for identifying mediastinal widening in full-text records. (216)  The NLP technique 
was validated by chart review. The study examined 79,032 records and classified 1,729 (2.19%) 
as WM. The sensitivity was found to be 85.6, Specificity=97.2, PPV=40.9. The final classifying 
terms are shown in Table 16. This study shows promise for investigators looking for more 
accurate means of identifying late phase inhalation anthrax symptoms from textual data types. 
Table 16. Terms for Identifying Mediastinal Widening 
Concept type Terms 
Boolean “bihilar” or “bronchial lymph node” or “bronchial” or “hilar lymph nodes” 
or “hilar lymph node” or “hilar” or “hila” or “hilum” or “mediastinal 
lymph nodes” or “mediastinal lymph node” or “mediastinal” or 
“mediastinum” or “paramediastinal” or “paratracheal lymph nodes” or 
“paratracheal” or “peritracheal” or “tracheobronchial lymph nodes” or 
“tracheobronchial” 
Boolean “enlarged lymph nodes” or “lymph node enlargement” or 
“lymphadenopathy” or “widened” or “widening” or “wide” 
Probabilistic “lymphadenopathy (negated)” or “mediastinal lymph node (negated)” or 
“mediastinal lymph node enlargement (negated)” or “mediastinal 
lymphadenopathy (negated)” or “mediastinal widening (negated)” 
Probabilistic “hilar lymphadenopathy” or “mediastinal lymph node enlargement” or 
“mediastinal lymphadenopathy” or “mediastinal widening” 
5.5 EVALUATION OF CURRENT SYNDROMIC SURVEILLANCE FOR 
INHALATION ANTHRAX 
Currently systems rely on monitoring for febrile illness or respiratory syndromes to detect 
the largest releases of inhalation anthrax. Three published systematic evaluations of current 
systems give evidence of the strengths and weaknesses of the approach using the working 
surveillance systems data in Washington state, Florida, and US military treatment facility data 
from 10 centers around the US (268,267,269).  
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Figure 11. Area Under the Curve Varies by Outbreak Type, Baseline, and Test 
 
Murphy examined outbreaks of 1, 2, 3, and 4 times the standard deviation of baseline 
activity. (267) The results are presented in Figure 11. 
A ‘surge’ outbreak was represented by a spike of cases over 1 – 3 days. Murphy 
combined different baseline approaches with different statistical tests: single day z-score (z-
score), 28 day CUSUM (CUSUM), or a 28 day EWMA with coefficients’ set at 0.4 or 0.9 
(EWMA). The study found slowly developing outbreaks are more difficult to detect than surge 
outbreaks. The percentage of slowly developing outbreaks detected ranged from a worst 
performance of 7MA+CUSUM (50.02%) to a best performance of 7MA+WEWD (68.69%). The 
percentage of surge outbreaks detected ranged from a worst performance of 56MA+CUSUM 
(74.01%) to the best performance of WEWD7+EWMA (98.78%).  
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The top performing tests adjusted for weekends in either the baseline calculation or test 
itself. The worst performing algorithm used the shortest baseline without adjustment for 
weekends and the CUSUM which only considers the current day’s observation. The best 
performing slow outbreak combination used a short baseline but the WEWD z-score used 
residuals from the previous 28 days. Surge outbreaks were best detected by methods which 
adjusted for weekends and considered single days when testing the observed versus the expected. 
Four methods exceeded 97% AUC. 
 
 
Figure 12. Percentages of Outbreaks Detected Varies by Approach and Size 
 
Jackson examined outbreaks corresponding to five simulated distributions in time: 
airborne bioweapon, point-source, community transmission with close contact, multi-modal 
community transmission, and airborne community transmission. (268) The study used original 
time series from healthcare facilities. Indicator with mean indicator volume (Standard Deviation) 
were as follows: Respiratory 60 (16.0), Influenza-like illness 35 (9.9), Asthma 10 (4.0), and 
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pneumonia hospitalizations 2 (1.6). Outbreaks lasted 1, 2, 4, 6, 8, 16, and, 32 days. The results 
are presented in Figure 12. 
The magnitude of outbreaks varied from 1 – 4 times the standard deviation of the time 
series which corresponds to 5-50 additional cases. The study found that smaller outbreaks are 
harder to detect than large. The outbreaks were from 250% increase for pneumonia 
hospitalizations to an 8% increase for Respiratory syndromes. The 28 day Shewhart method 
appeared to perform the best but not by a large amount. 
 
 
Figure 13. Timeliness of Detection for Slowly Building Outbreaks 
In a recent study comparing multiple outbreak detection methods, Zhu compared the 
timeliness of various approaches. (269) Simulated outbreaks peaked on day 4 to three times the 
baseline and decreased to baseline rate by day 8. The study found slower outbreaks are best 
detected by EWMA which weights events over time. EWMA performed best on the fourth day. 
The results are presented in Figure 13. The study found the best performance for first day 
detection by C3 (18%), second day by C2 (25%) and C3 (27%), third day was similar (~25%) for 
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EWMA, C3 and C2. By the fourth day EWMA (45%) performed the best. EWMA on the fourth 
day had the highest percentage of all methods on any day. 
 
 
Figure 14. Timeliness of Detection for Surge Outbreaks 
 
 For surge outbreaks, cases were increased to 3 times the baseline rate on day 1-day 4 and 
decreased back to baseline over days 5-8. The study found that surge outbreaks were easier to 
detect than slow. The results are presented in Figure 14. The best performance was seen by C3 
and C2 for signaling on day 1 and day 2. For day 1 signal, C3 performed best. After first day 
performance, the performance of all approaches seriously decrease except for simple moving 
average which would apply a constant weight to the outbreak date until the end of the moving 
average window.  
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6.0  SUMMARY OF THE LITERATURE REVIEW 
Surveillance for naturally occurring anthrax, of all varieties, is a well-established 
practice. Patients present to healthcare professionals with distinct clinical findings consistent 
with the disease. More importantly, the history of present illness will reveal exposure to a known 
vector of anthrax such as sick livestock, contaminated hides, or wool of an exotic origin. 
However, the case of anthrax of an unknown origin presenting to the Emergency Department 
requires a quick and substantial public health response of treatment, prophylaxis, and 
decontamination.  Public health authorities must enhance monitoring to identify additional 
anthrax cases in the event of an intentional release of aerosolized anthrax. Syndromic 
surveillance, the widely accepted monitoring approach for bioterrorism, effectively monitors for 
large scale, wide-area events. However, the 2001 anthrax letters event revealed a considerable 
gap in the ability of syndromic surveillance to work effectively for small events.  Small events of 
bioterrorism, while low in scale, often cause a disproportionate amount of terror, anxiety, and 
cost to the public.  
The literature review shows that strong work is currently underway to identify more 
effective syndromic surveillance approaches for recognizing anthrax cases. The recent work by 
Chapman et al. proposes that surveillance should focus on recognizing widened mediastinum 
findings in textual data. (276) Kyriacou et al found that a high rate of accuracy for identifying 
inhalation anthrax could be obtained using an algorithmic approach based on key clinical data 
such as a chest radiograph, history and physical, and laboratory results available from 
Emergency Department encounters. (156)  Lastly, Jackson showed that improvement in anthrax 
surveillance can be attained by systematically combining a variety of baseline calculations with 
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aberration detection methods, depending upon the scenario, size of the outbreak, and timeliness 
requirements. (268) These studies, along with other developments in the field, show that 
syndromic surveillance has moved beyond the initial paradigm of embattled health department 
waiting for a post-9/11 terrorist attack.  The practice now incorporates sophisticated data 
processing, clinical studies, and analytical techniques.  
Gaps in the literature indicate that further study on identifying potential outbreaks of 
inhalation anthrax using syndromic surveillance is merited.  For example, tools for identifying 
patients presenting with syndromes of severe respiratory findings and mediastinal widening (key 
components of inhalation anthrax) need further development.  Patients with these syndromes 
differ from those currently targeted by syndromic surveillance systems and, thus, will require a 
modified monitoring strategy.  As an illustration, the textual chief complaint data fields that 
health departments currently rely upon in syndromic surveillance are a poor source for 
identifying subjects with later stages of inhalation anthrax. Chief complaints often contain only 
one clinical finding and, thus, prevent investigators from using anything but the simplest case 
definitions such as “chest pain” OR “anthrax” OR “white powder” in their searches. The popular 
approach available from the New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene 
illustrates the limitations. (270) The use of more sophisticated data fields and an algorithmic 
approach may address these limitations, leading to more accurate, useful syndromic surveillance 
for inhalation anthrax.  However, the value of advanced tools has not yet been established 
through validation studies.  
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7.0  PURPOSE AND SPECIFIC AIMS OF THE STUDY 
The current approach for syndromic surveillance for inhalation anthrax evolved in the 
aftermath of the September 11th attack which introduced the very real possibility of large-scale 
biological attack affecting thousands of people. The reality of the ensuing public health situation 
was that 22 persons were infected, 6 fatally, and that millions were affected directly or indirectly 
by experiencing terror and anxiety. This smaller attack lead to less infected persons and lower 
fatalities than expected in the post 9-11 climate, but nevertheless presented a new challenge to 
public health. If one person or a small group of actors could use the US Mail system to spread 
disease and terror, surveillance must be readied to detect that threat as soon as possible. The 
proposed study seeks to improve the currently accepted practices of high-volume, regional 
syndromic surveillance for inhalation anthrax using a more focused, hospital-based approach 
featuring a more exact case definition. 
The public health significance of this work unfolded on a national stage over a decade 
ago when an intentional release of aerosolized anthrax spores resulted in twenty two cases of 
anthrax. This act of bioterrorism caused 11 cases of cutaneous anthrax and 11 cases of inhalation 
anthrax with 6 of the inhalation anthrax cases being fatal. (271) Although this number of anthrax 
cases represents a tiny fraction of the US population, the implications for the nation were 
extensive. The investigation, prophylaxis, and subsequent clean-up from the anthrax release 
carried a financial cost in the millions of dollars. In addition, the event created a sense of terror 
for millions of American citizens.  
The following study seeks to investigate the effectiveness of syndromic surveillance for 
monitoring bioterrorism-related anthrax in an emergency department population. Current 
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surveillance practice relies on casting the widest possible net for anthrax by concentrating on 
influenza-like illness symptoms.  These symptoms are a possible early indicator of anthrax.  
However, they also may identify other health events, and, as a result, this surveillance approach 
for anthrax often leads to frequent false alarms.  The following study seeks to improve anthrax 
outbreak detection by examining the effectiveness of an approach which relies on identifying 
symptoms and syndromes in anthrax patients that occur slightly later in the course of their 
illness.  The rationale of this approach is to target symptoms that are more anthrax-specific, thus 
considerably reducing the number of outbreaks to investigate for confirmation. 
7.1 SPECIFIC AIM 1 
To identify a cohort of anthrax-like illness among individuals using the Emergency 
Department (ED) at Presbyterian University Hospital (PUH) in 2001. Syndromic surveillance is 
typically conducted in hospital Emergency Departments (ED). The first step in the evaluation of 
syndromic surveillance of anthrax in an ED setting requires the identification of admission 
events that would draw the attention of a syndromic surveillance program.  The aim will develop 
a case definition for inhalation anthrax based upon fulminate phase syndromes and symptoms, 
ICD-9-CM codes, arterial blood gas levels, and radiologic reports to identify mediastinal 
widening or lymphadenopathy on chest radiographs in an ED setting. Compared to the 
predominant case definition of inhalation anthrax in the literature, based on indications of febrile 
illness and chest pain, the proposed case definition is more encompassing, and includes more 
specific and later stage health events in the natural history of anthrax.  The assumption is that this 
comprehensive case-definition will greatly reduce the number of incorrect patient encounters 
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included in the surveillance effort, while not sacrificing timeliness of detection to a significant 
extent.  Information from the medical records on all ED admissions in 2001 will be reviewed to 
identify the number of persons who meet the proposed case-definition. 
7.2 SPECIFIC AIM 2 
To identify and characterize the clinical characteristics which differentiate inhalation 
anthrax from other causes of acute respiratory failure with a widened mediastinum. An 
important component of this work is to examine the usefulness of existing medical record 
information for syndromic surveillance purposes. This aim will compare the reported signs, 
symptoms, medical history, and laboratory values for the emergency department patients 
meeting the fulminate phase syndromic case definition from Specific Aim 1 to the clinical 
characteristics of the 11 inhalation anthrax patients from the 2001 terrorism event in order to 
determine which clinical features are most useful in discriminating inhalation anthrax from other 
causes of acute respiratory failure among individuals with evidence of a widened mediastinum. 
This aim will also address the findings from the literature that signs and symptoms primarily 
associated with seasonal influenza such as sore throat or runny nose would most significantly 
contraindicate inhalation anthrax. Other findings from the medical history of the patient will also 
be examined to identify and evaluate potential factors that can be used in syndromic surveillance 
to rule out anthrax. 
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7.3 SPECIFIC AIM 3 
To simulate outbreaks of anthrax like illness based on the characteristics of the 2001 
anthrax attacks. 
Epidemiologists use known outbreaks to assess the usefulness of their syndromic 
systems. The evaluation of syndromic detection methods and their usefulness requires the 
identification of known outbreaks. Because only one anthrax outbreak has occurred in the recent 
past, simulation techniques must be used to recreate outbreaks based on the 2001 attack. To 
simulate an outbreak of inhalation anthrax during the study period, excess cases, based on the 
pattern of the cases from 2001, were added to the daily counts from the 2001 PUH admissions. 
This aim is required to assess the accuracy and timeliness of the outbreak detection methods in 
Aim 4. This aim replicated a set of outbreaks consistent with anthrax outbreaks by varying the 
magnitude, duration, and distribution of excess cases. This aim applied simulation methods 
demonstrated in the syndromic surveillance literature used for detecting large influenza like 
illness outbreaks. Although smaller in scale, a useful set of synthetic anthrax outbreaks was 
produced by this aim. 
7.4 SPECIFIC AIM 4 
To determine the potential accuracy and timeliness of commonly used detection methods 
for inhalation anthrax outbreaks.  
In order for public health practitioners to appropriately respond to inhalation anthrax 
outbreaks, they must understand the accuracy and timeliness of the alerting syndromic 
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surveillance system. This is especially true in the case of a newly implemented syndromic 
surveillance system. The goal of this aim is to evaluate the potential accuracy and timeliness of a 
fulminate phase inhalation anthrax syndromic surveillance system. The simulated outbreaks 
constructed in Specific Aim 3 will be evaluated using the z-score, and the cumulative summation 
(CUSUM) algorithms used by the CDC Early Aberration Reporting System (EARS) to assess 
accuracy. The time to detection will also be compared across methods to better understand how 
quickly outbreaks can be detected. 
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8.0  METHODS 
This research was undertaken using data collected from the emergency department of the 
PUH.  The following section describes the methods of the study in more detail; including the 
study population, details on the case definitions, data collection, and data analysis. The 
University of Pittsburgh Institutional Review Board reviewed and approved this study 
(Appendix H).  
8.1 STUDY POPULATION 
8.1.1 Inclusion Criteria 
This study identified patient visits resembling those of individuals seeking care for 
critical symptoms of late stage anthrax.  Eligible visits for this study were selected from a review 
of all ED admissions to Presbyterian University Hospital (PUH) in 2001.  Eligible visits were 
classified as those visits with criteria resembling inhalation anthrax. Specifically, eligible visits 
had to meet the following syndromic case definition for inhalation anthrax: any patient admitted 
to PUH from the ED with acute respiratory failure and radiological findings consistent with 
inhalation anthrax. 
Patient visits with acute respiratory failure were identified using clinical laboratory 
values, diagnostic codes, and procedure codes. A review of consensus statements, medical 
textbooks, and primary literature provided resource material for the inclusion criteria for the 
study. Acute respiratory failure was defined as any one of the following: a PCO2 value of ≥50 
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mmHg and pH of <7.38, a PO2 of <60 mmHg, a diagnosis of ARF (ICD-9 518.81) in the 
Admission, Discharge, and Transfer (ADT) record, mechanical ventilation (ICD-9 96.7 or ICD-9 
96.72), or intubation (ICD-9 96.04). Only acute respiratory failure that occurred within 48 hours 
of admission was included.  Once it is determined that a patient visit met the definition of ARF, 
their free text radiology reports were retrieved. (141,272, 273, 274, 275) 
Radiological findings of anthrax were covered extensively in section 4.2 Clinical 
Features.  Radiological findings consistent with inhalation anthrax were defined as mediastinal 
widening or mediastinal, paratracheal, and hilar lymphadenopathy on chest radiograph, chest CT, 
or chest MRI as described by Inglesby. (145) Only radiological findings consistent with 
inhalation anthrax occurring within 48 hours of admission were considered. Confirmation of 
these findings was provided by radiologist review. Review of radiological records is described in 
the following section. 
The “Identifying Patient Sets” software was used to formulate Boolean search strings 
(e.g. “mediastinal AND widening”) to identify patient visits with possible mediastinal widening 
or lymphadenopathy (IPS Software, IAIMS Program at the University of Pittsburgh's 
Department of Biomedical Informatics).  (276)  All radiology reports were retrieved for 4 patient 
sets: mechanical ventilation, intubation, a diagnosis of ARF, or arterial blood gases meeting the 
inclusion criteria. For each of these four sets Boolean search strings were formulated to retrieve 
the maximum amount of potential patient visits meeting the radiological criteria (“Hits”). All 
reports which contain a word or phrase related to mediastinal widening or lymphadenopathy 
were reviewed preliminarily. Any report which only mentioned these findings in a statement of 
negation (“The patient had no mediastinal widening”) or in relation to verifying tube placement 
(“An endotracheal tube, right IJ swan ganz catheter, mediastinal drainage tube, and left chest 
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tube are in place”) were labeled as ‘Not of interest’ (“Misses”). All other reports were given to 
radiologists for further review.  
To identify findings consistent with IA, radiologists were recruited from the University of 
Pittsburgh Department of Radiology residency program and paid on an hourly basis to read the 
radiology reports identified by the software. In an attempt to improve internal validity and reduce 
measurement error, the study required that each radiologist attend at least one training session. 
Initial training consisted of a one hour session and review of a ten record training set. A detailed 
instruction for Form 1 is included in Appendix I.  
Radiologists reviewed all chest radiographs from the patient’s first three days of 
admission. Radiologists characterized each report as positive, negative, inconclusive, or not 
specified for mediastinal widening or lymphadenopathy. See Appendix J. Reviewers further 
characterized lymphadenopathy into anatomical locations. Only hilar, mediastinal, and 
paratracheal lymphadenopathy were accepted as radiological findings that could be consistent 
with inhalational anthrax for the purposes of this study. Once all records were reviewed by two 
radiologists, a third radiologist broke the tie for discordant reports. Radiologist agreement will be 
reached through majority consensus. See Appendix K.  
Radiologists did not accept mediastinal widening that was attributed to positioning, 
technique, or was mentioned as a historical finding. Other findings which were not accepted or 
considered controversial: calcified lymph nodes, mediastinal shift, soft tissue mass, huge edema 
in the chest and “limited studies.” CT scans are considered more informative than chest X-rays 
but both were accepted.  
Eligible patient visits had to meet three successive criteria to be included in the anthrax 
like illness population. The process for identifying a patient visit is illustrated in Figure 15. 
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Figure 15. Flow Chart of Study Inclusion Criteria 
 
Patient visits that met all study inclusion criteria will be referred to as “syndromic” 
patient visits and their condition will be described as “anthrax like illness’ for the remainder of 
the paper. The number of patient visits in the PUH ED that would be expected to be identified in 
a syndromic surveillance system (with the forementioned eligibility criteria) will be referred to 
as the “PUH baseline” for the remainder of the paper. 
8.1.2 Data collection 
Detailed clinical data was collected for all (N=134) patients meeting the study inclusion 
criteria. Data for this study were obtained from the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center 
(UPMC) Medical Archival Retrieval System (MARS).  This electronic medical records system 
includes data from hospital and emergency department visits for the PUH and other clinical units 
in the UPMC health system.  Data collection consisted of examining both textual reports and 
coded data.  Not all patients had complete records for all types of information. This may be due 
to very short ED episodes where the patient was essentially passed through to critical care, 
missing chart information, or only a paper version but no electronic version exists. Two resident, 
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emergency medicine physicians were recruited and trained to review the physical findings and 
medical history portions of the patient’s ED report, and additional textual reports.  
The two ED physicians reviewed each ED report for the presence of fever, sweats, 
fatigue, cough, dementia, dyspnea, nausea or vomiting, chest pain or discomfort, myalgias, 
headache, confusion, abdominal pain, sore throat, rhinorrhea, and trauma. The reviewing 
physicians also collected chief complaint. The complaint was either explicitly stated in the report 
or assigned by the reviewing physicians. The residents were trained in a one hour session with 
ten training reports and were paid an hourly rate for reviewing reports.  All reports identified in 
an initial eligibility screen were reviewed by both residents.  Ties were broken by consensus 
during a three hour long conference at the end of record review. Detailed instructions given to 
the residents and can be found in Appendix L. 
To better understand the cause of admission, ED physicians collected medical history 
from the patient's ED report. The Charlson Index, a weighted index that takes into account the 
number and the seriousness of comorbid diseases, was used to categorize important conditions 
from the patient’s medical history. (277) Each item of the history was classified by an emergency 
medicine physician as one of 17 categories of the Charlson Index. A supplement to the 
instructions provided an expanded listing of conditions includes each medical history definition 
as adapted by Deyo et al. (278) See Appendix M. Those include chronic pulmonary disease, 
cerebrovascular disease, renal disease, peripheral vascular disease, rheumatologic disease, 
diabetes, myocardial infarction, congestive heart failure, dementia, peptic ulcer disease, mild 
liver disease, hemiplegia or paraplegia, any malignancy, moderate or severe liver disease, 
metastatic solid tumor, or AIDS.   Only pre-existing conditions of the admitted patient were 
included.  Reviewers excluded complications developed during the hospital stay. Reviewers 
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recorded any additional medical history items mentioned in the patient’s ED report that fulfilled 
the definition of a comorbid condition in an ‘additional history items’ field. 
In addition to the radiological findings required as part of the study inclusion criteria, a 
second review of the radiological records was conducted to ascertain presence of findings 
consistent with inhalation anthrax. Patient free text radiological records were reviewed by 
radiologists for the presence of consolidation or pleural effusions. See Appendix S. The 
reviewers further characterized each record by lung and region. Tie-breaking consisted of a 
reviewer conference at the end of the record reviews to reach a consensus on disagreements. All 
reports from the first three days of admission were combined into a single record. All extraneous 
reports (e.g. CT of the head) were eliminated.  
Patient demographics were collected from the Admission, Discharge, and Transfer 
(ADT) record including date of birth and gender. Admission pattern was determined by 
examining the patient’s ADT data for all previous visits to PUH in 2001. A visit was defined as 
the number of days from admission to discharge. Although a patient may have multiple visits 
throughout the course of a year, all analyses were conducted at visit level. The number of 
previous admissions was examined as both a continuous and categorical variable. Previous 
admissions were coded as a binary variable using one week as the cut point based on clinical 
plausibility and the natural history of IA.  
For clinical labs, the first result after the time of admission was used. White blood cell 
count, hematocrit, platelet count, blood urea nitrogen, sodium, potassium, creatinine, bilirubin, 
aspartate aminotransferase, alanine aminotransferase, albumin, and calcium were examined. For 
hematocrit, sex-adjusted normal values were used (male 39-49, female 35-45). Clinical 
laboratory results for anthrax patients were collected from the medical literature. In some cases, 
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results were only described as ‘within normal limits,’ ‘normal admission laboratory results 
reported,’ or ‘normal levels reported’. More specific results were reported as ‘normal electrolytes 
reported’ or ‘normal serum chemistries.’ In situations where multiple laboratory results were 
available, such as Anthrax Case 6, the earliest was selected. All laboratory results are shown in 
Appendix V.  Microbiological results for all blood and CSF cultures were retrieved for each 
patient visit.  
Clinical characteristics of the 11 patients with inhalation anthrax in the 2001 bioterrorism 
event were abstracted from published case reports (160,279,280,281,282,283,284). All patients 
except for the Connecticut patient were described in the summary by Jernigan et al. In addition, 
six of the patients, including the Connecticut patient, were described in individual case reports. 
The clinical summaries from the case reports were extracted to a study form. The article itself 
was also attached to the form. Both were available to reviewers.  
8.2 ANALYSIS 
8.2.1 Analysis - Specific Aim 1 
The analysis for this aim focused on describing the study population inclusion criteria 
and understanding the frequency and distribution of anthrax like illness over time to use as a 
baseline for the evaluation of a syndromic surveillance system for inhalation anthrax in an ED 
setting. Summary statistics described characteristics of the study cohort, including the frequency 
of each of four inclusion criteria for acute respiratory failure (blood gases, intubation, diagnosis, 
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and mechanical ventilation) and the inclusion criteria for radiologic findings (lymphadenopathy 
and mediastinal widening)  
It is important to understand the frequency and distribution of flagged anthrax-like cases 
in the PUH ED over time. The analysis calculated the daily mean and standard deviation of 
anthrax like illness over time, single day minimums and maximums, changes in volume due to 
day of week, and week day versus weekend volume. No hypotheses were tested in Specific Aim 
1. 
8.2.2 Analysis - Specific Aim 2 
Analysis for Specific Aim 2 focused on comparing the frequency of signs and symptoms 
between the historical inhalational anthrax cases and the identified anthrax-like subjects in the 
study population. The most discriminate clinical features were then used to build a decision tree 
for further classifying patients according to their clinical characteristics. Specific Aim 2 is 
formally stated in Section 7.2.  
A complete listing of the analysis variables for Specific Aim 2 is found in Table 17. 
Radiologic and physical exam findings were analyzed as dichotomous variables. Any finding 
which reviewers marked as No, Uncertain, or Not Specified was considered negative for the 
finding of interest. Trauma as a cause for admission was grouped into four categories: those 
including motor vehicles, falls, gunshot wounds, and all other causes. A patient was considered 
positive for a significant medical history if any item on the Charlson index was present. Each 
“medical history” item was examined individually as a dichotomous variable. Microbiology 
results were grouped into three categories: gram-positive bacilli, gram-negative bacilli, gram-
positive cocci. Previous admission was coded as positive or negative for having a previous visit 
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within one week and analyzed as a dichotomous variable. Laboratory results were analyzed as 
dichotomous variables using normal clinical ranges as cut points.  
All data analysis was conducted using SAS version 9.2. (SAS Institute Inc., Carry, NC) 
Odds ratios with confidence intervals were calculated for all variables. (285) Confidence 
intervals were calculated according to the method of Simel. (286) Due to 100% prevalence of 
certain indicators (pleural effusions, consolidation, left lung pleural effusions, left lung 
consolidation), no odds ratio could be calculated, significance testing was done by Fishers exact 
test or chi square.   
All variables found to have a lower confidence interval greater than 1.00 were retained 
for a decision tree analysis to further examine the most discriminate combination of clinical 
variables for use in a syndromic surveillance. The primary outcome for the tree was to determine 
presence of anthrax infection. All clinical predictors were input as binary categorical variables. 
For variables with missing data, CART chooses a surrogate variable with a distribution similar to 
the missing variable relative to the outcome. This means CART chooses a surrogate variable that 
is not explicitly included in decision rules in the tree but was used in the algorithm to predict the 
final variable set. A standard ten-fold cross validation scheme was used to determine the optimal 
tree by maximizing predictive accuracy while minimizing the number of terminal nodes 
(“complexity”) in the tree. The tree with the lowest misclassification cost was chosen. 
The tree was then used to score each patient encounter including syndromic and anthrax 
cases. Encounters were then plotted over time to illustrate the frequency and distribution of high 
and low probability cases. All decision tree analysis was conducted using Salford Predictive 
Model Builder v6.6 (Salford Systems, CA). 
 
 103 
Table 17. Aim 2 Key Clinical Indicators 
 
Consolidation? Pleural Effusions?
Right Lung Consolidation Right Lung Pleural Effusion
Right Upper Lung Right Large
Right Middle Lung Right Medium
Right Lower Lung Right Small
Left Lung Consolidation Left Lung Pleural Effusion
Left Upper Lung Left Large
Left Middle Lung Left Medium
Left Lower Lung Left Small
Sign or Symptom^
Cough Chest Pain or Discomfort
Fever Headache
Dyspnea Confusion
Nausea or Vomiting Abdominal Pain
Fatigue Sore Throat
Myalgias Rhinorrhea
Sweats
Medical History Item
Significant medical history? Dementia
Chronic pulmonary disease Peptic ulcer disease
Cereberovascular disease Mild liver disease
Renal disease Hemiplegia or paraplegia
Peripheral vascular disease Any malignancy
Rheumatologic disease Moderate or severe liver disease
Diabetes Metastatic solid tumor
Myocardial Infarction AIDS
Congestive Heart Failure
Laboratory study
WBC Count, 10 9^ cells/L Creatinine, mg/dL
Hematocrit, % Bilirubin, mg/dL
Platelet count, x 10 9^ platelets/L Aspartate aminotransferase, U/L
Blood urea nitrogen, mg/dL Alanine aminotransferase, U/L
Sodium, mM Albumin, g/dL
Potassium, mM Calcium, mg/dL
Microbiology result
Gram Negative Rod Gram Positive Cocci
Gram Positive Rod
 104 
8.2.3 Hypotheses Aim 2 
In order to evaluate the potential of emergency department data for a syndromic 
surveillance case definition of inhalation anthrax, it is important to understand the clinical picture 
of the patients presenting in the ED. The overall alternate hypothesis for Aim 2 was that there 
exist significant clinical differences between the characteristics of the 2001 bioterrorism anthrax 
patients and the characteristics of the identified syndromic patients at PUH. Five distinct clinical 
sub-analyses were conducted. Hypotheses for each analysis are given below. 
Signs and symptoms:  Myalgias, fatigue, nausea, sweats, cough, fever, headache, 
dyspnea, confusion, chest pain, rhinorrhea, and abdominal pain are predictive of anthrax. 
Rhinorrhea and sore throat should not be protective, as reported in the literature, due to low 
prevalence of seasonal respiratory conditions among syndromic patients. 
Medical history:  Patients may exhibit anthrax-like illness due to a co-morbid condition. 
Items from the Charlson Index were examined due to their prevalence and severity. A simple test 
for any Charlson Index item should differentiate syndromic patients from anthrax patients. 
Examining each co-morbid condition on the Charlson Index, items related to serious chronic 
respiratory complications should differentiate syndromic patients from anthrax patients. 
Radiologic findings:  Pleural effusions and/or consolidation were found in all 11 anthrax 
cases. These findings should occur with relatively lower frequency in the syndromic group. 
Anthrax patients should have a significantly higher proportion of pleural effusions and 
consolidation on chest radiograph. 
Visit Pattern:  Anthrax is a biphasic disease. Patients may be more likely to be seen twice 
in one week – once in the prodromal phase, once in the fulminate phase. Anthrax patients ought 
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to have a significantly higher proportion of patients with a visit in the week prior to their 
admission. 
Clinical Labs: Anthrax patients have a distinct laboratory profile. Anthrax patients should 
have significantly high AST, high ALT, low sodium, high BUN, high hematocrit, high bilurubin 
low calcium, and low albumin laboratory values as demonstrated in the literature. Other labs may 
be protective such as low potassium, high creatinine lab values given their low prevalence in 
recent anthrax cases. 
8.2.4 Analysis - Specific Aim 3 
Specific Aim 3 focuses on constructing a set of realistic outbreak data sets to test the 
accuracy and timeliness of each detection method.  While this aim does not test a hypothesis, it 
outlines and provides understanding to the size, length and distribution of outbreaks in a 
potential syndromic surveillance system, and illustrates their possible detection in an ED-based 
system.  Specific Aim 3 is formally stated in Section 7.3.  
Creating a “synthetic” or “simulated’ outbreak is a technique which adds excess case 
counts to an existing time series of surveillance data. The technique employed in this study is 
similar to simulated outbreaks created for the studies by Jackson, Murphy and Zhu, reviewed in 
the Analytical methods section on beginning on page 69.   
However, instead of creating large numbers of hypothetical scenarios corresponding to 
typical outbreaks seen in the community, a very specific focus on the epidemiologic patterns of 
the 2001 anthrax attack was maintained. The primary epidemiologic reference for the attack was 
“Investigation of bioterrorism-related anthrax, United States, 2001: epidemiologic findings”. 
(271)   
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8.2.5 Outbreak parameters 
 
 
Figure 16. 2001 Inhalation Anthrax Attack 
 
The 2001 attack, as described by Jernigan is plotted in Figure 16.  The entire outbreak 
lasted 47 days, with the first patient hospital visit on October 1st and the last on November 17th. 
The outbreak consisted of 11 cases, with a single day maximum of two cases. The outbreak has 
three major disease clusters. Each cluster corresponds to a distinct exposure due to anthrax letters 
sent to three offices in Florida, Washington, D.C., and New York. From this source data, six 
outbreak simulations were created for the 2001 PUH ED time series.  
The first simulation created in this specific aim superimposed the excess counts from the 
2001 anthrax attack to the PUH time series exactly as they occurred in time.  As shown in the 
timeline in Figure 16, one case was added on day 1 (October 1st), one case on day 2 (October 
2nd), and so forth.  
Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 
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The second simulation created was similar to the first simulation in that the excess counts 
from the 2001 anthrax attack were added to the PUH time series exactly as they occurred in time.  
However, the start date was varied. This was done in order to remove bias created by the 
seasonality, healthcare utilization, or most importantly, Sept 11th attacks. 
The third, fourth, and fifth simulations relied on the three disease clusters within the 2001 
attack. These are labeled in Figure 16. The first cluster (“Cluster 1”) consisted of 2 cases over a 
2 day period. The second cluster (“Cluster 2”) consisted of 8 cases over 11 day period. The third 
cluster (“Cluster 3”) consisted of a single case. These were chosen to recreate possible anthrax 
letter mailings based on the incidence from 2001. Each simulation chose a start date at random. 
Although there was no way to vary the distribution of Cluster 1 or Cluster 3, a random 
distribution of the case counts in Cluster 2 was used over an 11 day period with a 2 case single-
day maximum.  
The sixth outbreak scenario randomly distributed the 11 inhalation cases over a 48 day 
period (“All clusters”). To maintain the historical limits from 2001, a single day case count 
maximum of 2 cases was used. This scenario provided the most variability in outbreak 
simulations give the very high number of combinations of start date and distribution. 
For each cluster type, a custom SAS program was written to generate the appropriate data 
sets. A dataset to provide the daily number of syndromic visits was created. Each day of 2001 
was numbered from 1 to 365 corresponding to admission dates from 1/1/2001 to 12/31/2001. 
The number of syndromic patient visits was recorded for each day. The number of daily 
historical anthrax cases was also recorded to be used with the 2001 Cluster and All Clusters 
scenarios.  
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Five outbreak sets were created based on the scenarios described by Jernigan. Each set 
was created using SAS 9.2 software. Before data simulations could occur, it was necessary to 
prepare the underlying time series. First a data set was prepared for the 2001 PUH admissions. 
This data set consisted of the number of syndromic anthrax cases for each day of the year, 
numbered 1-365, which corresponded to the dates of January 1st – December 31st. This data set 
provided the daily number of syndromic cases for the ‘baseline’ population and was derived 
from Specific Aim 1.  
For each of the simulations, there were three major steps: randomly distribute excess 
syndromic cases for the appropriate time frame, create the correct number of outbreaks, and then 
run the three analytical methods on each outbreak to determine if the outbreak was detected.  
The first step was to randomly distribute excess syndromic cases for the appropriate time 
frame. This step begins by first knowing the number of cases, the duration of the outbreak, the 
start date of the outbreak, and the maximum number of cases, if any, for any one single day. All 
of this information was gathered from the article by Jernigan et al and is detailed in the section 
8.2.5 Outbreak parameters. Start date was determined by random number generation with only 
numbers greater than 30 and less than 365 minus the duration of the outbreak retained. Once a 
start date was established the distribution of the cases was determined.  
For scenarios ‘2001 Outbreak’, Cluster 1, and Cluster 3 no randomization was required 
because the distribution was set. Only a start date was chosen. However for ‘Cluster 2’ and ‘All 
Clusters’ randomization was used to distribute the cases across the duration of the outbreak. This 
process assigned each day of the outbreak, 11 days for Cluster 2 and 48 days for All Clusters, a 
random number. This was done for ten thousand uniquely identified outbreaks. The outbreaks 
were then sorted by ID number and then random number. Depending on the number of cases for 
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the outbreak, 1 or 2 cases were then added for each day of the outbreak until the total number of 
cases was reached. The outbreaks were then resorted back to their original order by date.  This is 
illustrated for Cluster 2 in Table 18. 
 
Table 18. Randomly Distribute Cases 
Generate correct number of 
days 
Randomize Assign cases accumulating 
to predetermined total 
Re-sort 
    
 
 
Once the distribution of cases was determined, the excess cases were added to the 
baseline number of cases corresponding to the randomly selected start date. For example if the 
start date 50 was randomly chosen, Day 1 of the outbreak would be 50, Day 2 would be 51, etc. 
This process was repeated 10,000 times for all five outbreak scenarios until 50,000 total time 
series were generated, each one 365 days long with the appropriate number of excess cases 
added to it. 
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8.2.6 Analysis - Specific Aim 4 
This aim determined the optimal statistical test for identifying inhalation anthrax 
outbreaks – significant departures from normal illness trends – as well as characterized which 
tests optimally perform under various combinations of outbreak size, duration, and distribution. 
This aim relied on results from Aim 1 where the baseline of the PUH ED was calculated. This 
aim also relied on the simulated data sets produced in Aim 3.  
In public health surveillance, “outbreaks” are traditionally defined as an observed value 
being greater than an expected historical value for that same time period.  This study used three 
detection methods to identify when identified visits may exceed the historical norm: the EARS 
C1 & C3 and the z-score method of Jackson. 
The EARS C1 & C3 methods are featured in the package develop and maintained by the 
CDC BioSense program. (287) Also, the EARS C1 & C3 methods are supported and freely 
distributed by the CDC. (238,248,247,253) These statistical methods were developed based on a 
one-sided positive CUSUM (cumulative sum) calculation. The equation can be written as 
follows:  
St=max(0, St-1  + ((Xt -(µ0 +kσxt))/σxt )) 
with a decision value of St >2, where Xt is the count, µo is the expected value, σxt is the standard 
deviation, k is the detectable shift from the mean, St is the current CUSUM calculation, and St-1 
is the previous CUSUM calculation. The length of the baseline was chosen as 14 days which was 
shown to be optimum in a recent study by Tokars. (249) 
C3 is useful for identifying aberrations that gradually increase over short periods of time. 
The C3 uses a 14 day baseline with a two day offset and the threshold is based on a 3-day 
average run length of the one-sided positive CUSUM. The positive differences from the mean 
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for the past 3 days are then summed.  The cumulative sum is then compared to the baseline 
period to determine its significance. C3 is designed to signal when consecutive days of high case 
counts occur since those counts would not be incorporated immediately into the baseline period 
after the initial flag. This is illustrated in Figure 17. 
The baseline period for C1 is obtained from the previous 14 days immediately following 
the observed case counts. The threshold calculations for the C1 signal when observed case 
counts exceed 3 standard deviations above the baseline mean.  This method differs from C3 in its 
handling of consecutive signal days. For C1, if a signal is noted on a particular day, the next day 
is less likely to produce a flag since the elevated count from the previous day will be 
immediately incorporated into the new baseline period.  C1 is most useful for situations where 
signals can be monitored on a daily basis and accounted for quickly (i.e., within 24 hours). 
Therefore, being alerted to the same information the following day would be considered 
redundant and burdensome. This is illustrated in Figure 17. 
 
 
Figure 17. C1 and C3 Approaches 
 
The WEWD Z score approach is featured in the ESSENCE package developed at Johns 
Hopkins University. The z-score approach differentiates between weekends and weekdays 
(WEWD) to calculate the difference of the observed day from the past 7 days. (238,268) This 
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adjustment is made to compensate for dramatically different healthcare utilization periods on the 
weekends. It is common that Sunday is the lowest volume day of the week thus leading to 
frequent Monday signals. The WEWD approach is illustrated in Figure 18. The mean and 
standard deviation of the prior 28 days are then used to calculate the z-score. When the z-score 
exceeds 2.00 (99% prediction interval), an alarm is sounded. The analysis showed no weekend 
effect in the baseline, therefore an unstratified z score was used. 
 
 
Figure 18. WEWD Z-Score Approach 
 
After simulations are run for the three methods, each was evaluated according to 
accuracy, timeliness, and sensitivity. Accuracy measured the detection ability of the method.  
‘Detection’ of an outbreak meant crossing the predefined threshold level during the time period 
containing the outbreak (i.e. z-score ≥ 2; cumulative sum ≥ 2) . False alarms were defined as 
detection in the absence of an outbreak interval. The accuracy of each combination of baseline 
calculation and outbreak detection test was calculated by the number of outbreaks detected 
divided by the total number of outbreaks. Timeliness will be measured by the number of days 
between the outbreak start date and detection. Several hypotheses were tested according each of 
these evaluations. 
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Hypotheses - Aim 4 
The overall hypothesis of Aim 4 was that syndromic surveillance for inhalation anthrax 
in an emergency department can provide accurate and timely identification of outbreaks.  
1. Each of the three outbreak detection should detect the simulated 2001 inhalation anthrax 
outbreak. 
2. The choice of baseline calculation improves the accuracy and timeliness of outbreak 
detection. 
3. There exists a detection threshold which optimizes the balance between accurate outbreak 
identification and excessive false alarms. 
4. Optimal performance of each anthrax outbreak detection will vary depending on 
characteristics of the anthrax outbreak simulation, including: 
a. Size: Total number of cases and daily maximums affect detection. 
b. Length: Duration of an outbreak will affect timeliness. 
c. Distribution: How cases cluster will determine optimal method. 
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9.0  RESULTS 
This section presents the results of each of the four study aims. The primary goal of the 
first two Aims was to identify and describe a population which fit a syndromic surveillance case 
definition for inhalation anthrax with a focus on the Presbyterian University Hospital (PUH) 
Emergency Department (ED). The second aim evaluated several outbreak detection methods for 
identifying possible anthrax attacks. 
9.1 AIM 1 
9.1.1 Identify syndromic population 
The syndromic case definition was defined as any patient admitted to PUH from the ED 
with acute respiratory failure and radiological findings consistent with inhalation anthrax. In 
2001 there were approximately 16497 patient visits resulting in admission to PUH from the ED. 
Table 19 shows that among those visits, 685 were intubated (ICD-9 96.04), 1198 required 
mechanical ventilation (ICD-9 96.7 or ICD-9 96.72) and 849 were given a diagnosis of acute 
respiratory failure (ICD-9 518.81). Of 3558 patient visits with arterial blood gas readings, 1126 
encounters satisfied one of the two blood gas criteria: 706 had a PO2P < 60 and 689 with a 
PCO2P >= 50/PH<7.38. In all, 2478 patient visits were identified as meeting the criteria for 
acute respiratory distress. 
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Table 19. Inclusion Criteria 
 
 
Radiology records were collected for the 461 of those patient visits that had at least one 
chest radiograph in the first 48 hours of their admission. Mediastinal widening was found in 93 
visits and lymphadenopathy was found in 42 thus satisfying the syndromic case definition. A 
total of 134 of 16,497 (0.08%) total patient visits were included in the study. These 134 patient 
visits comprised the baseline population necessary to calculate the expected values in Aim 4.  
Figure 19 shows each patient visit by admission date plotted over 2001 with the mean, 
1x standard deviation (SD), and 2x SD with a 14 day moving average to smooth daily variations.  
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Figure 19. Baseline Population 
 
Daily volume fluctuated from 0-3 cases per day. The mean number of daily syndromic 
visits was equal to 0.3 (SD=0.61). The mean percentage of total ED volume was equal to 0.81% 
(SD=1.4%). The maximum number of cases was equal to 3 on three occasions: Day 53, Day 102, 
and Day 192. The highest percentage of total ED volume was 8% and occurred on Day 154. The 
percentage of cases exceeded 6% on three occasions: Day 53, Day 102, and Day 192. Day-of-
week did not affect volume with a weekday average count of 0.38 (0.81%) similar to weekend 
average count of 0.33 (0.84%). 
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9.2 AIM 2 
The goal of the analysis for Aim 2 is to compare the 11 anthrax cases from the literature 
to the patients identified at PUH ED by applying a syndromic surveillance case definition. 
Subsequently, detailed clinical data is examined to evaluate the potential for an improved 
syndromic case definition for inhalation anthrax.  
9.2.1 Identify Discriminating Factors 
The first step in the analysis was to identify clinical characteristics which differentiate 
inhalation anthrax from other causes of acute respiratory failure with a widened mediastinum. 
Significant findings in this section formed the basis of a refined syndromic surveillance case 
definition resulting from decision tree analysis. 
9.2.2 Demographic Summary 
It is important to note in a demographic summary of the anthrax and syndromic patients 
that while all PUH patients were seen in Pennsylvania, anthrax patients were seen in six states 
across the Eastern seaboard: Maryland (3), Virginia (2), New York (1), New Jersey (2), Florida 
(2), and Connecticut (1).  However, this geographic difference did not result in significant 
demographic differences. Table 20 shows the number (No.) and percentage (%) of anthrax and 
syndromic patient visits by gender and race. Mean age in years is also given. Table 20 shows 
syndromic patients were similar to the anthrax patients in both gender and age. Over 60% of 
each group was male. The syndromic group was predominantly white. There was no statistically 
significant difference in age between the two groups (p=0.51) 
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Table 20. Demographics 
 
9.2.3 Power calculations 
Based on this sample and a fixed number of records, a power analysis was conducted for 
significance testing portion of the research. Calculations were performed using the PS Power and 
Sample Size software developed by Dupont and Plummer at Vanderbilt University. (288) Given 
the fixed sample size of the study, the software provided the power to detect odds ratios at 
varying levels of prevalence for a Fisher’s exact test at alpha equal to 0.05. Figure 20 shows, for 
11:134 matching, the power of detectable odds ratio (OR) from 2-25 at prevalence of 0.1 to 0.9. 
This level of matching is for analysis with all study subjects having complete records such as 
radiology reports. Figure 21 shows, for 11:92 matching, the power of detectable odds ratio (OR) 
from 2-25 at prevalence of 0.1 to 0.9. This level of matching is for analysis with all study 
subjects having emergency department reports. The charts are color coded to differentiate 
analyses with the most power (green) from the least power (red). Results show that power of 
80% in most analyses with a detectable OR > 8 and a prevalence < 40%. 
No. % No. %
Gender Male 7 64 91 68
Female 4 36 43 32
Race Black 5 45 9 7
White 3 27 115 86
Asian 2 18 2 1
Hispanic 1 9 0 0
Other 0 0 8 6
Age Mean (yrs)
Anthrax
(n=11)
60 56
Syndromic
 (n=134)
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Figure 20. Power Calculations for Analysis Requiring Radiology Report Data 
 
 
Figure 21. Power Calculations for Analysis Requiring Emergency Report Data 
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9.2.4 Signs and symptoms 
ED reports were retrieved for 92 of 134 syndromic group patients. Odds ratios (OR) with 
95% confidence intervals (LLCI, ULCI) were calculated for each ED report variable. Table 21 
shows all symptoms except abdominal pain and rhinorrhea to be statistically higher in the 
anthrax group than the syndromic group. Myalgias (muscle pain) were found to be most 
predictive, whereas cough, dyspnea, and fever were shown to be most common among anthrax 
patients.  
 
Table 21. Signs and Symptoms 
 
 
Num Pct Num Pct OR
Cough 10 91 11 12 73.64 8.58 632.12
Dyspnea 9 82 25 27 12.06 2.44 59.71
Fever 9 82 7 8 54.64 9.83 303.66
Nausea or Vomiting 9 82 5 5 78.30 13.24 463.21
Fatigue 8 73 2 2 120.00 17.42 826.57
Myalgias 8 73 1 1 242.67 22.55 2610.95
Chest Pain or Discomfort 7 64 17 18 7.72 2.03 29.38
Sweats 7 64 1 1 159.25 15.61 1624.12
Confusion 5 45 9 10 7.69 1.95 30.30
Headache 5 45 2 2 37.50 5.98 235.24
Abdominal Pain 3 27 13 14 2.28 0.53 9.72
Sore Throat 2 18 1 1 20.22 1.67 245.43
Rhinorrhea 1 9 1 1 9.10 0.53 156.95
95% CI
Anthrax Syndromic
(n=11) (n=92)
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9.2.5 Previous admission 
Given the biphasic nature of the anthrax illness, it is important to note differences in visit 
pattern between anthrax and syndromic patients. The analysis of admission pattern examined the 
possibility that anthrax patients more frequently visited the hospital twice in the same week. In 
the case of the 2001 attack, two anthrax patients were admitted, discharged and then later 
readmitted with severe respiratory findings. This visit pattern was less common among 
syndromic patients although not significantly so. Table 22 summarizes the findings. 
 
Table 22. Previous Admission for Anthrax and Syndromic Patient Populations 
 
  
 
No. % No. % OR
Prior visit within 1 week? 2 18 13 10 2.00 0.40 10.07
Anthrax Syndromic
95% CI
(n = 134)(n = 11)
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9.2.6 Trauma 
Of 94 patients meeting the syndromic case definition with emergency department 
records, 64 (69%) reported a traumatic cause of injury leading to admission. The leading cause 
of injury was motor vehicle accident (54%). No anthrax patient presented to the ED with trauma. 
Given the high prevalence of trauma among syndromic patients, it could serve as a useful rule 
out factor when conducting case investigations. Table 23 summarizes the findings. 
 
Table 23. Percentage of Trauma among Syndromic Patients 
 
  
Description No. (%)
Motor vehicle accident 50 54
Fall 11 12
Gun shot wound 2 2
Ski accident 1 1
41 patients missing ED record
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9.2.7 Medical history 
Similar to trauma, medical history provides a clue as to the reason for admission. Because 
acute respiratory failure among anthrax patients was caused by the infectious disease process, 
this aim explored whether more syndromic patients would be admitted due to major underlying 
medical conditions. While there were a greater variety of underlying medical conditions among 
syndromic patients, there existed no significant difference. Table 24 tabulates the results. 
 
Table 24. Medical History 
 
9.2.8 Radiologic findings – Consolidation 
The radiology report provides primary evidence of inhalation anthrax by revealing the 
telltale sign of mediastinal widening. In addition, the radiology report can provide key 
Medical history item No. % No. %
Cerebrovascular disease 2 18 4 4
Congestive heart failure 6 7
Chronic pulmonary disease 3 27 16 17
Dementia 3 3
Diabetes 1 9 4 4
Any malignancy 11 12
Myocardial infarction 1 1
Mild liver disease 2 2
Peripheral vascular disease 1 9 15 16
Renal disease 2 18 5 5
Rheumatologic disease 1 9 6 7
Anthrax Syndromic
(n=11) (n=92)
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radiological findings indicative of inhalation anthrax such as the presence of consolidation or 
pleural effusions.  
Table 25 shows consolidation in any location, right lung, right lower lung, and right 
middle lung were all found to be significantly higher in the anthrax group. Although, the point 
estimates appear to be higher in most significant indicators, the lower end of 95% CI (LLCI) 
were slightly above 1 in all 4 findings. Consolidation was found in 91% of anthrax patients with 
right lung being more common than left lung. The right lower lung was the most common lung 
region. The greatest significant difference between anthrax and syndromic patients was found in 
right lung consolidation (OR=13.10; 1.6, 105.3). 
 
Table 25. Radiologic Findings – Consolidation 
 
9.2.9 Radiologic findings – Pleural Effusions 
Table 26 shows differences in the presence of pleural effusions (PE) were found to be 
more pronounced than with consolidation. Pleural effusions were found in 100% of anthrax 
Num Pct Num Pct OR LLCI ULCI
Consolidation? 11 100 74 55 * * *
Left Lung Consolidation 11 100 61 46 * * *
Left Lower Lung 6 55 46 34 2.30 0.66 7.93
Left Middle Lung 3 27 17 13 2.58 0.62 10.69
Left Upper Lung 1 9 23 17 0.48 0.06 3.96
Right Lung Consolidation 10 91 58 43 13.10 1.63 105.29
Right Lower Lung 8 73 46 34 5.10 1.29 20.16
Right Middle Lung 5 45 24 18 3.82 1.08 13.55
Right Upper Lung 2 18 32 24 0.71 0.15 3.45
Anthrax Syndromic
(n=11) (n=92)
* No odds ratio calculated, p < 0.05
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patients. No odds ratio was calculated but the p-value found to be less than 0.05. All anthrax 
patients had left lung pleural effusions. This finding was not so common among syndromic 
patients with only 55% having the finding. Pleural effusions in any location, left lung, and right 
lung were all found to be significant. 
 
Table 26. Radiologic Findings – Pleural Effusions 
 
9.2.10 Clinical labs 
Clinical laboratory results can provide important indications of an infectious disease 
process like inhalation anthrax. Clinical laboratory results had varying availability for syndromic 
patients with sodium most available, and ALT/AST least available. Low albumin was the most 
prevalent anthrax finding. Table 27 shows that among those patients with labs, low sodium and 
high hematocrit were the most discriminating features  
Num Pct Num Pct OR LLCI ULCI
Pleural Effusions? 11 100 74 55 * * *
Left Lung Pleural Effusion 11 100 61 46 * * *
Left Large 4 36 5 4 14.74 3.23 67.34
Left Medium 2 18 9 7 3.09 0.58 16.48
Left Small 5 45 42 31 1.83 0.53 6.32
Right Lung Pleural Effusion 10 91 58 43 13.10 1.63 105.29
Right Large 7 64 7 5 31.75 7.48 134.69
Right Medium 3 27 10 7 4.65 1.06 20.33
Right Small 0 0 33 25
Anthrax Syndromic
(n=11) (n=92)
* No odds ratio calculated, p < 0.05
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Table 27. Clinical Laboratories 
 
Normal 
Laboratory study range No. % No. % OR
WBC Count, 10^9 cells/L 4.5-10.8
Low 0 0 3 2 ~ ~ ~
High 4 36 73 58 0.4 0.1 1.5
Hematocrit, % ^^
Low 0 0 105 70 ~ ~ ~
High 4 36 3 2 28.2 5.3 151.0
Platelet count, x 10^9 platelets/L 130-400
Low 2 18 16 15 1.3 0.3 6.6
High 0 0 9 8 ~ ~ ~
Blood urea nitrogen, mg/dL 10-20
Low 0 0 28 23 ~ ~ ~
High 3 27 37 30 0.8 0.2 3.1
Sodium, mM 136-145
Low 6 55 30 24 3.6 1.0 12.6
High 1 9 7 6 1.8 0.2 15.5
Potassium, mM 3.5-5.0
Low 0 0 22 17 ~ ~ ~
High 1 9 13 10 0.8 0.1 6.9
Creatinine, mg/dL <1.5
High 2 18 31 25 0.6 0.1 3.1
Bilirubin, mg/dL 0.3-1.0
Low 2 18 2 6 4.1 0.5 33.3
High 4 36 15 45 0.7 0.2 2.7
Aspartate aminotransferase, U/L 0-35
High 4 50 26 68 0.5 0.1 2.2
Alanine aminotransferase, U/L 0-35
High 2 25 24 65 0.2 0.0 1.2
Albumin, g/dL 3.5-5.5
Low 8 73 16 89 0.2 0.0 1.7
Calcium, mg/dL 9.0-10.5
Low 4 50 66 92 0.1 0.0 0.5
Syndromic
95% CI
Anthrax
^^ Male 39-49, female 35-45. 
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9.2.11 Decision tree 
Decision trees analysis was conducted to identify the most predictive combination of 
clinical findings. The resulting tree could be useful for deciding which syndromic cases to 
investigate. Table 28 shows all significant variables found to have a lower confidence interval 
greater than 1.0 that were retained for classification tree analysis. The analysis variables consist 
of nine findings from radiologic findings, 11 from signs and symptoms, and 2 laboratories. 
Presence of a gram positive bacillus and trauma were also included in the decision tree analysis.  
 
Table 28. Summary of Variables Retained for CART Tree 
 
Variable name Records Missing Number Percent Number Percent Odds ratio LLCI ULCI
Right Lung Consolidation 145 0 10 91 58 43 13 2 105
Right Lower Lung 145 0 8 73 46 34 5 1.3 20
Right Middle Lung 145 0 5 45 24 18 4 1.1 14
Consolidation? 145 0 10 91 74 55 8 1.01 65
Right Large 145 0 7 64 7 5 32 7 135
Left Large 145 0 4 36 5 4 15 3 67
Right Lung Pleural Effusion 145 0 10 91 58 43 13 2 105
Right Medium 145 0 3 27 10 7 5 1.1 20
Pleural Effusions? 145 0 10 91 74 55 8 1.01 65
Myalgias 103 42 8 73 1 1 243 23 2611
Fatigue 103 42 8 73 2 2 120 17 827
Sweats 103 42 7 64 1 1 159 16 1624
Nausea or Vomiting 103 42 9 82 5 5 78 13 463
Fever 103 42 9 82 7 8 55 10 304
Cough 103 42 10 91 11 12 74 9 632
Headache 103 42 5 45 2 2 38 6 235
Dyspnea 103 42 9 82 25 27 12 2 60
Chest Pain or Discomfort 103 42 7 64 17 18 8 2 29
Confusion 103 42 5 45 9 10 8 2 30
Sore Throat 103 42 2 18 1 1 20 2 245
Abnormal CA 80 54 4 50 6 8 11 2 55
Low NA 137 8 6 55 30 24 4 1.1 13
Anthrax Syndromic
(n=134)(n=11)
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Appendix U presents the detailed results of the CART analysis. Figure 22 presents a 
graphical depiction of the optimal decision tree. The tree sorted all 145 patient encounters into 8 
terminal nodes. Based on the composition of a terminal node, a probability for a patient 
encounter to be anthrax was calculated. For instance, 103 encounters did not have a cough. Of 
these 103, 102 also did not have fatigue. This terminal node is composed entirely of syndromic 
cases thus the chance of those encounters being anthrax is 0 out of 102, or 0%. The converse is 
true for the adjacent node. Only 1 visit did not have a cough but did have fatigue. The chance of 
anthrax within the node is 1 of 1, or 100%. Where 2 of 3 cases are anthrax the node is assigned a 
66% chance. The results of this analysis could provide an algorithm to aid subsequent 
investigations of cases meeting the current case definition. 
 
 
Figure 22. Decision Tree Results 
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Figure 23 illustrates the final decision tree. Each terminal node is colored to depict the 
possibility of anthrax:  0% chance of anthrax as green and 100% chance as red, the other four 
terminal nodes can be seen as yellow and orange or intermediate levels of risk. 
 
 
Figure 23. Decision Tree Results with Color Coding 
 
Given that naturally occurring anthrax is extremely rare, monitoring for bioterrorism-
related anthrax will detect almost exclusively false positives. The tree identified 126 of 134 cases 
correctly as not anthrax whereas 8 were incorrectly assigned to the anthrax group resulting in a 
specificity of 94%. The tree as a whole had a sensitivity of 100% which is to be expected with 
such a small case cohort. 
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Table 29 presents an index of importance as calculated by CART. To calculate a variable 
importance score, CART looks at the improvement measure attributable to each variable in its 
role as a either a primary or a surrogate splitter. The values of all these improvements are 
summed over each node and totaled, and are then scaled relative to the best performing variable. 
The variable with the greatest sum of improvements is scored the highest, and all other variables 
will have lower scores ranging downwards toward zero. (289) 
 
Table 29. Variable Importance in CART Decision Tree 
 
 
Variable Score
Myalgias 100
Cough 91
Truama 90
Right PE 49
Dyspnea 44
Fatigue 41
Any PE 35
Nausea 35
Left PE 31
Fever 31
Sweats 21
Right Medium PE 13
Confusion 11
Chest pain 9
Right Lower Consolidation 6
Headache 4
Right Large PE 3
Any Consolidation 2
Right Consolidation 2
Left large PE 1
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9.2.12 Decision Tree Results over Time 
The intention of the decision tree analysis is to provide a daily tool for use by Infection 
Control practitioners to make the decision to investigate a cluster of cases or not. The 
interpretation of these results can best be examined if visualized over time as in Figure 24. 
Shown here are all anthrax cases and the 134 syndromic cases plotted by admission week and 
scored with the classification algorithm. The frequency ranges from 0-9 cases in any given week 
with an average of about 3 encounters. Shown below the scored encounters is the total frequency 
of patient encounters in the ED with a 7 day running proportion to illustrate any fluctuations in 
volume or trends in admission pattern. A typical week in the ED is about 300 visits. Six cases 
exceeded a probability of 0 in the first 36 weeks of the year. An implication for public health 
preparedness is that a busy ED in an urban setting could expect a syndromic case every couple 
days, while having to spend some time investigating a case about every six weeks.  
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Figure 24. Decision Tree Results Plotted over Time 
9.2.13 Focus on 2001 anthrax attack 
Examining the events of October 2001, Figure 25 illustrates that two patients meeting the 
syndromic case definition were admitted to the hospital on October 1st. If the algorithm were 
implemented, the orange case would be investigated for anthrax. In reality, the first case, Ernesto 
Blanco, stymied the clinical staff for three days. It is important that no anthrax cases would be 
missed if the lowest scoring cases (“green”) were routinely excluded from investigation 
protocols. 
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Figure 25. Decision Tree Results Focused on Anthrax Attack Period 
 
To summarize Aim 2, a new way to look at syndromic cases of inhalation anthrax has 
been presented. Starting with fulminate symptoms and then using additional clinical data to 
narrow down a case cluster to only the most probable patients should decrease the time spent by 
outbreak investigators on annual basis.  
9.3 AIM 3  
The purpose of Aim 3 is to prepare analytical data sets for the analysis in Aim 4. Both 
Aim 3 and Aim 4 focus on a population-based approach to identifying outbreaks as opposed to a 
patient-based approach highlighted in Aim 1 and Aim 2. As described in Section 8.2.4, the 2001 
anthrax outbreak provided 5 scenarios to test syndromic surveillance outbreak detection 
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approaches. Ten thousand outbreaks of predetermined size and length were generated for each 
scenario. Figure 26 summarizes important parameters of the simulated outbreaks.  “Minimum 
day” is uniformly set at 31 for all outbreaks to allow for sufficient ramp up time for baseline (30 
days) calculations. “Minimum” and “Maximum” cases refer to the single day maximum or 
minimum as dictated by the individual scenario. For example, “Cluster 1” is a two-day, two case 
outbreak with a case occurring on each day. Therefore Minimum Case equals to 1 and Maximum 
Case equals to 1. In the “2001 Outbreak,” “Cluster 2,” and “All Clusters” scenarios there is 
greater variability of distribution allowing for 0 case days. All outbreaks were constrained to a 
maximum of two cases in a single day in accord with the 2001 anthrax attack maximum. 
 
 
Figure 26. Key Parameters for Simulated Outbreaks 
 
Aim 1 showed daily counts of syndromic cases fluctuate throughout the year. In periods 
of less syndromic activity, outbreak detection methods are more likely to identify a significant 
increase. To avoid systematic bias each scenario start date was chosen at random. Figure 27 
shows the number of outbreaks per start date for all 60,000 simulations generated for this aim. 
Figure 27 shows a fall in the number of outbreaks in the last 30 days of the year. This is because 
the 47 day outbreaks (“2001 Outbreak” & “All Clusters”) must start before the 318th day of the 
year to finish by the 365th day. This decreases the volume by 20%. A similar fall off is seen at 
around 354 days for Cluster 2, an 11 day outbreak.  
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Figure 27. Distribution of Start Day for 50,000 Simulated Outbreaks 
 
Two outbreak scenarios, All Clusters and Cluster 2, relied on randomization to distribute 
the excess cases across the outbreak interval. Figure 28 shows the distribution of cases by 
percentage of all simulated cases for two outbreak types by day of outbreak. All simulated 
outbreaks begin with at least one case on Day 1. After the first day, both outbreak scenarios 
show fairly uniform distribution of cases for the remainder of the outbreak period. 
 
 
Figure 28. Distribution of Cases for Two Outbreak Scenarios 
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9.4 AIM 4 
9.4.1 2001 Attack – Accuracy and Timeliness 
 
Figure 29. Baseline with Superimposed Anthrax Cases and Expected Values 
 
The aim of this analysis was to determine the accuracy and timeliness of commonly used 
detection methods for inhalation anthrax outbreaks. Using daily ED data from PUH, the analysis 
provides a good example of how to simulate an anthrax attack using data on hand and how to 
conduct and evaluation a surveillance system when prospective outbreak data is not available. 
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The first step to understanding the accuracy and timeliness was to evaluate the 
performance of the three methods during the 2001 anthrax attack. Figure 29 shows the 11 
anthrax patient admissions (red) from the 2001 attack with the PUH syndromic patient visits 
(green) for the same time period. The daily expected value calculated for each of the three 
detection methods is also shown. Because outbreak detection methods signal depending on the 
difference of the observed value from the expected values, it is important to understand the 
behavior of each method as it relates to the 2001 attack. The z-method uses the 7 days 
immediately preceding the analysis day as the baseline to calculate the expected value, whereas 
C1 and C3 each use a 14 day baseline. The C3 method uses a 2 day buffer thus explaining the 
offset from C1 which does not have a buffer (See callout in Figure 29). Because the Z-score 
method uses the shortest baseline, it incorporates new cases immediately into the baseline, thus 
increasing its expectation. Conversely, C1 and C3 both use longer baselines with less volatility.  
In addition, the C3 method adds a two day buffer to its expected value calculation making it the 
last to incorporate new cases and the least volatile method. 
Figure 30 illustrates the outbreak alarms generated by each detection method.  Each day 
with a signal is denoted with a corresponding marker for the Z, C1, or C3 method.   
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 Figure 30. Anthrax Attack Period with Flags for Significant Increases in Syndromic Cases 
 
At the time of the first anthrax case, October 1st, all three methods were expecting 
extremely low numbers of cases: Z (0.00), C1 (0.07) and C3 (0.07). At the time of Cluster 2, 
October 18th, Z (0.29) and C1 (0.29) had incorporated the two benign syndromic cases from 
October 16th into their baseline whereas C3 remained slightly lower (0.21) resulting in a signal. 
By October 19th, all three methods crossed their signal threshold. Throughout the attack period, 6 
signal days occurred. Figure 31shows the signal values for each method for the same period.  
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Figure 31. Signal Values for Outbreak Period 
 
An alarm occurs when the signal threshold is exceeded. The broken line denotes that for all three 
methods the signal threshold was set at 2. Of the three major anthrax clusters, each of the 
methods detected the first two clusters. However, no method detected the third cluster.  
To better understand the dynamics of the last anthrax case, Cluster 3, Table 30 shows the 
relative strength of signal for each of the outbreak days.  
 
Table 30. Anthrax Attack Period Signals Details 
 
 
In the days preceding Cluster 3, the baseline was affected by the three successive 
syndromic visits from 11/9-11/11. However, on 11/15 a single case was incorporated into the 
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baseline of both Z and C1. Because of the buffer on C3, the case did not influence the C3 
expected value quite as high as Z and C1. Although no method picked up the 11/16 outbreak, C3 
was the closest its signaling threshold with a value of 1.69 and a p value of 0.05. 
9.4.2 Accuracy 
To better understand the quality of each detection method, accuracy was examined across 
five outbreak scenarios. Accuracy is measured by the number of outbreaks detected during the 
outbreak interval out of a possible 10,000 simulated outbreaks. Table 31 shows the accuracy of 
each of the three outbreak detection methods the 5 outbreak scenarios where “Detected” is an 
outbreak detected by any of the three methods.  
 
Table 31. Accuracy of Three Methods on Simulated Outbreaks 
 
 
Overall, the three methods performed best on the larger outbreak scenarios. For the “2001 
Attack” and “All Clusters”, nearly every outbreak was detected by one of the three methods. 
This is in part because of the size of the outbreak and the length of the outbreak which gives the 
method a longer period of time to signal. Conversely, “Cluster 3” which is a single case outbreak 
showed the worst performance. In this scenario, the outbreak is small and must be detected in a 
single day. To examine the three methods individually, there is clearly a superior approach. The 
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Z method outperformed C1 and C3 in every scenario except the 2001 Attack. The poorest 
performance was seen in C1 especially in the single case outbreak.  
9.4.3 Timeliness 
A key indication of the quality of a surveillance system is how quickly outbreaks are 
detected. Section 9.4.2 demonstrated nearly identical accuracy for both the Z-score and C3 
method across a variety of scenarios. However, syndromic surveillance systems require not only 
accurate but timely outbreak detection to be most effective. The section illustrates clear 
differences in the two methods. 
A direct comparison of methods is possible by identifying the first outbreak signal (or 
signals in the case of a tie.) Table 32 presents the number (No.) and percent (%) of outbreaks 
detected first by outbreak scenario for each method. The Z method detected outbreaks first 90% 
of the time which is clearly superior to the performance of C1 (67%) and C3 (70%).  
 
Table 32. Percent of Outbreaks Detected on Day 1 of Outbreak by Method 
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Signaling first is a different quality than signaling on the first day of the outbreak. An 
examination of signal day still shows the performance of the Z method as superior. However, the 
timeliness dips as signals on the first day are highlighted. Figure 32 shows the percentage of 
total outbreaks by signal date for the Cluster 1 type outbreaks for each outbreak detection 
method. Although the Z method demonstrates the timeliest detection, only 35% of the outbreaks 
are detected on the first day. 
 
 
Figure 32. Signal Day for Cluster 1 Outbreak Type 
 
Figure 33 shows the cumulative percent of outbreaks detected by signal day for the 
“2001 Attack”, “Cluster 2” and “All Clusters” outbreak types. As the day of detection increases, 
the cumulative percentage of outbreaks increases. The 2001 Attack signal dates are clearly 
defined by the distribution of the anthrax cases over the outbreak period. Moreover, the Z 
method shows a higher cumulative percentage across all three scenarios. 
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Figure 33. Signal Day for 2001 Attack, All Clusters, and Cluster 2 Outbreak Types
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9.4.4 False alarms 
When a surveillance system sounds an alarm in the absence of an outbreak, it is 
considered a false alarm. To truly understand the usefulness of a surveillance system, the number 
of false alarms throughout the course of a year must be taken into account because statistically 
significant increases do occur by chance. Figure 34 presents the daily number of syndromic 
cases with the alarm flags for the 2001 PUH ED syndromic baseline. From January to August, 
most days with 2 or more cases generated an alarm by at least one method. As the syndromic 
case volume decreased in the later part of 2001, more days with single cases caused false alarms. 
The breakdown of false alarms (No.) is as follows: Z (20), C1 (12), and C3 (22). 
 
 
Figure 34. Signal Flags 
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There were 8 overlapping alarms during 2001 meaning all three methods falsely signaled 
on the same day. It is probably more important to understand the unique false alarm properties of 
the techniques. Figure 35 shows that Z-score method falsely triggered 11 times, 8 of those 
singly. 
 
 
Figure 35. Non-overlapping Signals, All Methods 
 
The C1 method falsely signaled only three times, 1 of those alone. C3 falsely signaled 8 
times, 4 of those unaccompanied. Although a small number of false alarms intuitively minimize 
the amount of unnecessary investigation, it also may signify less sensitive surveillance.  
Table 33 presents the total number of false alarms across all 10,000 simulated outbreaks 
and the ratio of true signals to false alarms for the three outbreak types. Overall, despite 
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producing the least accurate and timely performance, C1 has the highest ratio of true outbreaks to 
false alarms. C1 produced an average of 10 (not shown) per surveillance year whereas Z (17) and 
C3 (15) produced more. 
 
Table 33. Ratio of True Signals to False Alarms for 3 Detection Methods by Simulation Type 
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10.0  DISCUSSION 
This research examined the dynamics of establishing a syndromic surveillance system for 
anthrax in an ED setting.  Anthrax is a significant public health issue because of its high case 
fatality rate and the potential for an outbreak to incite panic in the population.  Traditional 
surveillance for anthrax is not well suited to identify anthrax outbreaks related to bioterrorism.  
This system is too slow in case identification and basing public health prevention efforts on its 
use would result in a large number of unnecessary deaths. Syndromic surveillance systems have 
been proposed as a solution to allow for quick case identification, and more rapid initiation of 
prevention strategies. 
 The goal of the research presented in this document is to examine the feasibility of a 
syndromic surveillance system for anthrax and its potential ability to identify the signs of an 
inhalation anthrax outbreak as early as possible.  Key components investigated include an 
evaluation of the key signs and symptoms that would form a case definition for use in a 
syndromic surveillance system for anthrax, an evaluation of the accuracy of different detection 
methods in syndromic surveillance, and an evaluation of the timeliness of different detection 
methods in syndromic surveillance.  The key findings of this research include the following: 1. A 
case definition based on the fulminate phase of anthrax, as opposed to the prodrome, 
significantly decreases the number of potential case investigations 2. Decision tree based clinical 
algorithms may be applied to the clinical findings of patients to further decrease the number of 
case investigations. 3. Potential anthrax outbreaks may be identified in an accurate and timely 
manner with a minimum number of false alarms using well-known outbreak detection methods. 
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10.1 SYNDROMIC CASE DETECTION 
Aim 1 and Aim 2 focused on identifying patients resembling inhalation anthrax and then 
used clinical characteristics of those patients to further discriminate inhalation anthrax from other 
causes of acute respiratory failure with a widened mediastinum. Aim 1 and Aim 2 are formally 
stated in Section 7.1 and Section 7.2.  
These aims hold public health significance because of the deadly nature of the disease 
and the potential for an anthrax attack to incite panic in the general population. Specifically for 
inhalation anthrax, the goal of this research is to identify the first case of inhalation anthrax in an 
Emergency Department population or identify the first signs of an inhalation anthrax outbreak as 
early as possible. The key findings of the research represent important first steps to reaching 
these goals. 
Aim 1 found that a syndromic surveillance case definition focused on fulminate phase 
anthrax findings like acute respiratory failure (ARF) and widened mediastinum identified about 
1% of the PUH ED population. The billing code for mechanical ventilation (ICD9- 97.1/97.2) 
identified the highest number of ARF cases (10%). This finding is consistent with a multicenter 
Scandinavian study of acute respiratory failure identifying about 9% of ICU admissions. (290)  
The time required to identify the various patients by the inclusion criteria varied 
substantially. The time required to develop and implement the various criteria for Aim 1 varied 
by data type. For facilities interested in using the case definition from his study, the time 
commitment may require consideration. For acute respiratory failure, all ICD criteria were 
straight forward. Either a patient’s visit included the procedure or not. To develop these criteria, 
an attending Infectious Disease physician provided feedback as to what would be appropriate. 
Blood gas criteria are well established for acute respiratory failure and required very little time to 
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choose the exact source of an algorithm. However, the implementation of an arterial blood gas 
algorithm required data processing, programming time, and quality assurance to ensure the 
results were accurate.  
The only way to identify mediastinal widening at the time of this study was to have 
radiologist’s read full text reports. The training of the physicians, retrieval of the records, 
abstraction to a standard form, and tie breaking procedures was time consuming and the most 
expensive portion of the study. In addition the timing of data elements required to fulfill the case 
definition is not weighed. Each element is considered to be happening simultaneously. This is 
especially important in constructing the baseline for Aims 3 and 4, as admission date is used for 
each patient even though a chest x-ray or intubation may have occurred up to 48 hours after 
admission. Similarly the time to transcribe full text radiology reports or ED reports could also 
cause a lag. 
Going forward, a less expensive review process based on structured data elements from 
an electronic health record may reduce the time and financial commitment required to implement 
this approach. Since 2000, when this study was first undertaken, federal initiatives to make 
electronic health record data available for syndromic surveillance are underway and set to be 
implemented in 2013. (291) Although syndromic surveillance for rare conditions is not sufficient 
cause to upgrade to an expensive electronic system, if a system is implemented for other reasons 
it would require few resources to capitalize on its capabilities to identify and manage a panel of 
patients across care settings. 
The findings from Aim 2 differed in several areas from published literature seeking to 
identify inhalation anthrax cases. Myalgias were found to be the most significant clinical 
difference among ED report findings. Only one study, Kheunhert, examined the factor with the 
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difference being significant in ILI but not CAP populations. (155) Fatigue, in the same study, 
had no association with anthrax. Sweats were predictive in both CAP and ILI populations. (156) 
However, in each case, the magnitude of association was muted in the CAP, ILI comparisons as 
compared to the present study. This could be due in part to the choice of populations. In 
comparisons to ILI, CAP, or influenza, an underlying infectious disease process is occurring 
which leads to many similar symptoms to anthrax. However, a combination of widened 
mediastinum and ARF does not necessarily stem from a similar infectious disease process. In 
fact, 68% of patients with ED reports suffered a trauma leading to their admission.  This 
represents a major strength of the present study to remove the underlying ‘noise’ of such similar 
patients from the baseline. It is not clear however that a trauma indicator could be reliably coded 
for syndromic surveillance. Rules based on ICD9 codes (Gun Shot Wound, Motor Vehicle 
Accident), presence of fractures, or intercranial hemorrhage are all possible indicators but 
beyond the scope of this research. As electronic systems develop, with template data entry 
prompting the user for presence of trauma, this indicator could become more readily available. 
Comparison of the radiological findings between the anthrax and syndromic populations 
were consistent to findings from the literature. Even before clinical studies were conducted 
Jernigan highlighted that all 11 cases exhibited pleural effusions on chest radiograph. (6) These 
findings were echoed by Kyriacou, Kuehnert, and Hupert across several populations. (157) The 
present study shows the robustness of this finding given that the population was drawn from 
critically ill patients suffering ARF and a widened mediastinum. 
In total, 134 cases were identified throughout 2001 as meeting the syndromic surveillance 
case definition for inhalation anthrax. To consider the practical implications of this work, it is 
important to understand the time and effort required to investigate these cases. The most obvious, 
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and expensive in terms of time, is for an infection control practitioner (ICP) to investigate every 
case as it happens, approximately 3 case investigations per week.  
However, the CART analysis results provide a potentially more cost effective alternative 
to investigating every case. The CART tree, although limited by a small number of anthrax 
cases, provided a means to score each case as it occurs. Most cases (94% of syndromic cases) 
were scored ‘lowest probability’ (nearly zero). Applying an algorithm approach, which is a 
common practice in Emergency Departments, an ICP would only unnecessarily investigate 8 
cases throughout the year.  
 A similar tree with similar objectives by Kyriacou found pleural effusions, confusion, 
and high hematocrit to be most predictive with a sensitivity of 100% and specificity of 98%. 
(159) In addition both Kuehnert and Hupert offer decision supports to predict anthrax infection 
with high sensitivity and specificity above 90%. These findings show that anthrax infection is 
distinct from most other candidate conditions. However, the underlying baseline chosen by other 
authors would lead to thousands of ‘hits’ per year as opposed to just over 100 by the current 
study. 
Although an algorithmic approach clearly has advantages, there are several limitations to 
consider when implementing it for syndromic surveillance. Data preparation for the present 
study required the review of practicing ED physicians and radiologists reading full text reports. 
However, template data entry is more common today and often codes symptoms such as cough, 
fatigue, and muscle pain into ICD 9 which are easily input to an algorithm. In addition, 
algorithms should be updated regularly as patient mix changes. The expertise to re-run a program 
such as CART may not be present in a smaller health care facilities. 
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The results of Aim 1 and Aim 2 hold promise for the implementation of syndromic 
surveillance in an emergency department population especially for case detection. With such a 
system in place, the time necessary for creating a line list of patients resembling inhalation 
anthrax is substantially decreased. This would speed investigations if the threat of inhalation 
anthrax attack were heightened in the area.  
As ambulatory healthcare settings migrate from the hospital setting to community 
providers, it is an open question whether emergency departments are still the appropriate setting 
to conduct this type of surveillance. Given the critical illness of the patients meeting the case 
definition, emergency departments are probably still most appropriate but in the foreseeable 
future changes to the health care process may necessitate a reexamination of settings for 
syndromic surveillance.  
10.2 SYNDROMIC OUTBREAK DETECTION 
Aim 3 and Aim 4 focused on identifying inhalation anthrax outbreaks using a syndromic 
surveillance approach. Different scenarios were simulated and then outbreak detection methods 
were applied to understand how outbreak size, distribution, length, and start date affect the 
accuracy, timeliness, and rate of false alarms of each technique. Aim3 and Aim 4 are formally 
stated in Section 7.3 and Section 7.4.  
These aims hold public health significance because of the syndromic surveillance has not 
focused on small, severe outbreaks. In particular no syndromic surveillance study has dealt with 
the detection of a small, deadly outbreak such as occurred in 2001, claiming the lives of 6 
American citizens and hospitalizing 5 others. The results of the current study examine the 2001 
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attack in fine detail and answer the question “Would the 2001 attack be detected were it to occur 
at PUH?” The key findings of the research represent important first steps to reaching these goals. 
Aim 3 identified three major disease clusters in the 2001 anthrax attack. In all 5 disease 
scenarios were identified to test the outbreak detection methods. For the two largest scenarios, 
the distribution of cases and start date was randomized. Although these simulations almost 
exhaustively present possible outbreak scenarios for testing, some limitations arise from certain 
design decisions. One limitation was due to the mean (0.37 cases/day) and standard deviation 
(0.61 cases) of the underlying time series. Because the mean was less than one case, it did not 
make sense to allow non-integer number of cases into the simulation. In addition, because the 
2001 anthrax attack did not result in more than two patient admissions in one day, this limit was 
also used for the current study. Two excess cases in a single day represent an increase of 3.2 
standard deviations of typical case volume.  
Studies such as those conducted by Jackson et al. and Zhu et al. used up to five times the 
standard deviation to model case volume. (268,269) This was not justified in the current study 
where testing the actual cases counts was more important the hypothetical case counts. Although 
this simulation approach limits the generalizability of the findings for syndromic surveillance, it 
strengthens the findings for an outbreak specifically resembling the 2001 attack.  
Aim 4 focused on identifying inhalation anthrax using 3 different outbreak detection 
methods in a variety of scenarios drawn from the 2001 anthrax attack. The first scenario 
superimposed the 2001 anthrax attack on to the 2001 PUH baseline identified in Aim 1. All three 
methods detected this outbreak on the first day. The success of each method may have been 
affected by an external factor. The baseline of syndromic cases was at an annual low from 
August 25th through the end of the year. At the time of the attack each method was forecasting 
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zero expected cases. This scarcity of syndromic activity does not appear to coincide with 
September 11th attack as it began two weeks prior. One way to better understand how the day of 
the anthrax attack, October 16th, affected the accuracy of the methods was to vary the start date 
of the attack. The “Cluster 1” simulation randomly chose start dates for the initial case cluster 
from the 2001 attack – 2 cases in 2 days. The outbreak detection performance declined once start 
date was varied from perfect detection across all three methods to 59% detection.  
In terms of timeliness, the 2001 attack was detected on the first day by all three methods. 
When start date was randomized in “Cluster 1” simulations, only 20-30% of outbreaks were 
detected on the first day. 
During this historically low period of syndromic activity, false alarms also increased. 
From September 13th to November 30th, every day with a syndromic case caused a false alarm – 
meaning the outbreak detection method registered a significant increase greater than 0.01 
probability. This is not unexpected with syndromic surveillance. Timely systems tradeoff a 
certain number of false alarms for the assurance outbreaks are detected as quickly as possible. 
Aim 4 uncovered trends in the minimum size of an outbreak able to be detected by the 
three methods. A clear trend is shown by looking at the accuracy of Cluster 3 (43% outbreaks 
detected), Cluster 1 (59% of outbreaks detected) and Cluster 2 (97% of outbreaks detected). This 
may also be affected by the length of the outbreak. The Cluster 3 had only one day to be detected 
within the outbreak interval. In many cases the outbreak occurred before the increase had a 
chance to be registered. Cluster 2, which is up to 11 days long, allows greater time for the 
increase to develop. For instance, the Z method detected 97% of Cluster 2 outbreaks. 
Approximately, 60% of those were detected after the second day.  
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These results are consistent with the findings of Murphy who found 60% detection of 
“Slow-building” outbreaks using the same z-score methodology. However, the present study 
greatly improves on the results in the Jackson study looking at C1 and C3 performance for small 
outbreaks. (See Section 5.5) In the study only 10% of outbreaks under 5 cases were detected by 
the two methods. This can be explained by the mean and standard deviation of the underlying 
baselines chosen for the study. The lowest volume was for pneumonia hospitalizations with a 
mean of 2 cases per day with a SD of 1.6 cases per day with the highest volume represented by a 
general respiratory syndrome with a mean of 60 cases per day and a SD of 16. Because Murphy 
presents his findings in aggregate, it is impossible to tell the C1 and C3 performance on just the 
pneumonia time series. This study affirms C1 and C3 would far exceed only 10% performance 
given a lower volume baseline. 
10.3 LIMITATONS 
The practice of syndromic surveillance relies on the timely identification of outbreaks. 
Given the nature of bioterrorism, events will unfold over hours or minutes. The availability of 
data for the study limited the level of granularity of the analysis. Ideally, the study would provide 
the number of hours or minutes that it took a detection method to identify an outbreak.  The data 
limitation existed for several reasons. The first was for privacy concerns. At the time of the 
study, there existed no practical way to mask the exact time of events without violating HIPPAA 
privacy rules. Events were uniformly masked at the day level but all times below that level were 
obscured. Secondly, the nature of data processing does not always allow for timely analysis. For 
instance, the time between the Emergency Department physicians history and physical and the 
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time to transcription of that report varies greatly. It is possible to report the number of hours or 
minutes between medical procedures or examinations but the results would not necessarily 
reflect the actual time it would take to make the data available for syndromic surveillance. In 
most cases, the results would overestimate the timeliness of the system. 
Aim 1 and Aim 2 rely on the analysis of clinical data. The gold standard for a study of 
this nature would be to examine each of these patients prospectively and record the presence of 
various indicators. The expense and logistics of physicians being employed on the study 
prohibited this approach. Another approach would have been to retrieve all the paper charts for 
the patients included in the study. Resources did not exist to undertake such an extensive chart 
abstraction. The approach of the study relied on the availability of the data in electronic format in 
the MARS system.  
10.4 RECOMMENDATIONS 
This study has brought to light the importance of future research in the field of syndromic 
surveillance as well as implications for public health practice. The ability of newly implemented 
electronic health records (EHR) to provide data for syndromic surveillance requires further 
study. Once it is understood what data is available and the quality of such data, public health 
practitioners can begin the process of putting surveillance protocols in place which rely on a 
greater interchange of electronic health record data between health care providers and public 
health authorities.  This work should occur at both the patient and population level. At a patient 
level, electronic health records can prompt practicing physicians to immediately investigate a 
case of possible anthrax using decision supports. Population level monitoring can occur at 
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several levels and each requires understanding of implications for surveillance whether at a 
single provider, health system, region, state or national level. It is not clear that privacy protocols 
are in place to allow sharing of data across jurisdictions to conduct syndromic surveillance using 
newly available EHRs. Public health practitioners will soon need to undertake policymaking in 
this area. 
From a research perspective, there are several key areas which require future inquiry. 
Clinical data is by necessity unstructured for certain medical records. The more that can be done 
to structure this data, the greater the accuracy of syndromic systems. For instance, the measured 
temperature of a patient should be made available electronically in a standardized format. This 
one piece of data would allow the objective measure of a patient’s temperature as opposed to the 
interpretation required from extracting the word ‘fever’ (or ‘febrile’ or ‘feverish’ etc.) from a 
chief complaint. Across a region, it would be possible to take the temperature of a county or even 
state.   
 158 
    APPENDICES 
Appendix A. Cutaneous Anthrax Cases 
Author Reference Age Sex Year Location Outcome Country 
Symonds 292 38 M 1885 London Death England 
Browne 293 30 F 1894 W. Bromwich Recovered England 
Robinson 294 13 M 1897 London Recovered England 
Robinson 294 37 M 1897 London Recovered England 
Neave 295 50 M 1900  Death England 
Clarke 296 17 M 1900  Recovered England 
Mutschler 297 21 M 1900 PA Recovered US 
Kidd 298 27 M 1900  Recovered England 
Mutschler 297 44 M 1901 PA Recovered US 
Wilson 299 59 M 1907 Lavenham Death England 
Clarke 300 28 M 1908  Recovered England 
Clarke 300 NS M 1908  Recovered England 
Roberts 301 27 M 1908 Inverness Recovered Scotland 
Fallon 302 40 M 1914 NV Death US 
Bennett 303 30 M 1915 Aldershot Recovered England 
Snell 304 34 M 1916 Coventry Death England 
Gilmour 305 NS M 1918  Death Canada 
Gilmour 305 NS M 1918  Death Canada 
Pernet 306 26 M 1920 London Not Specified England 
Anonymous 62 NS M 1924 Copenhagen Death Denmark 
Cowan 32 68 M 1928 ND Death US 
Rankin 307 53 M 1930 Edinburgh Death Scotland 
Cowan 32 NS M 1937 ND Recovered US 
Cowan 32 24 M 1937 ND Recovered US 
Cowan 32 24 M 1938 ND Recovered US 
Cowan 32 NS NS 1938 ND Recovered US 
Cowan 32 35 M 1938 ND Death US 
Steele 35 NS NS 1945 FL Recovered US 
Steele 35 NS NS 1945 AR Recovered US 
Steele 35 NS NS 1945 AR Recovered US 
Steele 35 NS NS 1945 AR Recovered US 
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Appendix A. (Continued)  
Author Reference Age Sex Year Location Outcome Country 
Steele 35 NS NS 1945 CA Recovered US 
Steele 35 NS NS 1945 KY Recovered US 
Steele 35 NS NS 1945 KY Recovered US 
Steele 35 NS NS 1945 FL Recovered US 
Steele 35 NS NS 1945 FL Recovered US 
Steele 35 NS NS 1945 FL Recovered US 
Steele 35 NS NS 1945 CA Recovered US 
Steele 35 NS NS 1945 CA Recovered US 
Steele 35 NS NS 1945 CA Recovered US 
Steele 35 Child NS 1945 FL Recovered US 
Steele 35 NS NS 1946 NJ Recovered US 
Hunt 308 49 M 1953 Kent Recovered England 
Plotkin 149 35 M 1957 NH Recovered US 
Plotkin 149 50 F 1957 NH Recovered US 
Plotkin 149 64 F 1957 NH Recovered US 
Plotkin 149 61 M 1957 NH Recovered US 
CDC 309 42 M 1987 NC Recovered US 
Taylor 310 63 M 1988 TX Recovered US 
Smego 311 38 F 1989 Jeremie Recovered Haiti 
Smego 311 12 M 1989 Jeremie Recovered Haiti 
Smego 311 50 F 1989 Jeremie Recovered Haiti 
Smego 311 7 M 1989 Jeremie Recovered Haiti 
Smego 311 9 F 1989 Jeremie Recovered Haiti 
WHO 312 35 M 1991 South Wales Recovered Australia 
de Lalla 313 63 M 1991 Vincenza Recovered Italy 
de Lalla 313 48 M 1991 Vincenza Recovered Italy 
de Lalla 313 43 M 1991 Vincenza Recovered Italy 
Natori 314 63 M 1994 Miyagi Recovered Japan 
Mallon 315 57 M 1997 London Recovered England 
CDC 316 67 M 2000 ND Recovered US 
Freedman 317 0.58 M 2001 NY Recovered US 
CDC 318 NS M 2002 TX Recovered US 
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Appendix B. Inhalational Anthrax Cases 
Author Ref Case Age Sex Year Location Country 
Bell 319 2 55 M 1876 Bradford England 
Bell 319 1 58 M 1877 Bradford England 
Bell 319 5 NS M 1878 Bradford England 
Bell 319 6 23 M 1878 Bradford England 
Bell 319 7 27 M 1878 Bradford England 
Bell 320 8 39 M 1878 Bradford England 
Bell 320 9 37 M 1878 Bradford England 
Bell 320 10 55 M 1878 Bradford England 
Bell 321 1 43 M 1880 Bradford England 
Bell 322 1 40 M 1880 Bradford England 
Bell 319 3 54 M 1880 Bradford England 
Bell 319 4 37 M 1880 Bradford England 
Bell 321 5 NS M 1880 Bradford England 
Bell 321 6 39 M 1880 Bradford England 
Bell 323 1 72 M 1881 Bradford England 
Wilmot 324 1 41 M 1883 Bradford England 
Tunstall 325 1 42 M 1897 Denholme England 
Brachman 151 2 50 F 1948 PA US 
Brachman 151 1 28 M 1954 PA US 
Plotkin 149 1 60 M 1957 NH US 
Plotkin 149 2 49 M 1957 NH US 
Plotkin 149 3 65 F 1957 NH US 
Plotkin 149 4 46 M 1957 NH US 
Plotkin 149 8 33 M 1957 NH US 
Vessal 153 1 16 F 1975 Shiraz Iran 
Vessal 153 2 34 F 1975 Shiraz Iran 
Severn 326 1 53 M 1976 Northhamptonshire England 
Suffin 152 1 32 M 1976 CA US 
LaForce  1 46 M 1976 NH US 
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Appendix C. Signal Investigations 
 
  
Study Forecast Anamoly Validation
Assess 
seasonality
Result
Besculides Serfling 14 day CUSUM Seasonal influenza
Graphed with 
seasonal illness
Age specific signals during flu season
Hanslik Control chart 19 signalss @ 99.7% CI
Heffernan 14 day baseline SatScan Seasonal influenza
Graphical 
comparison with 
seasonal illness
14 of 22 citywide resp/21 of 22 
citywide fever signals during peak Flu 
A and Flu B season
Meyer
Poisson Regression 
Model
Farrington 
Exceedence Score Investigation
16 signals, 3 sources, none real
Meyer
1-12 months 
Historical Average CUSUM Investigation
79 signals, 4 sources, no real
Mostashari Serfling 99% UCI Seasonal Influenza 24 alarms (21 during flu season)
Mostashari Serfling 95% UCI Seasonal Influenza 45 alarms (21 during flu season)
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Appendix D. Seasonal Correlations 
Study Method Test Forecast Data Source Measures of Accuracy Result
Carrat Regression, Serfling 90% Threshold Seasonal Influenza
Comparison with 
seasonal illness
Cooper Regression, Poisson
GP ILI and Positive 
Influenza Tests
Correlation with GP ILI 
Reporting;
R2 = 0.51
Costaglia Regression, Serfling
2 SD for 2 
weeks Seasonal Influenza
Comparison with 
seasonal illness
Figure 1
Choi Regression, ARIMA P&I deaths P&I deaths Relative error AVG 1.4%; SD 10.9%
Reis Regression, ARIMA Respiratory visits ED CC Mean absolute percentage error 27.54%
Choi Regression, Serfling P&I deaths P&I deaths Relative error AVG 1.9%; SD 13.0% 
Flamand Moving Average, 7da y 2sigma Seasonal Influenza
Correlation with 
seasonal illness
CC 0.92
Lazarus Regression, GLMM p-value Seasonal Influenza
Graphical 
comparison with 
seasonal illness
Spearman 0.89
Lazarus Regression, GLMM p-value Seasonal Influenza
Graphical 
comparison with 
seasonal illness
Lewis Regression, ARIMA 95% UCI Seasonal Influenza
Correlation with 
seasonal illness
Spearman 0.704
Miller
Regression, PROC 
AUTOREG CUSUM Simulation
Correlation with 
seasonal illness;
Pearson  same week 0.41 
previous week 0.41 ;
0.41
Mostashari Regression, Serfling Seasonal Influenza Correlation with seasonal illness R squared 76%; 121 alarms
Tsui Regression, Serfling 95% UCI Seasonal Influenza
Discuss seasonal 
illness
Vergu Regression ILI incidence OTC sales Correlation coefficient 0.94
Viboud Regression ILI incidence GP reports Correlation coefficient 0.9
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Appendix E. Case Series of Cutaneous Anthrax 
Cutaneous Anthrax Cases 
1987, North Carolina - Small, red, pruritic, papular lesion on right forearm. Over the 
next week, the lesion became vesiculated and then developed a depressed black eschar 
with surrounding edema. Patient was hospitalized with worsening edema, pain, fever, and 
chills. Recovered. (309) 
1988, Texas - First noticed a purplish, pruritic papule on the exterior surface of the left 
forearm distally. Illness characterized by left arm pain and edema. Necrotic lesion on left 
forearm with cellulitis and lymphadenopathy by the time patient came for outpatient care 
complaining of "spider bite". Physical exam revealed no acute distress. A 3 cm necrotic 
eschar was present on the exterior surface of the distal aspect of the left forearm, 
surrounded by a border of non-pitting gelatinous edema. Recovered. (310) 
2000, North Dakota - Four days after disposing of five cows that had died of anthrax 
patient noticed a small bump on his left cheek at the angle of his jaw. On August 25, the 
lesion had enlarged and he sought medical attention. Patient denied fever, malaise, 
headache, pruritus, or difficulty swallowing. On examination, the lesion was indurated to 
approximately the size of a quarter and was surrounded by a purple colored ring. The 
patient was afebrile and did not appear ill. The physician reported a firm, nontender, 
superficial nodule with an overlying 0.5 cm black eschar. Recovered. (316) 
2001, New York - Infant admitted to hospital. On admission, the infant was alert, 
afebrile, and in no apparent distress. Two days prior to admission he was noted to have a 
painless red macule on the proximal medial aspect of the left upper extremity with 
associated swelling. During the next 24 hours, the arm became increasingly edematous, 
the macule evolved to a papule, and a slight serous drainage began. On hospital day 2, the 
left arm showed massive, nonpitting, nontender edema with a dark red macule 
approximately 2 to 3 cm in diameter. There was copious, yellow serous drainage from the 
wound and paler erythema extending across the anterior thorax to the sternum. Later that 
day, the patient became febrile (39.2°C) and developed significant thrombocytopenia. 
Recovered. (317) 
2002, Texas - A laboratory worker noticed a small bump on his right jaw while shaving, 
which bled briefly and then became itchy and irritated. During the next 2--3 days, the 
worker's facial wound increased in size and developed a scab. He also reported right 
cervical adenopathy, a low-grade fever, and swelling and erythema on his right cheek and 
neck. Recovered. (318) 
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Appendix F. Case Series of Gastrointestinal Anthrax  
Gastrointestinal Anthrax Cases 
1970, Iran - Patient developed chills and fever one week before admission. Fever 
subsided two days after admission. Abdomen size and discomfort increased. Admitted 
with restlessness, dehydration, confusion, and in acute distress. Abdomen markedly 
distended by ascites. Progressed to hypotension and shock. Fatal. (327) 
1995, Iran - 2 year old girl admitted with history of fever, nausea, vomiting, and loose 
stools followed by restlessness, blood tinged vomit, and abdominal distention. Soon after 
developed shock. Dehydration, restless, confusion, and acute distress followed. She had 
mild cyanosis  with cold extremities. Her condition steadily deteriorated.  Fatal. (328) 
1997, Turkey - 40 year old woman developed chills and fevers three days before hospital 
admission. She was restless, confused, dehydrated, and afebrile. Her abdomen was 
distended and tense. She complained of constant generalized abdominal pain with 
rebound tenderness. which was more severe in the lower right quadrant. Next day, 
patient's bowel sounds disappeared and her abdomen became more distended and tender. 
Rectal exam revealed small amount of blood. Recovered. (329) 
 
 
Appendix G. Case Series of Anthrax with Meningitis Complications
Meningitis 
1989, Iran - 2 year old girl admitted in poor general condition. She had high fever, right 
focal seizures, and bilateral soft tissue swelling of 2.5 to 3.0 cm diameter on the parietal 
area of the skull. Neurologic exam revealed ptosis, with pupillary dilation of the right 
eye. The patient died within 3 hours. Fatal. (330) 
1997, Turkey - 64 year old man admitted to a hospital with high fever, shortness of 
breath, and unconsciousness. Complained three days earlier of malaise, headache, and 
abdominal pain. Patient was comatose and pupils were dilated. Neurologic examination 
revealed indefinite meningeal signs without neck rigidity. Corneal and deep tendon 
reflexes were negative and the patient did not respond to painful stimuli.   The right  
retroauricular region and neck were slightly swollen and hyperemic. The patient died 
after 20 hours. Fatal. (331) 
1997, Hong Kong - 13 year old boy admitted with 4 day history of vomiting and 
diarrhea. Complained of slowly progressive headache and right lower quadrant 
abdominal pain. Patient remained febrile and became confused 5 hours after admission. 
Condition deteriorated rapidly and he became comatose and developed shock. Fatal.  
(332) 
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Appendix H. IRB Approval 
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Appendix I. Form 1 Instructions 
 
  
STUDY: Characterization of Patients with Features Consistent with Inhalation Anthrax in an Emergency Department Population
FORM 1 INSTRUCTIONS - RADIOLOGY REPORT REVIEW
PURPOSE
These instructions describe the use of Form 1 to identify patients with findings consistent with inhalation anthrax 
from full-text radiology reports. The two radiologic findings of interest for Form 1 are mediastinal widening or hilar, 
paratracheal, peribronchial, or mediastinal lymphadenopathy. 
REVIEW PROCEDURE
Each radiology report is printed separately. Reports with more than one page are stapled. Complete the form 
at the bottom of the last page. If an error occurs in marking the form, please cross out and initial the error. Review 
of each report requires the completion of two questions. 
Question A ascertains the presence of a widened mediastinum. If a report positively identifies the patient as 
having a widened mediastinum, choose YES. If the report indicates the patient does not have a widened 
mediastinum or indicates the mediastinum is normal, choose NO. A report which does not mention the 
mediastinum should be marked NOT SPECIFIED. If a report does not contain enough evidence to choose YES, 
but NO or NOT SPECIFIED does not accurately identify the record, choose UNCERTAIN. One example of this 
circumstance is a report which refers to a prior report or to an image. All reports are to be considered 
independently of outside evidence. Another example is a report containing phrases or terms relating uncertainty 
such as 'may be', 'may represent', 'suggesting', or 'possibly'. Without additional evidence in the report, further 
review is required to ascertain whether the patient had mediastinal widening. Also, some reports will attribute the 
finding of interest to technique or positioning. These reports would need further review. The HISTORY may specify 
the patient had the finding of interest in the past. This requires further review because it is based on history not the 
current radiograph. 
Question B establishes the presence of lymphadenopathy. If the report positively identifies the patient as 
having lymphadenopathy, choose YES. Any YES report requires further characterization. Four types of 
lymphadenopathy are specifically addressed: hilar, paratracheal, peribroncheal, or mediastinal. Choose the 
appropriate box if any of these is present. Lymphadenopathy of any other location is indicated by choosing the 
OTHER LOCATION box. If no mention of the location is made, choose NOT SPECIFIED. If a report indicates a 
patient does not have lymphadenopathy or that the lymph nodes are normal, choose NO. A report which does not 
mention lymphadenopathy should be marked as NOT SPECIFIED. Reports with insufficient evidence should be 
marked as UNCERTAIN.
A NOTES section has been included for any reviewer comments on the report; whether to themselves or to 
the study investigators. The NOTES section is optional and not required for completion of the review of the report. 
A patient may have multiple reports. If question A or B is YES at any time in any of the reports, the form 
should be marked as YES. 
ATTESTATION
Once questions A and B have been marked, initial and date the form attesting to your completed review of the 
report.
CONFIDENTIALITY
Although the reports have been stripped of patient identifiers, they should be stored in a secure and private 
location throughout the review process; conforming to the requirements of HIPAA.
RETURN OF REPORTS
All reports, whether completed or not, will be returned to the study investigators. A predetermined time period 
allowed for the review of the reports will be agreed upon between reviewers and investigators. This will be 
communicated in the initial reviewer meeting. 
TITLE: FORM 1 INSTRUCTIONS - RADIOLOGY REPORT REVIEW FILENAME: FORM_01_INSTRUCTIONS_030924.vsd
Nicholas SoulakisCOMPANY: CREATOR:UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH
10/1/2005 , 2:23:27 PMLast Edit Date:
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Appendix J. Form 1– Radiologic Findings 
  
B. Lymphadenopathy? Yes No Not specified
Reviewer Initials: Date:
Uncertain
Note:
Location:
Hilar Mediastinal
Peribronchial
Paratracheal
Other Location Not Specified
A. Widened Mediastinum? Yes No Not specified Uncertain
S_O_H
Counters Account Number Principal Date Record Type
204,2m5e2quzyaQS  NICK-6741 Mar 28 2001 RAD
E_O_H
[Record de-identified by: De-ID ver.5.10]
PORTABLE CHEST: 3-28-01 0555 HRS.
The heart is normal.  Trachea is at the midline.  Partial
obscuration of the right hilum by the tortuous thoracic aorta.
There is minimal fluid within the right minor fissure.
There is borderline interstitial edema with no midline shift.
Left chest tube at the apex.  Subcutaneous emphysema over the neck
and over the left chest wall.
IMPRESSION:
1.   CARDIAC SIZE IS NORMAL.  MINIMAL FLUID WITHIN THE RIGHT MINOR
     FISSURE. BORDERLINE INTERSTITIAL EDEMA WITH NO PNEUMOTHORAX.
2.   LEFT CHEST TUBE LATERAL TO THE LEFT APEX.
M28
My signature below is attestation that I have interpreted
this/these examination(s) and agree with the findings as noted
above.
END OF IMPRESSION:
E_O_R
RECNO:  6741TITLE: FORM 1 - RADIOLOGY REPORT REVIEW
rev:6/12/2006 1:39:04 PM
FILENAME: FORM_01_030811A.vsd
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Appendix K. Form 1 Tie-break Form 
  
B. Lymphadenopathy? Yes No Not specified
Reviewer 2 Initials: Date:
Uncertain
Note:
Location: Hilar Mediastinal
Peribronchial
Paratracheal
Other Location Not Specified
A. Widened Mediastinum? Yes No Not specified Uncertain
S_O_H
Counters Account Number Principal Date Record Type
204,2m5e2quzyaQS  NICK-6741 Mar 28 2001 RAD
E_O_H
[Record de-identified by: De-ID ver.5.10]
PORTABLE CHEST: 3-28-01 0555 HRS.
The heart is normal.  Trachea is at the midline.  Partial
obscuration of the right hilum by the tortuous thoracic aorta.
There is minimal fluid within the right minor fissure.
There is borderline interstitial edema with no midline shift.
Left chest tube at the apex.  Subcutaneous emphysema over the neck
and over the left chest wall.
IMPRESSION:
1.   CARDIAC SIZE IS NORMAL.  MINIMAL FLUID WITHIN THE RIGHT MINOR
     FISSURE. BORDERLINE INTERSTITIAL EDEMA WITH NO PNEUMOTHORAX.
2.   LEFT CHEST TUBE LATERAL TO THE LEFT APEX.
M28
My signature below is attestation that I have interpreted
this/these examination(s) and agree with the findings as noted
above.
END OF IMPRESSION:
E_O_R
FILENAME: FORM_01_TIE_060612.vsd RECNO:      6741TITLE: FORM 1 - RADIOLOGY REPORT REVIEW FORM
rev:6/12/2006 1:48:32 PM
Reviewer 1 Initials: Date:
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Appendix L. Form 2 Instructions 
 
  
PURPOSE
These instructions describe the use of Form 2 to review full-text patient Emergency Department [ED] reports. 
REVIEW PROCEDURE
Each ED report is printed separately. Reports with more than one page will be stapled. Complete the form on the last 
page. If an error occurs in marking the form, please cross out and initial the error. Review of each report requires the 
completion of CHIEF COMPLAINT and two checklists - MEDICAL HISTORY and SIGNS AND SYMPTOMS. Every item 
must be marked. If CHIEF COMPLAINT cannot be completed, mark 'NA'. Where applicable, please print legibly. Include 
a clear description of any shorthand used for the review on the ABBREVIATIONS sheet. 
MEDICAL HISTORY
If a report positively identifies the patient as having any of the comorbid conditions in the medical history listing, choose 
YES [Y] for that item.  SUPPLEMENT TO FORM 2 defines 'comorbid condition' and provides a more detailed listing of 
the comorbities contained in each category. 
If the report indicates the patient does not have an item in the medical history listing or does not have a significant 
medical history [i.e. previously healthy], choose NO [N] for that item. If a report does not contain enough evidence to 
choose YES for an item, but NO does not accurately identify the report, choose UNCERTAIN [U]. One example of this 
circumstance is a report which refers to a prior report or to an image. All reports are to be considered independently of 
outside evidence. Another example is a report containing phrases or terms relating uncertainty such as 'may be', 'may 
represent', 'suggesting', or 'possibly'. Without additional evidence in the report, further review is required to ascertain 
whether the patient has had the item. 
The lack of mention of a specific comorbid condition in these reports cannot be interpreted as the absence of that finding 
from the patient’s medical history.  Each item that is not mentioned in the report should be marked as NOT SPECIFIED 
[NS]. Any disease not included in the 17 categories but is likely to be a significant factor influencing mortality or resource 
use in the hospital should be added to a patient's list of 'OTHER' comorbid conditions.
SIGNS AND SYMPTOMS
If a report positively identifies the patient as having any of the signs or symptoms in the physical examination listing, 
choose YES [Y] for that item.  
If the report indicates the patient does not have an item in the physical exam listing, choose NO [N] for that item. If a 
report does not contain enough evidence to choose YES for an item, but NO does not accurately identify the report, 
choose UNCERTAIN [U]. Reports with uncertainty or insufficient evidence should be marked as UNCERTAIN. Each item 
that is not mentioned in the report should be marked as NOT SPECIFIED [NS].
NOTES 
This section has been included for any reviewer comments on the report; whether to themselves or to the study 
investigators. The NOTES section is optional and not required for completion of the review of the report. 
ATTESTATION
Once MEDICAL HISTORY and SIGNS AND SYMPTOMS have been marked, initial and date the form attesting to your 
completed review of the report.
CONFIDENTIALITY
Although the reports have been stripped of patient identifiers, they should be stored in a secure and private location 
throughout the review process; conforming to the requirements of HIPAA.
RETURN OF REPORTS
All reports, whether completed or not, will be returned to the study investigators. A predetermined time period allowed for 
the review of the reports will be agreed upon between reviewers and investigators. This will be communicated in the 
initial reviewer meeting.  
TITLE: FORM 2  Instructions - Medical History & Physical Exam Review FILENAME: FORM_02_INSTRUCTIONS_030923A.vsd
STUDY: "Characterization of Patients with Features Consistent with Inhalation Anthrax in an Emergency Department Population"
3:27:21 PM 1DATE: TIME: PG: OF PGS111/21/2003
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Appendix M. Form 2 Supplement for Medical History Definitions 
 
  
Comorbidity: A clinical condition that exists before a patient's admission to the hospital and is likely to be a significant factor 
influencing mortality and resource use in the hospital [Elixhauser 1998].
The comorbid conditions below are explicitly defined in:
Charlson et al. "A New Method for Classifying Prognostic Comorbidity in Longitudinal Studies: Development & Evaluation." J 
Chron Dis Vol 40. No. 5, pp 373-383. 1987.
Deyo et al. "Adapting a Clinical Comorbidity Index for Use with ICD-9-CM Administrative Databases." J Clin Epidemiol Vol 
45. No. 9, pp 613-619. 1992.
Romano et al. "Adapting a Clinical Comorbidity Index for Use with ICD-9-CM Administrative Data: Differing Perspectives." J 
Clin Epidemiol Vol 46. No. 10, pp 1075-1079. 1993.
Myocardial Infarction 
Acute myocardial infarction
Old myocardial infarction
Congestive heart failure 
Hypertensive heart disease
Cardiomyopathy
Heart failure
Ill-defined descriptions & complications of heart disease
Peripheral vascular disease  
Atherosclerosis
Aortic aneurysm & dissection
Other aneurysm
Other peripheral vascular disease
Other disorders of arteries & arterioles
Symptoms involving cardiovascular system
Cereberovascular disease 
Other retinal disorders
Subarachnoid hemorrhage
Intracerebral hemorrhage
Other & unspecified intracranial hemorrhage
Occlusion & stenosis of precerebral arteries
Occlusion of cerebral arteries
Transient cerebral ischemia
Acute, but ill-defined, cerebrovascular disease
Other cerebrovascular disease
Late effects of cerebrovascular disease
Symptoms involving nervous & musculoskeletal systems
Symptoms involving head & neck
Complications affecting specified body systems, not elsewhere classified
Dementia 
Senile & presenile organic psychotic conditions
Other cerebral degenerations
Chronic pulmonary disease  [continued on next page] 
Acute pulmonary heart disease
Chronic pulmonary heart disease
Bronchitis, not specified as acute or chronic
Chronic bronchitis
Emphysema
Asthma
TITLE: SUPPLEMENT TO FORM 2 FILENAME: SUPPLEMENT02_030923.vsd
3:18:31 PM 1DATE: TIME: PG: OF PGS311/21/2003
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Appendix N. Form 2 Supplement for Medical History Definitions 
 
  
Chronic pulmonary disease cont...
Bronchiectasis
Extrinsic allergic alveolitis
Chronic airway obstruction, not elsewhere classified
Coal workers' pneumoconiosis
Asbestosis
Pneumoconiosis due to other silica or silicates
Pneumoconiosis due to other inorganic dust
Pneumonopathy due to inhalation of other dust
Pneumoconiosis, unspecified
Respiratory conditions due to chemical fumes & vapors
Rheumatologic disease 
Diffuse diseases of connective tissue
Rheumatoid arthritis & other inflammatory polyarthropathies
Polymyalgia rheumatica
Peptic Ulcer disease 
Gastric ulcer
Duodenal ulcer
Peptic ulcer, site unspecified
Gastrojejunal ulcer
Mild liver disease 
Chronic liver disease & cirrhosis
Diabetes mellitus
Hemiplagia or paraplegia 
Hemiplegia & hemiparesis
Other paralytic syndromes
Renal Disease 
Chronic glomerulonephritis
Nephritis & nephropathy, not specified as acute or chronic
Chronic renal failure
Renal failure, unspecified
Disorders resulting from impaired renal function
Any malignancy [See Page 3]
Moderate or severe liver disease 
Liver abscess & sequelae of chronic liver disease
Other disorders of liver
Cholelithiasis
Other disorders of gallbladder
Other disorders of biliary tract
Diseases of pancreas
Gastrointestinal hemorrhage
Intestinal malabsorption
Acute glomerulonephritis
Nephrotic syndrome
Metastatic solid tumor 
Secondary & unspecified malignant neoplasm of lymph nodes
Secondary malignant neoplasm of respiratory & digestive systems
Secondary malignant neoplasm of other specified sites
Malignant neoplasm without specification of site
AIDS 
Human immunodeficiency virus [HIV] disease
3:18:31 PM 1DATE: TIME: PG: OF PGS311/21/2003
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Appendix O. Form 2 Supplement for Medical History Definitions 
 
Any malignancy 
Malignant neoplasm of lip
Malignant neoplasm of tongue
Malignant neoplasm of major salivary gl&s
Malignant neoplasm of gum
Malignant neoplasm of floor of mouth
Malignant neoplasm of other & unspecified parts of mouth
Malignant neoplasm of oropharynx
Malignant neoplasm of nasopharynx
Malignant neoplasm of hypopharynx
Malignant neoplasm of other sites within the lip, oral cavity, & pharynx
Malignant neoplasm of esophagus
Malignant neoplasm of stomach
Malignant neoplasm of small intestine, including duodenum
Malignant neoplasm of colon
Malignant neoplasm of rectum, rectosigmoid junction, & anus
Malignant neoplasm of liver & intrahepatic bile ducts
Malignant neoplasm of gallbladder & extrahepatic bile ducts
Malignant neoplasm of pancreas
Malignant neoplasm of retroperitoneum & peritoneum
Malignant neoplasm of other sites within the digestive organs & peritoneum
Malignant neoplasm of nasal cavities, middle ear, & accessory sinuses
Malignant neoplasm of larynx
Malignant neoplasm of trachea, bronchus, & lung
Malignant neoplasm of pleura
Malignant neoplasm of thymus, heart, & mediastinum
Malignant neoplasm of other sites within the respiratory system & intrathoracic organs
Malignant neoplasm of bone & articular cartilage
Malignant neoplasm of connective & other soft tissue
Malignant melanoma of skin
Malignant neoplasm of female breast
Malignant neoplasm of male breast
Kaposi's sarcoma
Malignant neoplasm of uterus, part unspecified
Malignant neoplasm of cervix uteri
Malignant neoplasm of placenta
Malignant neoplasm of body of uterus
Malignant neoplasm of ovary & other uterine adnexa
Malignant neoplasm of other & unspecified female genital organs
Malignant neoplasm of prostate
Malignant neoplasm of testis
Malignant neoplasm of penis & other male genital organs
Malignant neoplasm of bladder
Malignant neoplasm of kidney & other & unspecified urinary organs
Malignant neoplasm of eye
Malignant neoplasm of brain
Malignant neoplasm of other & unspecified parts of nervous system
Malignant neoplasm of thyroid gl&
Malignant neoplasm of other endocrine gl&s & related structures
Malignant neoplasm of other sites
Lymphosarcoma & reticulosarcoma
Hodgkin's disease
Other malignant neoplasms of lymphoid & histiocytic tissue
Multiple myeloma & immunoproliferative neoplasms
Lymphoid leukemia
Myeloid leukemia
Monocytic leukemia
Other specified leukemia
Leukemia of unspecified cell type
3:18:31 PM 1DATE: TIME: PG: OF PGS311/21/2003
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Appendix P. Form 2 – Medical History and Physical Findings 
 
  
S_O_H
Counters Account Number Principal Date Record Type
2,xT4U3Fc/yK+T  NICK-4404 May 24 2001 ER
E_O_H
[Record de-identified by: De-ID ver.5.08]
HISTORY OF PRESENT ILLNESS:
The patient is an 80-year-old white male who presents to the emergency
department with complaints of not feeling well and being too sick to stay at
home.  The patient was seen in the emergency department yesterday at which
time he had complaints of nausea, weakness, and fatigue.  The patient was
thought to have had too much of a dose of OxyContin which he had started
recently for back pain.  The symptoms that he exhibited yesterday were
attributed to this and he was discharged ambulatory to home with instructions
to take half of the dose prescribed rather than two times the dose prescribed,
and to follow up with his primary care physician.  He presents today because
he is not feeling well.  His main complaints are sore throat, difficulty
swallowing, and constipation.  The patient states that he has not felt well,
has been increasingly weak, and feels that he is unsafe to stay at home.
REVIEW OF SYSTEMS:
GENERAL:  Generally, the patient's health has been decreased over the past 24
hours.  He feels weak and feels that he needs to hold onto the furniture to
get around the house.  He does not ambulate with an assistive device.  The
patient states that he has not taken his temperature, but feels warm.  
HEENT:  Eyes:  The patient wears corrective lenses.  He denies any blurred
vision or double vision.  Ears:  No change in hearing, no discharge, and no
pain.  Nose:  The patient has had nasal congestion.  He denies any epistaxis. 
Mouth:  The patient has had a sore throat.  He states it is painful to
swallow, and therefore, he has limited his oral intake of food and fluids. 
NECK:  No neck pain or immobility.
RESPIRATORY:  The patient has a history of left lung cancer.  He denies any
productive cough.  The patient has had a dry cough and a feeling of shortness
of breath.
CARDIAC:  The patient denies any chest pain, orthopnea, or ankle edema.  He
is status post insertion of a pacemaker.  The patient also has a history of
coronary artery disease and has had placement of four stents.  He denies any
current chest pain. 
GI:  The patient complains of slight nausea.  He has had no vomiting.  He
denies any diarrhea.  The patient's last bowel movement was yesterday.  The
patient feels that his constipation has been aggravated by the opiate used for
his back pain.  He denies any hematochezia or melena.
GU:  The patient is status post radical prostatectomy.  He denies any dysuria
or hematuria.  He has nocturia two to three times per night.  The patient has
occasional incontinence.  He is status post radiation therapy and chemotherapy
also for his prostate cancer.  
ENDOCRINE:  The patient denies any diabetes or thyroid disease.
HEME/LYMPH:  No abnormal bleeding or bruising.
NEUROLOGIC:  No headache, lightheadedness, or seizure.  The patient has
Parkinson's disease.
PSYCHIATRIC:  The patient denies any history of depression.  
All others negative.
PAST MEDICAL HISTORY:
1. Osteoporosis.
2. Coronary artery disease with stenting. 
3. Pacemaker.
4. Left lung cancer.
5. Gait disturbance.
6. CVA.
TITLE: FORM 2 - Emergency Department Report Review
RECORD NUMBER:  4404
Note:
Initials: Date:
SIGNS AND SYMPTOMS
 
 
FeverY    N  U   NS
Y    N  U   NS Sweats
FatigueY    N  U   NS
CoughY    N  U   NS
DementiaY    N  U   NS
DyspneaY    N  U   NS
Nausea or VomitingY    N  U   NS
Chest Discomfort or PainY    N  U   NS
MyalgiasY    N  U   NS
HeadacheY    N  U   NS
ConfusionY    N  U   NS
Abdominal PainY    N  U   NS
Sore ThroatY    N  U   NS
RhinorrheaY    N  U   NS
CHIEF COMPLAINT6/12/2006 2:08:34 PMLast Edit:
Other 4_________________________
Other 3_________________________
Other 2_________________________
Other 1_________________________
Y    N  U   NS
Myocardial infarction 
Congestive heart failure 
Peripheral vasc. disease 
Dementia
Rheumatologic disease 
Peptic ulcer disease
Diabetes mellitus 
Chronic pulm. disease
Mild liver disease 
Renal disease 
Any malignancy
Metastatic solid tumor 
Mod. or sev. liver disease
AIDS 
Y    N  U   NS
Y    N  U   NS
Y    N  U   NS
Y    N  U   NS
Y    N  U   NS
Y    N  U   NS
Y    N  U   NS
Y    N  U   NS
Y    N  U   NS
Y    N  U   NS
Y    N  U   NS
Y    N  U   NS
Y    N  U   NS
Y    N  U   NS
Y    N  U   NS
PAST MEDICAL HISTORY
Cerebrovascular disease 
Hemiplegia or paraplegia 
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Appendix Q. Form 2 Tie-break 
 
  
S_O_H
Counters Account Number Principal Date Record Type
2,xT4U3Fc/yK+T  NICK-4404 May 24 2001 ER
E_O_H
[Record de-identified by: De-ID ver.5.08]
HISTORY OF PRESENT ILLNESS:
The patient is an 80-year-old white male who presents to the emergency
department with complaints of not feeling well and being too sick to stay at
home.  The patient was seen in the emergency department yesterday at which
time he had complaints of nausea, weakness, and fatigue.  The patient was
thought to have had too much of a dose of OxyContin which he had started
recently for back pain.  The symptoms that he exhibited yesterday were
attributed to this and he was discharged ambulatory to home with instructions
to take half of the dose prescribed rather than two times the dose prescribed,
and to follow up with his primary care physician.  He presents today because
he is not feeling well.  His main complaints are sore throat, difficulty
swallowing, and constipation.  The patient states that he has not felt well,
has been increasingly weak, and feels that he is unsafe to stay at home.
REVIEW OF SYSTEMS:
GENERAL:  Generally, the patient's health has been decreased over the past 24
hours.  He feels weak and feels that he needs to hold onto the furniture to
get around the house.  He does not ambulate with an assistive device.  The
patient states that he has not taken his temperature, but feels warm.  
HEENT:  Eyes:  The patient wears corrective lenses.  He denies any blurred
vision or double vision.  Ears:  No change in hearing, no discharge, and no
pain.  Nose:  The patient has had nasal congestion.  He denies any epistaxis. 
Mouth:  The patient has had a sore throat.  He states it is painful to
swallow, and therefore, he has limited his oral intake of food and fluids. 
NECK:  No neck pain or immobility.
RESPIRATORY:  The patient has a history of left lung cancer.  He denies any
productive cough.  The patient has had a dry cough and a feeling of shortness
of breath.
CARDIAC:  The patient denies any chest pain, orthopnea, or ankle edema.  He
is status post insertion of a pacemaker.  The patient also has a history of
coronary artery disease and has had placement of four stents.  He denies any
current chest pain. 
GI:  The patient complains of slight nausea.  He has had no vomiting.  He
denies any diarrhea.  The patient's last bowel movement was yesterday.  The
patient feels that his constipation has been aggravated by the opiate used for
his back pain.  He denies any hematochezia or melena.
GU:  The patient is status post radical prostatectomy.  He denies any dysuria
or hematuria.  He has nocturia two to three times per night.  The patient has
occasional incontinence.  He is status post radiation therapy and chemotherapy
also for his prostate cancer.  
ENDOCRINE:  The patient denies any diabetes or thyroid disease.
HEME/LYMPH:  No abnormal bleeding or bruising.
NEUROLOGIC:  No headache, lightheadedness, or seizure.  The patient has
Parkinson's disease.
PSYCHIATRIC:  The patient denies any history of depression.  
All others negative.
PAST MEDICAL HISTORY:
1. Osteoporosis.
2. Coronary artery disease with stenting. 
3. Pacemaker.
4. Left lung cancer.
5. Gait disturbance.
6. CVA.
TITLE: FORM 2 - Emergency Department Report Tie Break Form
RECORD NUMBER: 4404
Initials 1: Date:
SIGNS AND SYMPTOMS
 
 
FeverY    N  U   NS
Y    N  U   NS Sweats
FatigueY    N  U   NS
CoughY    N  U   NS
DementiaY    N  U   NS
DyspneaY    N  U   NS
Nausea or VomitingY    N  U   NS
Chest Discomfort or PainY    N  U   NS
MyalgiasY    N  U   NS
HeadacheY    N  U   NS
ConfusionY    N  U   NS
Abdominal PainY    N  U   NS
Sore ThroatY    N  U   NS
RhinorrheaY    N  U   NS
CHIEF COMPLAINT2/18/2004 9:25:18 PMLast Edit:
Other 4_________________________
Other 3_________________________
Other 2_________________________
Other 1_________________________
Y    N  U   NS
Myocardial infarction 
Congestive heart failure 
Peripheral vasc. disease 
Dementia
Rheumatologic disease 
Peptic ulcer disease
Diabetes mellitus 
Chronic pulm. disease
Mild liver disease 
Renal disease 
Any malignancy
Metastatic solid tumor 
Mod. or sev. liver disease
AIDS 
Y    N  U   NS
Y    N  U   NS
Y    N  U   NS
Y    N  U   NS
Y    N  U   NS
Y    N  U   NS
Y    N  U   NS
Y    N  U   NS
Y    N  U   NS
Y    N  U   NS
Y    N  U   NS
Y    N  U   NS
Y    N  U   NS
Y    N  U   NS
Y    N  U   NS
PAST MEDICAL HISTORY
Cerebrovascular disease 
Hemiplegia or paraplegia 
Initials 2: Date:
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Appendix R. Form 3 Instructions  
 
  
STUDY: Characterization of Patients with Features Consistent with Inhalation Anthrax in an Emergency 
Department Population
PURPOSE
These instructions describe the use of Form 3 to identify patients with findings consistent with inhalation 
anthrax from full-text radiology reports. The two radiologic findings of interest for Form 3 are 
consolidation or pleural effusions. These radiologic findings are common among those suffering 
inhalation anthrax. 
REVIEW PROCEDURE
Each radiology report is printed separately. Complete the form at the bottom of the last page. If 
an error occurs in marking the form, please cross out and initial the error. Review of each report requires 
the completion of two questions. 
Question A ascertains the presence of consolidation. Terms such as 'air space disease,' 
'opacity,' 'pneumonia,' or 'infiltrates' could also describe consolidation. If a report positively identifies the 
patient as having consolidation, choose YES. Specify the location of the consolidation for all YES 
reports. LOCATION is indicated by completing the RIGHT and LEFT lung fields.  If only one lung is 
mentioned, choose NOT SPECIFIED for the other. Do not leave it blank. If no mention of the location is 
made in the report, choose location NOT SPECIFIED for both. Further specify the region of the lung by 
choosing UPPER, MIDDLE, or LOWER. If no region is indicated choose NOT SPECIFIED. If the report 
indicates the patient does not have consolidation or indicates the lungs are normal, choose NO. A report 
which does not mention consolidation should be marked NOT SPECIFIED. If a report does not contain 
enough evidence to choose YES, but NO or NOT SPECIFIED does not accurately identify the record, 
choose UNCERTAIN. One example of this is a report containing phrases or terms relating uncertainty 
such as 'may be', 'may represent', 'suggesting', or 'possibly'. Without additional evidence in the report, 
further review may be required to ascertain whether the patient had consolidation. Also, some reports 
will attribute the finding of interest to technique or positioning. These reports would need further review. 
The HISTORY may specify the patient had the finding of interest in the past. This requires further review 
because it is based on history not the current radiograph. 
Question B establishes the presence of pleural effusions. If the report positively identifies the 
patient as having pleural effusions, choose YES. Any YES report requires further characterization. 
Specify the location and size of the pleural effusions for all YES reports. LOCATION is indicated by 
completing the RIGHT and LEFT lung fields.  If only one lung is mentioned, choose NOT SPECIFIED for 
the other. Do not leave it blank. If no mention of the location is made in the report, choose location NOT 
SPECIFIED for both. Specify the size of the effusion by choosing LARGE, MEDIUM, or SMALL. If no 
size is indicated choose NOT SPECIFIED.  If a report indicates a patient does not have pleural effusions 
or that the lungs are normal, choose NO. A report which does not mention pleural effusions should be 
marked as NOT SPECIFIED. Reports with uncertainty or insufficient evidence should be marked as 
UNCERTAIN.
A NOTES section has been included for any reviewer comments on the report; whether to 
themselves or to the study investigators. The NOTES section is optional and not required for completion 
of the review of the report. 
A patient may have multiple reports. If question A or B is YES at any time in any of the reports, 
the form should be marked as YES. 
ATTESTATION
Once questions A and B have been marked, initial and date the form attesting to your completed review 
of the report.
CONFIDENTIALITY
Although the reports have been stripped of patient identifiers, they should be stored in a secure and 
private location throughout the review process; conforming to the requirements of HIPAA.
RETURN OF REPORTS
All reports, whether completed or not, will be returned to the study investigators. A predetermined time 
period allowed for the review of the reports will be agreed upon between reviewers and investigators. 
This will be communicated in the initial reviewer meeting. 
FILENAME: FORM_03_INSTRUCTIONS_031022.vsd
Nicholas D. SoulakisCOMPANY: CREATOR:UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH
TITLE: FORM 3 INSTRUCTIONS - RADIOLOGY REPORT REVIEW
9:10:25 AM 1DATE: TIME: PG: OF PGS19/5/2003
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Appendix S. Form 3 – Consolidation and Pleural Effusions 
 
  
S_O_H
Counters Account Number Principal Date Record Type
45,9kTBnphgu0Td  NICK-8932 Feb 13 2001 RAD
E_O_H
[Record de-identified by: De-ID ver.5.10]
CHEST, PORTABLE AP SEMI-ERECT 2-13-01 1602 HRS
HISTORY:  EVALUATE FOR INFILTRATE.
Previous chest 2-1-01.  There is a large left pleural effusion
which is increased from the previous study of 2-1-01.  There is
patchy consolidation at the right base compatible with pneumonia.
The distribution would raise the possibility of aspiration.  Again
noted is a curvilinear foreign body projected over the lateral
aspect of the left apex.  The left IJ central line tip is in the
SVC.
IMPRESSION:
1.   LARGE LEFT PLEURAL EFFUSION.  THIS IS INCREASED FROM PREVIOUS
     STUDY OF 2-1-01.
2.   PATCHY CONSOLIDATION AT RIGHT BASE SUGGESTING PNEUMONIA.  THE
     DISTRIBUTION WOULD RAISE THE POSSIBILITY OF ASPIRATION.
F13
My signature below is attestation that I have interpreted
this/these examination(s) and agree with the findings as noted
above.
END OF IMPRESSION:
E_O_R
FILENAME: FORM_03_031022.vsd RECNO: 8932TITLE: FORM 3 - RADIOLOGY REPORT REVIEW
Reviewer Initials: Date:
Note:
A. Consolidation?
Yes No Not specified Uncertain
Upper
Lower
Middle
Not Specified
Upper
Lower
Middle
Not Specified
Location
Left
Not Specified
Right
Not Specified
B. Pleural Effusions?
Yes No Not specified
Large
Small
Medium
Not Specified
Large
Small
Medium
Not Specified
Location
Left
Not Specified
Right
Not Specified
Uncertain
rev:6/13/2006 1:05:00 AM
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Appendix T. Form 3 Tie-break 
 
 
 
S_O_H
Counters Account Number Principal Date Record Type
45,9kTBnphgu0Td  NICK-8932 Feb 13 2001 RAD
E_O_H
[Record de-identified by: De-ID ver.5.10]
CHEST, PORTABLE AP SEMI-ERECT 2-13-01 1602 HRS
HISTORY:  EVALUATE FOR INFILTRATE.
Previous chest 2-1-01.  There is a large left pleural effusion
which is increased from the previous study of 2-1-01.  There is
patchy consolidation at the right base compatible with pneumonia.
The distribution would raise the possibility of aspiration.  Again
noted is a curvilinear foreign body projected over the lateral
aspect of the left apex.  The left IJ central line tip is in the
SVC.
IMPRESSION:
1.   LARGE LEFT PLEURAL EFFUSION.  THIS IS INCREASED FROM PREVIOUS
     STUDY OF 2-1-01.
2.   PATCHY CONSOLIDATION AT RIGHT BASE SUGGESTING PNEUMONIA.  THE
     DISTRIBUTION WOULD RAISE THE POSSIBILITY OF ASPIRATION.
F13
My signature below is attestation that I have interpreted
this/these examination(s) and agree with the findings as noted
above.
END OF IMPRESSION:
E_O_R
FILENAME: FORM_03_031022_TIE_BREAKA.vsd RECNO: 8932TITLE: FORM 3 - RADIOLOGY REPORT REVIEW TIE BREAK
Date:
Reviewer 1 Initials:
A. Consolidation?
Yes No Not specified Uncertain
Upper
Lower
Middle
Not Specified
Upper
Lower
Middle
Not Specified
Location
Left
Not Specified
Right
Not Specified
B. Pleural Effusions?
Yes No Not specified
Large
Small
Medium
Not Specified
Large
Small
Medium
Not Specified
Location
Left
Not Specified
Right
Not Specified
Uncertain
Reviewer 2 Initials:
Date:
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Appendix U. Decision Tree Analysis Results 
 
Five trees were produced of varying number of terminal nodes, cost, and complexity. 
CART selects the optimal tree by minimizing cost and complexity. In this case, tree number 1 
with 8 terminal nodes was chosen. 
 
 
 
Tree 
Number
Terminal 
Nodes
Cross-Validated 
Relative Cost Complexity
1** 8 0.17 0.00
2 5 0.25 0.01
3 3 0.28 0.03
4 2 0.82 0.05
5 1 1.00 0.34
** Optimal
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Appendix V. Clinical Laboratory Results for Anthrax Patients From Medical Literature 
AWBC HCT HGB PLT UREAN NA K CREAT TBILI AST ALT ALB CA
IPSNO PUB. DATE /mm3 % g/dL /mm3 mg/dL mmol/L mmol/L mg/dL mg/dL U/L U/L g/dL mg/dL
anthrax0001 BUSH 10/2/2001 9400 46 16.1 109000 20 132 3.9 1.1 1.5 30 4 8.7
anthrax0001 JERN 10/2/2001 9400 45.7 109000 132 WNL WNL 1.5 WNL
anthrax0002 JERN 10/1/2001 9900 47.1 WNL WNL WNL 1.2 WNL 2.3
anthrax0003 JERN 10/19/2001 7500 46.9 WNL WNL WNL WNL 1.9 2.9
anthrax0003 MAYER 10/19/2001 7500
anthrax0004 JERN 10/20/2001 9700 40.9 82000 WNL WNL WNL 1.7 2.9
anthrax0004 MAYER 10/20/2001 9700
anthrax0005 JERN 10/18/2001 10300 43 WNL ND ND ND ND ND
anthrax0005 BORIO 10/21/2001 18800 55.3 141000 22 130 5.3 1.6 0.9 76 77 3.1 8.5
anthrax0005 JERN 10/21/2001 18800 55 141000 130 5.3 1.6 76 77
anthrax0006 BORIO 10/21/2001 13300 51.4 207000 20 139 4.7 1.2 0.4 39 44 3.6 7.9
anthrax0006 JERN 10/21/2001 13300 51.4 WNL WNL WNL WNL WNL WNL
anthrax0006 JERN 10/22/2001 31200 148 2.8
anthrax0006 QUIN 10/22/2001 31.2 62.4 20.8 250 52 148 4.8 2.8 0.2 47 33 2.9 8.5
anthrax0007 JERN 10/24/2001 9700 45 WNL 134 3.4 WNL ND ND
anthrax0007 JERN 10/25/2001 9500 48.1 215000 1.6 3
anthrax0008 JERN 10/19/2001 8100 45.3 WNL 133 WNL WNL WNL WNL
anthrax0009 JERN 10/18/2001 11200 42.5 WNL 133 WNL WNL WNL 3.4
anthrax0010 JERN 10/28/2001 11400 46.3 WNL 134 WNL WNL WNL 3.3
anthrax0010 MINA 10/28/2001 11400 46.3 15.5 135000 18 134 3.5 0.8 0.1* 240 263 3.3 7.6
anthrax0011 BARA 11/16/2001 8100 39 134 1.3 45
BARA
BORIO
BUSH
JERN
MINA
NSC Normal serum chemistry levels reported.
NALR Normal admission laboratory results reported. 
NE Normal electrolytes reported.
WNL  = Within normal limits; ND  = Not done; *  From 10/29/2001
Mina et al. Fatal Inhalational Anthrax with Unknown Source of Exposure in a 61-Year-Old Woman in New York City. JAMA 2002; 287:858-862.
Barakat et al. Fatal Inhalational Anthrax in a 94-year-old Connecticut Woman. JAMA 2002; 287:863-8.
Borio et al. Death Due to Bioterrorism-Related Inhalational Anthrax - Report of 2 Patients. JAMA 2001; 286: 2554-2557.
Bush et al. Brief Report: Index Case of Fatal Inhalational Anthrax Due to Bioterrorism in the United States. NEMJ 2001; 345: 1607-1610.
Jernigan et al. Bioterrorism-Related Inhalational Anthrax: The First 10 Cases Reported in the United States. Emerg Infect Dis 2001; 7:933-44.
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